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INTRODUCTION
This Article is based on the following premises:
1) there has been a "globalization of the legal profession,"
which is demonstrated by the fact that cross-border legal practice
is both increasing, and increasingly important, throughout the
world;'
2) important as it is, the cross-border legal practice that
currently exists barely scratches the surface of that which is to
come;
3) despite the increase in scholarly writing on this topic,
the development of cross-border practice throughout the world
has vastly outpaced the theory of whether and how such practice
should be regulated; 2
1. See MichaelJ. Chapman & PaulJ. Tauber, Liberalizing International Trade in Legal
Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, 16 MICH.J. INT'L L. 941, 947 (1995). For example, exports of U.S. legal services
worldwide rose from a total of US$97 million in 1986 to US$1.453 trillion in 1993. Id.
Likewise, U.S. imports of foreign legal services rose from a total of US$40 million in
1986 to US$326 million in 1993. Id. at 948. See also SYDNEY M. CONE, III, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES: REGULATION OF LAwYERs AND FIRMS IN GLOBAL PRAC-
TICE 1:19 (1996) (explaining basis for these figures); see 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INT'L
LAw DIRECTORY LAIB-LA43B (1996) (listing law firms involved in international affilia-
tions or cooperative arrangements).
2. There are many books addressing cross-border legal practice. See RICHARD L.
ABEL & PHILIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY 1-3 (1988); TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRAC-
TICE 1-2 (Prof. Dennis Campbell ed., 1982); see CONE, supra note 1. See also RIGHTS,
LIABILITY, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (Mary C. Daly & RogerJ. Goe-
bel eds., 1995); CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM (D.M. Donald-Little ed., 1991)
[hereinafter COMPENDIUM]; LAw WITHOUT FRONTIERS (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995); LEGAL
TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK (Alan N. Katz ed., 1986);
LINDA S. SPEDDING, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE EEC AND THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
There are also several articles discussing cross-border legal practice. See Richard L.
Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994) [hereinafter Trans-
national Law Practice]; Julie Barker, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Com-
plete Integration of the Legal Profession: Dismantling the Barriers to Providing Cross-Border Legal
Service, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 95 (1996); Chapman & Tauber, supra note 1; Orlando
Flores, Prospects for Liberalizing the Regulation of Foreign Lawyers Under GATS and NAFTA, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 159 (1996); RogerJ. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community:
Progress Towards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L Lj. 556 (1991-92);
RogerJ. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirements for Law Practice in
a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter
Bridging the Gap]; Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice in a Global
Economy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269 (1994); Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and International Practice:
A Guide to the Professional Responsibilities of Practitioners, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 53 (1992-
1993); Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal System: The Side
Effects of the Free Trade, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401 (1995).
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4) many of the same issues seem to surface whenever cross-
border legal practice is contemplated and thus it is worthwhile
to compare the different approaches to these common issues;
and
5) because the development of the regulation of cross-bor-
der practice used different models, it is a worthwhile exercise to
examine not only the substance but also the procedures used to
develop these regulations in order to better evaluate the possibil-
ity of future competing procedures.
It is against this background that this Article is written. This
Article will focus on the agreement ("Agreement") between the
American Bar Association ("ABA") and the French and Dutch
Orders of the Brussels Bar ("Brussels Bars").' In order to better
understand and develop future cross-border practice, this Article
will discuss both the substance of the Agreement and the proce-
dures used to develop it, putting both in context.
Section I of this Article provides an overview of the different
models used, or approaches to, cross-border practice and places
the Agreement in context. Section II chronicles the legislative
history of the Agreement, noting the process by which it was de-
veloped. Section III contains the analysis of the Agreement,
comparing it to other cross-border practice regulation. Section
IV addresses the implementation of the Agreement. Finally, Sec-
tion V offers a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Agreement and the process by which it was reached.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS THAT HAVE BEEN USED TO
RESPOND TO CROSS-BORDER LEGAL PRACTICE
Several different types of regulations have been used to fa-
cilitate or respond to the situation of lawyers engaged in cross-
border legal practice.4 For purposes of analysis, these types, or
Interestingly, an unusually large amount of the available literature is by practition-
ers rather than academics. Moreover, with the exception of Richard Abel, most of this
scholarship does not attempt to develop a unified approach or theory to cross-border
practice.
3. Agreement, Aug. 6, 1994, American Bar Ass'n-French Language Order of the
Brussels Bar-Dutch Language Order of the Brussels Bar, reprinted in Appendix A [here-
inafter Agreement].
4. In this Article, the term "cross-border legal practice" is used rather loosely to
refer to the general situation in which a lawyer originally licensed in one jurisdiction,
the Home State, provides legal services in another jurisdiction, the Host State. This can
occur when the lawyer physically travels to the Host State, or when the lawyer provides
138519981
1386 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1382
models, of regulation can be organized into two major catego-
ries.5 First, there are the models used where there is no single
entity with the authority to set the conditions under which law-
yers from one state may provide legal services in another state.
Second, there are the models used in those situations in which
there is a single body that has, or purports to have, the authority
to regulate the ability of lawyers from one jurisdiction to practice
in a second jurisdiction.
A. Models Used Where There Is No Single Regulating Authority
Although there are some situations in which there may be a
single entity with the power to set the conditions of cross-border
practice, regulation by a single entity is far from the norm. In
those situations in which there is no single entity, four models
have been used to facilitate, or regulate, the provision of cross-
border legal services. These models include a non-negotiation
model, in which individual states simply establish their own re-
quirements; government to government negotiations; private
sector to private sector negotiations; and a hybrid model, involv-
ing negotiations between private sector representatives and regu-
latory body representatives.
1. The Non-negotiation Approach: Individual State Regulation
One approach, used when there is no single regulatory en-
tity, occurs when one state or country, acting alone, sets forth
the conditions under which lawyers from another state or coun-
try can qualify as lawyers or provide legal services in that State or
country. For example, this is what New York did when it
adopted a rule regulating foreign legal consultants ("FLC") .6 It
may be misleading to call this a model. At some level, every
country does this when it determines what, if any, requirements
services through other means. See, e.g., Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 273-75 (discussing
methods by which cross-border legal practice may be performed). Obviously, jurisdic-
tions that want to regulate this type of cross-border practice must try to define precisely
that which they seek to regulate. As used in this Article, however, the term is not in-
tended to refer particularly to any of these definitions. Cf North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (using term cross-bor-
der legal practice narrowly and precisely) [hereinafter NAFTA].
5. These "models" represent my own articulation of how cross-border practice has
been regulated. In setting forth these "models," I have drawn upon the work of many
people, including those cited earlier. See supra, note 2.6. See New York Rules of Court, Rules of the Court of Appeals, Pt. 521.
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it will impose on the practice of law; whether and how lawyers
from other countries can satisfy these requirements; and
whether it recognizes a different type of professional license for
foreign lawyers, often called an FLC license. Several books and
articles now exist documenting various countries' handling of
these issues.
7
2. Government to Government Negotiations
A second model that occurs when there is no single regula-
tory body involves government to government negotiations
about the conditions that will apply in each country to regulate
the practice of law. This is a model that the United States has
used with Japan. The U.S. trade representative treated Japan's
limitations on U.S. and other foreign lawyers as trade issues and
negotiated these limitations with the Japanese Government in
the context of broad ongoing trade talks.'
3. Private Sector to Private Sector Negotiations
A third model often used occurs where private sector repre-
sentatives, acting alone or under the umbrella of some voluntary
association, negotiate or attempt to negotiate standards for facili-
tating cross-border legal practice, which they in turn hope will
be adopted by the appropriate regulatory bodies. The ongoing
efforts of the International Bar Association ("IBA") to develop
guidelines for regulating Foreign Legal Consultants is an exam-
ple of such an effort.9 The ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of
7. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 2; LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 2. One of
the biggest variations in this approach is whether the regulation depends on reciproc-
ity. Some Host States condition the admission of a foreign lawyer on the foreign law-
yer's Home State similarly permitting Host State lawyers to practice in the foreign law-
yer's Home State. See CONE, supra note 1, at 2:28-31 (discussing reciprocity require-
ments in light of the General Agreement on Trade and Services ("GATS")).
8. See United States International Trade Commission, USITC Publication 2594
(SV-3) 51 (Feb. 1993), available in 1993 ITC LEXIS 126, at 23. See generally CONE, supra
note 1, at 1:14-15, 2:8-12 (describing general circumstances in which government to
government negotiations are likely to occur and specifically Japanese-U.S. negotia-
tions).
9. The General Professional Program Committee of the International Bar Associa-
tion has been involved in a multi-year effort to develop model standards concerning
Foreign Legal Consultants. The International Bar Association ("IBA") committee origi-
nally drafted guidelines that contained very specific provisions. See PROPOSED GUIDE-
LINES FOR FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS (Apr. 5, 1996) [hereinafter IBA's REJECTED FLC
GUIDELINES] (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). There were numerous
objections, however, to the IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES. See Telephone Interview
1998] 1387
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Legal Consultants is another example of this approach."0 A
third example is the CCBE Code of Conduct ("CCBE"), which
the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Com-
munity adopted. Unlike the IBA and ABA efforts, however, the
CCBE ultimately proved successful in its efforts to have the vari-
ous regulatory bodies adopt its guidelines."1
4. The Hybrid: Private Sector to Regulatory Body Negotiation
The fourth model is something of a hybrid. In this fourth
model, the facilitation and regulation of cross-border practice
occurs between private sector representatives and a regulatory
body. The Agreement is an example of this fourth model. It is
an agreement between the ABA, which has no power other than
precatory power, and the two Brussels bar associations, which
have no right to insist upon registration of foreign lawyers who
will not appear in court, although they do have the power to set
with Bernard L. Greer, Jr., Principal Drafter of the IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES
(Mar. 19, 1997). Consequently, the drafting committee abandoned the detailed
"Guidelines" approach and instead drafted a much shorter STATEMENT OF GENERAL
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAwYERs [hereinafter
IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES] (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
As explained by Ben Greer, one reason for the change in approach was that in "at the
last two Council meetings it was clear that a number of bars simply will not support the
limited licensing approach taken in the previous drafts of the Guidelines." Accordingly,
the IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES "identify common regulatory principles which
should apply to all regimes and then .. . outline alternative approaches to the regula-
tion of foreign lawyers." One approach requires full integration into the Host State
legal profession and the other permits a limited license to practice law. See Letter from
Bernard L. Greer,Jr., Principal Drafter of IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, to author
(Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Greer Feb. 27, 1998 Letter]. The IBA PROPOSED GENERAL
PRINCIPLES will be submitted to the IBA Council for approval in June 1998, at a meeting
in Vienna.
For a critical analysis of the rules facing foreign legal consultants, see Sydney M.
Cone, III, FLC's Face Licensing Hurdles in Host Countries, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1996, at C2.
10. See American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the
House of Delegates, Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants, 28 INT'L LAw. 207
(1994) [hereinafter ABA Model FLC Rule].
11. For a discussion of the applicability of the CCBE Code of Conduct in the Euro-
pean Union, see Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics
Code Part : An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 11-15
(1993) [hereinafter CCBE Code, Part 1]; see also Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part II: Applying the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 345 (1993) (discussing jurisdictional provisions in CCBE Code and
some implementation issues) [hereinafter CCBE Code, Part III.
The IBA has had even less success than the ABA because it has been unable to have
its Guidelines adopted. See supra note 9.
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the conditions of such registration. Unlike the private sector to
private sector model, an agreement resulting from this model
effects the nature of the cross-border regulation because the reg-
ulatory body has the power to set and change the conditions
under which foreign lawyers are licensed.
B. Models Used Where There Is a Single Regulating Authority
As noted above, one of the ways in which cross-border prac-
tice regulation may occur is through government to government
negotiation. Such negotiations may be bilateral or multilateral.
In certain circumstances, these governmental entities may agree
to create a new entity that is responsible for regulating the cross-
border practice of lawyers from those countries. In other words,
through bilateral or multilateral negotiation, governments may
give, or purport to give, authority to a single entity that has the
power to regulate lawyers from one state and set the conditions
under which lawyers from that state may practice in another
state. 12 At least two different approaches to this "single entity"
approach have been used. I describe these as the "legislative
model" and the "legislative delegation" model.
1. The Legislative Model
The approach used in the European Union ("EU") to regu-
late intra-EU cross-border legal practice can be described as an
example of the legislative model. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to thoroughly discuss the EU's regulation of lawyers. A
brief overview is helpful, however, in order to understand the
various ways in which cross-border practice have been regulated
and to place the Agreement in context.
The relevant treaties of the EU transferred to the EU gov-
erning bodies the authority to adopt certain legislation with
which the fifteen countries who are Member States of the EU
12. It is not always clear that governments that sign multilateral agreements have
the authority to transfer the power to regulate lawyers to a new entity. In the United
States, for example, some commentators questioned whether the federal government
has the authority to adopt GATS and displace state regulation of lawyers. Compare Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1223 (1995) with BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID
GOLOVE, Is NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995). See Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 291 n.113
(discussing NAFTA's constitutionality).
1998] 1389
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must comply."3 These treaties also establish the procedures by
which such laws must be adopted.14 Two EU courts ensure that
these laws are followed by the EU Member States. 5
The EU governing bodies responded to the issue of cross-
border practice by issuing various laws, called directives. For
twenty years, the EU followed a directive 6 that regulated lawyers
who temporarily engage in cross-border legal practice in a "Host
State."' 7 Since 1989, the "Diploma Directive" governed the situa-
tion of lawyers from one EU Member State who want to become
permanently established in another EU Member State. This "Di-
ploma Directive" was not directed specifically to lawyers, how-
ever, but was a "global directive" designed to respond to the diffi-
culties and delays that the EU encountered when trying to de-
velop legislation for many different fields and professions. 8
Finally, in December 1997, after a decade of effort, the EU
adopted a directive that specifically addresses lawyers who want
to provide legal services on a permanent basis in another EU
country ("EU Establishment Directive").19 In short, the EU has
13. See generally GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 74-78
(1993) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw]; The European Union-EU, EUR. WORLD
Y.B. 143-69 (1996).
14. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 13, at 79-90.
15. See id. at 69-79; see also Single Market: Infringement Procedures Launched against
Slackers, EUR. REP., Dec. 24, 1996 available in LEXIS, Inflaw Library, Eurnews File (re-
porting on five cases to be brought by EU Commission against Member States for fail-
ing to transpose EU directives); European Countries Face Heavy Fines for Defying EU Law,
AGENCE FRANCE - PREssE, Jan. 8, 1997 available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurnews File
(noting new system of multi-million dollar fines for Member States that fail to comply
with European Court of Justice's rulings).
16. Council Directive No. 77/249, O.J. L 78/17 (1977) (facilitating effective exer-
cise by lawyers of freedom to provide services) [hereinafter Lawyers' Services Directive].
17. Host State and Home State are terms frequently used when discussing cross-
border practice. The CCBE Code of Conduct, for example, defines the Home Member
State as "the Member State of the Bar or Law Society to which the lawyer belongs." See
CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1988), cited in CCBE Code, Part I, supra note 11, at 66.
The CCBE Code of Conduct defines the "Host Member State" as "any other Member
State where the lawyer carries on cross-border activities." Id.
18. Council Directive No. 89/48, OJ. L 19/16 (1989) [hereinafter Diploma Direc-
tive].
.19. See Council Directive No. 98/5, O.J. L 77/36 (1998) [hereinafter EU Establish-
ment Directive].
The directive's path to adoption -has not been easy. The Commission first
presented a proposed directive on establishment of lawyers in 1994. See Commission
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive to facilitate practice of the
profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which
the qualification was obtained, OJ. C 128/6 (1995) (permitting established lawyers to
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promulgated legislation that will govern the cross-border legal
practice under their Home State title for maximum of five years). On July 5, 1995, the
Economic and Social Committee issued an opinion criticizing portions of the proposed
directive. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of
lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualifica-
tion was obtained, O.J. C 256/14 (1995). On November 17, 1995, the CCBE issued an
opinion on the proposed directive criticizing much of the Commission's original direc-
tive. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposed Directive, COM (96) 446 Final
(citing CCBE report); CONE, supra note 1, at 8:21-25 (describing report). The Euro-
pean Parliament referred the directive to its Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens
Rights, which issued the Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Coun-
cil Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a
Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained. See PE Doc. A4-
0146/96 of Apr. 30, 1996, cited in O.J. C 198/93 (1996); CONE, supra note 1, at 8:22-25
(describing report). The first reading of the proposal in the European Parliament took
place onJune 6,1996, and onJune 19, 1996, the proposal was approved by a vote of 449
to 23, subject to numerous amendments. See Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis
in a Member State other than that in which the qualification obtained COM(94) 0572-
C4-0125/95 -94/0299(COD), O.J. C 198/85, at 85, 92-93 (1996); CONE, supra note 1, at
app. IIIA:1. After receiving Parliament's amendments, the Commission issued an
amended proposed directive that'adopted some, but not all, of the European Parlia-
ment's amendments. See Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a
Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained, O.J. C 355/19
(1996). The Council adopted this proposal on July 24, 1997. See Common Position
(EC) NO. 35/97, adopted by the Council on July 24, 1997 with a view to adopting
Directive 97/... /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... to facilitate
the practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other
than that in which the qualification was obtained, O.J. C 297/6 (1997). Parliament's
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights recommended no further amendments
to the Common Position which the Council adopted July 24, 1997. See European Parlia-
ment Passes Lawyers Directive in Second Reading, EUR. REP. 2271 (Nov. 26, 1997) available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurnews File. The Parliament adopted the Directive on Novem-
ber 19, 1997. Id. When the Council approved the Directive on December 15, 1997, it
became official EU law. See EU Establishment Directive, "supra.
The Commission's work in preparing an establishment directive was built on the
earlier work of the CCBE. See generally CONE, supra note 1, at 8:12-26; Proceedings of the
Third Joint Conference of the American Society of International Law and the Nederlandse Verenig-
ing voor Internationaal Recht 429-430 (T.M.C. Asser Institute The Hague, 1995) (Re-
marks ofJohn Toulmin, C.M.G., Q.C.) (summarizing relationship of CCBE Draft Direc-
tive and Commission Draft Directive) [hereinafter Hague Proceedings]; Miracle of Barce-
lona Reconfirmed in Lisbon: New Draft Directive on Rights of Establishment for Laryers, 18
LAw. IN EUR. 10, 12-13 (1992) (presenting draft establishment directive approved by
CCBE); Establishment Directive: Where to Now, Draft Establishment Directive, 9 LAw. IN EUR.
6, 8-11 (1991) (containing CCBE "Experts" Draft Establishment Directive, which was
never approved by full CCBE); RogerJ. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational
Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country, 63 TUL. L. Rv. 443 (1989) (providing
history of CCBE's efforts to develop draft establishment directive prior to "experts"
draft).
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practice of lawyers in the EU. Hence the name "the legislative
model."
2. The Legislative Delegation Model
A second approach which involves a single entity with regu-
latory authority over cross-border practice can be described as a
legislative delegation approach. Under this model, the entity's
legislation establishes some general standards that govern the re-
quirements of cross-border legal practice. The legislation, how-
ever, contemplates that another group, sometimes called a work-
ing party, will develop the details that should apply to the regula-
tion of cross-border legal practice.2 ° Alternatively, this working
party may not have ultimate authority, but may instead be asked
to give a report or recommendations to the main legislative
body. The main legislative body retains the power to act, or not
act, on that report.
Something close to this second model is used in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services 1 ("GATS") and the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").22 Although it is
beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the regula-
tion of lawyers under GATS and NAFTA, a very brief overview of
GATS and NAFTA is helpful in order to understand the various
ways countries regulate cross-border legal practice, in order to
place the Agreement in context.
20. The line between the legislative model and the legislative-delegation model is
not necessarily a bright line. For example, I described the European Union as an exam-
ple of the legislative model. The EU Commission, however, initially did not draft an
establishment directive because it hoped that the CCBE would come up with a draft
directive that was acceptable to all its members. See Hague Proceedings, supra note 19,
at 429-430 (Remarks of John Toulmin, C.M.G., Q.C.). As set forth above, the CCBE
ultimately agreed upon a draft, following which the Commission issued its proposed
directive. See supra, note 19. This initial Commission proposal, which differed in signif-
icant respects from the CCBE draft directive, ultimately was modified to more closely
track the CCBE draft. See generally supra note 19. Thus, to some extent, one arguably
could characterize the EU Establishment Directive for lawyers as the result of a legisla-
tive delegation process. Despite the similarities, I have separated the models because
the EU Commission clearly had the power to develop its own legislation. In contrast,
the NAFTA and GATS enabling documents themselves create the delegation process.
21. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994) [hereinafter CATS].
22. NAFTA, supra note 4; see also North American Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing NAFTA into
U.S. law).
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a. GATS
GATS is a multilateral trade agreement, which is annexed to
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO") .23 GATS was part of the Uruguay Round trade negotia-
tions. These negotiations were substantially completed by De-
cember 15, 1993. On April 15, 1994, in Marrakech, Morocco,
the participants agreed to the text of the Final Act embodying
the results of the negotiations. 24 Over 120 countries, including
the United States, became Member States of the WTO and thus,
contracting parties to these multilateral trade agreements.25
To determine the effect of GATS on cross-border legal serv-
ices, one must examine three different aspects of GATS. 26 First,
one must consider the basic GATS agreement, which consists of
twenty-nine articles and nine annexes, one of which is important
to legal services.27 Second, there are the "Schedules of Specific
Commitments" submitted by individual countries ("Sched-
ule") .28 Third, there are "Exemption Lists" from the most fa-
vored nation provision that could be submitted by individual
countries for specific services upon the signatory's entry into
GATS ("MFN Exemption List") .29
The basic framework of the GATS final Agreement, despite
23. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations produced a group of multilateral
trade agreements. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, December 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994) [hereinafter Uru-
guay Round]. This group includes, but is not limited to, an Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 28 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; and GATS, supra note 21, with which
this Article is concerned. Id.
24. See generally CONE, supra note 1, at 2:14.
25. Id. at 2:15 (identifying 124 countries that have become or are expected to be-
come members of WTO, including United States). See also WTO, About the WI'O (visited
Apr. 11, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/organsn6.htm> (identifying 132 mem-
bers of WTO as of October 22, 1997) (also on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal). The U.S. Congress enacted legislation to implement the WTO and annexed
agreements, such as GATS, but did not ratify them as a treaty. See Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); see generally Tribe, supra
note 12 (discussing importance of approval of WTO and annexed agreements pursuant
to Constitutional requirements for treaties).
26. See CONE, supra note 1, at 2:15 (utilizing these three aspects to analyze CATS).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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the long-standing objections of some countries and the last min-
ute maneuvering of the United States, includes legal services."0
However, the inclusion of "legal services" in GATS does not
mean that a country's existing regulation of cross-border legal
services automatically must comply with all twenty-nine articles
in GATS. Rather, whether a WTO Member must comply with all
GATS provisions depends on whether, and how, legal services
are listed in its Schedule and its Most Favored Nation ("MFN")
Exemption List.
A WTO Member is only required to comply with GATS' "na-
tional treatment" and "market access" requirements if it in-
cluded legal services in its Schedule. 31 Although most countries
included legal services in their Schedules, they generally added a
caveat exempting their existing regulations.3 2 Thus, the current
effect of GATS is not so much a liberalization of trade in legal
services, but a standstill, in which most countries have agreed
not to pass any measure more restrictive than their existing pro-
visions.
One of the most significant aspects of GATS is the MFN pro-
30. Although the United States initially sought inclusion of legal services in GATS
and preferred a special annex addressing legal services, the annex approach was re-
jected and, by the conclusion of the GATS negotiations, many U.S. lawyers were un-
happy that legal services had been included. See Karen Dillon, Unfair Trade?, AM. LAw.,
Apr. 1994, at 54-57 (reporting that ABA representatives urged U.S. Government negoti-
ators to withdraw concessions on legal services because of dissatisfaction with Japanese
concessions). U.S. concessions on legal services remained in GATS, however, as part of
a package deal in which Japan traded concessions unrelated to legal services. Id. See
CONE, supra note 1, at 1:19-20, 2:2-13 (providing detailed description of evolution of
legal services in CATS, including last minute developments regarding legal services);
Flores, supra note 2, at 178 nn.146, 164-166 (noting that France initially objected to
inclusion of legal services in GATS and summarizing position of United States).
31. CATS, supra note 21, at part III, arts. XVI and XVII, 33 I.L.M. at 60. The
national treatment provision essentially prohibits discrimination against foreign provid-
ers of services. The market access provision identifies six types of quantitative or quali-
tative limits on market access, that are prohibited unless they are listed on a country's
schedule of commitments.
32. See CONE, supra note 1, at 2:20-24 (listing in tables I-IV GATS members that
submitted schedules of specific commitments for legal services, GATS members that
submitted MFN exemption lists for legal services, GATS members that submitted
neither lists nor schedules for legal services, and non-members of GATS.) Table I iden-
tifies approximately 70 countries, counting each member of the EU, that submitted
schedules for legal services. Table I also summarizes the nature of the standstill and
agreed liberalization. Id. at 2:20-22. See also WTO - World Trade Organization (Apr. 9,
1998) <http://www.tradecompass.com/library/wto/schedulesandexemptions> (also
on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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vision." 3 However, a WTO Member State is not subject to this
MFN provision if that WTO Member State placed legal services
on its MFN exemption list.34 Only twelve Member States, out of
more than 120, placed legal services on their MFN Exemption
Lists. 5 Thus, most signatory countries will be subject to an MFN
requirement with respect to legal services.
Because GATS itself covers legal services, WTO Members
must comply with certain provisions with respect to legal serv-
ices, regardless of a country's action with respect to its Schedule
or its MFN Exemption List. These provisions include a "trans-
parency" provision that requires any regulation to be published
or publicly available and a requirement that domestic regula-
tions of general application be administered in a reasonable, ob-
jective, and impartial manner. 6
The basic framework of GATS also requires all signatory
countries to inform the WTO bodies concerning their measures
for the authorization, licensing, or certification of service provid-
ers. 37 It further encourages a Member State to recognize the ed-
ucation and experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses
granted in another country on a unilateral or multilateral ba-
sis.38 This "recognition" provision further provides that "[i] n ap-
propriate cases, Members shall work in cooperation with rele-
vant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to-
wards the establishment and adoption of common international
standards and criteria for recognition and common interna-
tional standards for the practice of relevant services trades and
professions.39
In order to fulfill these provisions, a Working Party on Pro-
33. GATS, supra note 21, art. II, 33 I.L.M. at 49.
34. Id.
35. See CONE, supra note 1, at 2:22; see also Chapman & Tauber, supra note 1, at 146
(identifying four countries that placed legal services on MFN exemption list). Thus,
these 12 countries need not comply with the MFN provision even with respect to any
future bilateral or multilateral agreement they might negotiate. The first Annex to
CATS, however, provides that the Council for Trade in Services will review all MFN
exemptions granted for more than five years and provides for termination of MFN ex-
emptions. GATS, supra note 21, at Annex on Article II Exemptions, 33 I.L.M. at 67; see
CONE, supra note 1, at 2:18.
36. See CATS, supra note 21, arts. III, VI, 33 I.L.M. at 49-50.
37. Id. art. VII, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 54.
38. Id. at para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 54.
39. Id. at paras. 1, 5, 33 I.L.M. at 54.
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fessional Services ("Working Party") was created.40 This Work-
ing Party has the obligation to examine and report, with recom-
mendations, on the disciplines necessary to ensure that meas-
ures relating to qualification requirements and procedures,
technical standards and licensing requirements in the field of
professional services do not constitute unnecessary barriers to
trade.41 In 1994, the Working Party determined that the ac-
countancy sector should be considered first; its report is now
complete.42 Legal services are to be considered second, proba-
bly beginning in 1998.43
In sum, GATS itself did not establish a system for cross-bor-
der legal practice. GATS did establish a structure, including a
Working Party, that may serve as a basis for further development
of cross-border legal practice standards.4 4 Thus, GATS can be
40. See Decision on Professional Services, 33 I.L.M. 1259 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Id. "As a matter of priority, the Working Party shall make recommendations
for the elaboration of multilateral disciplines in the accountancy sector, so as to give
operational effect to specific commitments." See also Flores, supra note 2, at 191-192
n.229. See WTO Adopts Guidelines for Recognition of Qualifications in the Accountancy Sector
(visited Apr. 22, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/press/press73.htm> (reporting May
29, 1997 adoption of guidelines for accountancy sector) (also on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal). Steve Nelson reports that although the GATS Working Party
has not addressed lawyers, members of that working party are aware of the issues re-
lated to legal services because they follow the work done by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), which sponsored several conferences
related to restrictions in services, including legal services, resulting in the papers cited
in Flores, supra note 2, at nn.37, 146, 151. Telephone Interview with Steven Nelson,
Agreement Negotiator and Chair, NAFTA Trilateral Lawyers Working Group
("TWLG") (Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Interview].
43. See Ward Bower, Multidisciplinary Practices - The Future, in GLOBAL LAw IN PRAC-
TICE 155, 162 (. Ross Harper ed., 1997). "An October 1996 WTO briefing of [Interna-
tional Bar Association] leaders, in Geneva, indicates that the legal profession will be
next, 'in a few years' (1998 or after)."
44. Commentators disagree as to whether liberalization is more or less likely as a
result of GATS. One commentator predicted that,
[a] CATS jurisprudence will likely develop in this area [of recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications] because the GATS encourages the creation of multi-
lateral standards, criteria, and procedures. A country can challenge recogni-
tion requirements on the grounds that they are not based on competence and
ability to supply the service; are more burdensome than necessary to ensure
the quality of the service; or are themselves a restriction, through the proce-
dures imposed, on the supply of the service.
See Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 280 n.34, 315 n.285.
Other commentators, however, predicted that GATS will slow the speed at which
agreements are reached. Among other reasons, in the absence of the ability to impose
a reciprocity agreement, countries may be concerned about the free rider problem and
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viewed as an example of a legislative delegation model.
b. NAFTA
NAFTA is another example of the legislative delegation
model.- NAFTA, like GATS, is a multilateral trade agreement.
Signatory countries currently include Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.45 Unlike GATS, NAFTA does not employ a "posi-
tive list" or Schedule that requires the signatory parties to affirm-
atively indicate the goods and services to be covered by certain
agreements. Instead, NAFTA uses its "scope and coverage" pro-
visions in each chapter to specify the goods and services covered
by NAFTA. Chapters eleven and twelve of NA!FTA cover legal
services.4 6 Unless an existing law is specifically exempted or re-
served, the signatory countries have agreed to a number of provi-
sions that affect legal services, including a "most-favored nation"
requirement, a "national treatment" requirement, a "most-fa-
vored treatment" requirement, and a requirement that individ-
ual licensing decisions be based upon "objective and transparent
criteria, such as competence, and that they not be unnecessarily
burdensome or purely protectionist in nature . ". .. " With re-
spect to legal services, these provisions are less significant than
they sound because the parties filed many reservations related to
legal services.4" Both Mexico and the United States, for exam-
be less inclined to negotiate any further liberalization of its own rules. See Flores, supra
note 2, at 180. "Thus, removing the reciprocity requirement may have eliminated an
important incentive for liberalization." Chapman & Tauber, supra note 1, at 968-71.
Chapman and Tauber propose a possible annex for GATS on legal services. Id. at 976-
79. There seems little likelihood, however, that such an annex will be approved. The
EU and Japan previously rejected a U.S. proposal for an annex of the GATS on legal
services by foreign legal consultants. See Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 280 n.34.
45. See NAFTA, supra note 4, 32 I.L.M. at 605.
46. NAFTA, supra note 4, at Chap. 11, art. 1101, § 1, 32 I.L.M. at 639, and Chap.
12, art. 1201, §§ 1, 2, 32 I.L.M. at 639; see Vanessa P. Sciarra, NAFTA and the Transna-
tional Practice of Legal Services 2 (Jan. 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal); see also CONE, supra note 1, at 6:3-5 (discussing history of legal services' inclu-
sion in NAFTA).
47. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639, art. 1203, 32 I.L.M. at 649
(explaining most-favored nation treatment); art. 1102, 32 I.L.M. at 639, art. 1202, 32
I.L.M. at 649 (discussing national treatment); art. 1104, 32 I.L.M. at 639, art. 1204, 32
I.L.M. at 649 (detailing most favored treatment, called "standard of treatment"); and
art. 1210, 32 I.L.M. 650 (licensing and certification); see Sciarra, supra note 46, at 2-3.
48. NAFTA contains two types of reservations with respect to legal services:
Annex I contains reservations taken by a NAFTA government for existing
measures which do not conform to a Chapter 11 or 12 obligation. Once listed
as a reserved measure in Annex I, the measure can remain in existence indefi-
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ple, reserved the right to regulate each other's foreign legal con-
sultants in a more restrictive manner in the future.49
One of the most important provisions in NAFTA related to
legal services is Annex 1210.5 to Chapter Twelve. Section A of
Annex 1210.5 applies to "Professional Services" whereas Section
B applies to "Foreign Legal Consultants. '50 Section B was added
to the Annex due to the importance the negotiators attached to
the issue of legal services and in recognition of the fact that the
treatment of FLCs was not uniform among the three countries
and was subject to significant reservations. The goal is to ensure
that FLCs can effectively practice the law of their home country
in the host country."
Both sections of Annex 1210.5 require the signatory coun-
tries to encourage the relevant professional bodies to collaborate
in order to develop recommendations for the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission regarding standards and criteria for licens-
ing.52 A working party called the Trilateral Lawyers Working
Group has been established. This working party consists of both
nitely. However it cannot be made more restrictive at any future time ....
Reservations were taken in [Annex II] for sectoral areas in which a NAFrA
government wanted freedom to make or adopt more restrictive measures than
would be allowed under the relevant obligations of Chapters 11 and 12.
Sciarra, supra note 46, at 5. Sciarra characterized the reservations taken as "very defen-
sive." The annexes list existing laws regulating lawyers as a reservation, meaning they
were exempted from the NAFIA requirements. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex I
- Mexico I-M-45, 32 I.L.M. at 718, Annex I - United States I-U-9, 32 I.L.M. at 742. More-
over, both Mexico and the United States reserved the right to regulate each other's
foreign legal consultants in a more restrictive manner. Id. at Annex II - Mexico II-M-10,
32 I.L.M. at 752, Annex II - United States II-U-7, 32 I.L.M. at 755. The "commitments to
liberalize quantitative restrictions, licensing requirements, performance requirements
or other non-discriminatory measures" which were to be set forth in Annex VI
amounted to little more than a listing of current measures. Id. at Annex VI - Canada VI-
C-i, 32 I.L.M. at 766, Annex VI - Mexico VI-M-2, 32 I.L.M. at 166, Annex VI - United
States VI-U-2, 32 I.L.M. at 767.
49. See supra note 48.
50. NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 1210.5, 32 I.L.M. at 651.
51. Sciarra, supra note 46, at 3.
52. NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 1210.5, 'A, para. 2, 32 I.L.M. 652, Annex 1210.5,'
B, paras. 2-3, 32 I.L.M. at 652.
Annex 1210.5 recognizes that the legal profession may be self-regulating and that
the appropriate relevant body charged with addressing the issue of licensure and, there-
fore, of mutual recognition, may not be a governmental entity, but may be a profes-
sional association or board. The NAFTA negotiators intended to allow these groups to
meet on a trilateral basis, develop proposals for mutual recognition and/or temporary
licensure, and submit these proposals to the NAFTA governments, meeting as NAFTA's
governing body, the NAFTA Commission. Sciarra, supra note 46, at 3.
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private sector and state regulatory representatives.13  NAFTA
provides that once the proposals are reviewed by the Commis-
sion for consistency, the signatory governments will use their
best efforts to get the proposals adopted by the relevant regula-
tory boards.54 Thus, notwithstanding the many reservations in
NAFTA for legal services, it establishes a framework for evaluat-
ing and possibly changing the cross-border regulation in the sig-
natory countries. Indeed, the evidence so far shows NAFTA's
impact and may lead to some changes in some signatory coun-
tries' laws regulating cross-border legal practice. The Trilateral
Lawyers Working Group has developed, but not yet officially rec-
ommended, a NAFTA Model Rule Respecting Foreign Legal
Consultants ("NAFTA Model Rule"). Thus NAFTA, like GATS,
53. One of the representatives includes Steve Nelson, a partner in the Minneapolis
firm of Dorsey & Whitney. See Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Interview, supra note 42. Mr.
Nelson indicates that U.S. Government representatives attended these sessions as ob-
servers, but took the position that the bars should work out the details of any agree-
ment. The TLWG determined that it would first address the topic of foreign legal con-
sultants. The TLWG initially thought it reached an agreement on a NAFTA Model Rule
Respecting Foreign Legal Consultants, but is withholding its recommendation.
As an aside, when asked, Steve Nelson indicated that he had not thought in terms
of whether the TLWG was formed pursuant to Section B of Annex 1210.5, or pursuant
to Sections A and B. He indicated, however, that if and when the Working Party agreed
on the foreign legal consultant issues, they likely would turn to broader issues of harmo-
nization and recognition and thus might act pursuant to Section A, as well as Section B.
Id.
54. NAFTA, supra note 4, at Annex 1210.5, section B, para. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 652.
55. The TLWG, formed pursuant to NAFTA, initially thought it reached agree-
ment on a NAFTA Model Rule Respecting Foreign Legal Consultants, which it could
jointly recommend to submit to the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. SeeJoint Recom-
mendations of the Relevant Canadian, Mexican and American Professional Bodies
under Annex 1210.B, Section B of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
Schedule 1, Model Rule Respecting Foreign Legal Consultants (May 16, 1996), reprinted
in CONE, supra note 1, at App. IID:1-16 [hereinafter NAFTA Model Rule]; Susan Han-
sen, Viva La Protectionism, AM. LAw., June 1996, at 19 (reporting on status of NAFTA's
TWLG, noting tentative agreements).
Steve Nelson, chair of the NAFTA TLWG, notes that Hansen's report of an agree-
ment on the NAFTA Model Rule was premature. Although the TLWG tentatively
reached an agreement on a Model Rule Respecting Foreign Legal Consultants, as re-
ported by Hansen, the group has not submitted this NAFTA Model Rule to the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission or the NAFTA governments as ajoint recommendation. Based
upon comments received after circulating the proposed Model Rule, the TLWG de-
cided to delay recommendation of the Model Rule pending a determination of the
position of the Mexican Government. Some commentators suggested that the Mexican
Government's position was not as restrictive as the position of the Mexican National Bar
Association representatives on the TLWG. The Canadian and U.S. representatives did
not want to issue a set of recommendations more restrictive than necessary and thus
delayed approval pending determination of the Mexican Government's position. See
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might be described as a legislative delegation model. Although
NAFTA theoretically creates a single entity with authority to reg-
ulate the provision of legal services, in reality that regulation, if
any, will be developed by the working party to which it is dele-
gated.
As this very abbreviated discussion demonstrates, efforts
have been and currently are being made on many fronts to facili-
tate or regulate the provision of cross-border legal services. The
ABA/Brussels Agreement must be understood in this larger con-
text as the product of one of several different types of efforts or
models that can be undertaken. Its hybrid approach, between
private sector representatives and a regulatory body, represents
one method by which liberalization of trade in legal services may
be accomplished. By focusing on both the procedure by which the
Agreement came about, its legislative history, and its substance,
my hope is that this analysis will prove useful as the private sector
and the public sector, lawyers and non-lawyers, contemplate the
desirability, proper regulation, and methods of facilitating, fur-
ther cross-border trade in legal services.
II. EXPLORING THE PROCEDURE USED UNDER A HYBRID
MODEL: THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ABA
AND THE BRUSSELS BARS
On August 6, 1994, representatives of the ABA, the French
Language Order of the Brussels Bar, and the Dutch Language
Order of the Brussels Bar signed an historic agreement. This
Agreement set forth the conditions under which U.S. lawyers
could practice law in Brussels, Belgium. In order to understand
the Agreement, however, it is helpful to know some background
information.
Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Interview, supra note 42; Telephone Interview with Steven Nel-
son, Chair, NAFTA Trilateral Lawyers' Working Group (Mar. 18, 1998) [hereinafter
Nelson Mar. 18, 1998 Telephone Interview]; see also CONE, supra note 1, at 6:10-19 (sum-
marizing TLWG discussions under NAFTA and proposed NAFTA Model Rule Respect-
ing Foreign Legal Consultants which is awaiting recommendation); Robert Budden,
Mexican Lawyers Not Ready to Rock the Boat, 12 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 21 (1993) (providing
brief overview of U.S. law firms in Mexico and Mexican reaction to upcoming NAFTA
agreements).
Any joint recommendation reached by the TLWG would have to be adopted in the
individual states with regulatory powers over lawyers. Nevertheless, if this professional
group reaches agreement on key issues, it seems fair to conclude that this may lead to
some changes. But see CONE, supra note 1, at 6:19.
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A. Background Information about the Legal Situation in Brussels
The first important fact to understand is that an individual
in Brussels need not be licensed as a "lawyer" in order to provide
legal advice. To state it differently, in Belgium, lawyers do not
have a monopoly on providing legal advice. Anyone is free to
offer his or her services in providing legal advice.56 This lack of
restriction on offering legal advice stands in contrast to the ap-
proach used in the United States, where the individual states
that regulate lawyers generally prohibit non-lawyers from practic-
ing law.5 7 While the definition of "practicing law" varies from
U.S. state to U.S. state, these definitions are generally inter-
preted to include the provision of advice regarding the legal
rights or obligations of others.58 Thus, unlike the situation that
occurs in the United States and many countries, foreign lawyers
in Brussels, including U.S. lawyers, may hang up their shingle
and offer legal advice, provided it does not violate the conditions
of their work permit.
A second important concept to understand before examin-
ing the Agreement is the fact that in Belgium, the licensing of
lawyers is performed on a regional basis, rather than a national
basis.59 There are twenty-nine bar associations in Belgium. In
addition to the Bar of the Court of Cassation, which is the Con-
56. See CCBE, CROss-BoRDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM 8-Belgium (D.M. Donald-Lit-
tle ed. 1996); Louis-Henri Verbeke, Brussels: What's the Crack Jacques?, 13 LAw. IN EUR.
13, 15 (1992) (noting that legal professions of avocats and notaries have monopoly only
on representing clients before courts and delivery of certain deeds, including convey-
ances and incorporations).
This sentence is not intended to disparage the regulation used in Brussels or to
suggest that the United States' regulation of the giving of legal advice is necessarily
more protective of the public or clients, Rather, this language was used in order to
emphasize to U.S. lawyers how very different the U.S. and Brussels systems are because
many U.S. lawyers may be unaware of the different approaches to regulation that are
utilized throughout the world.
57. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 21:8001 (1998).
58. Id.
59. It is somewhat misleading to speak of the licensing of "lawyers" because
Belgium, like other European countries, does not have a unified legal profession. In
contrast to the situation in the United States, Belgium has no single title of lawyer that
encompasses all licensed professionals. Rather, there are a series of different kinds of
licenses for different kinds of legal work. In Belgium, what we would call lawyers in-
clude the Avocat, Avocat a' la Cour de Cassation, Notary, Juriste d'entrprise, Stagiaire, and
Hissiers. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 8-12 Belgium. The profession that comes
closest to what we in the United States would call lawyer is the avocat, who practices in
all areas of legal work and has, with few exceptions, the exclusive right to plead in
court. Id.
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stitutional Court, there is one bar for each of twenty-six districts,
and two bar associations for Brussels.6" Brussels has both a
French Language Order and a Dutch Language Order.61 Thus,
in order to be an avocat (French) or advocaat (Dutch)6 2 one
must register with the appropriate bar association of the judicial
district in which that person's office is located and must comply
with the requirements of that bar association.6" In addition to
these regional bar associations, there is a national bar association
which has responsibility for "maintaining and defending the in-
terests of the profession as a whole."64
A third important fact about Brussels is that it is considered
to be a critical market by many non-Belgian lawyers. Brussels is
the site of many important EU law making institutions.65 Thus,
many non-Belgian lawyers, including U.S. lawyers, consider it im-
portant to have a presence in Brussels in order to advise their
clients about EU laws that might affect them.6 6 Indeed, the
number of U.S. lawyers in Brussels increased dramatically as
1992 and European Integration approached.67
60. Id. at 14-Belgium.
61. Id. It is a matter of choice for avocats as to whether theyjoin the French Bar or
the Dutch Bar. Id. The functions of the two are similar. Id.
The split of the Brussels Bar into separate Dutch and French Orders occurred in
1984. See Transnational Law Practice, supra note 2, at 798. As of 1992, the Brussels Bars
had approximately 3400 members, of which 2250 belonged to the French Language
Order and 1150 belonged to the Dutch Language Order. See Position Paper on Establish-
ment and Practice by non-EEC lawyers - Members of a Bar or Law Society in the Country of
Origin or in a Third Country - Possible Cooperation with Members of the Brussels Bar, presen-
tation at the ABA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 8, 1992 (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Brussels' Bars Position Paper]. One com-
mentator characterized the Flemish Bar of Brussels as younger, more international, and
more structured, than the French Bar of Brussels. See Verbeke, supra note 56, at 14.
62. CROss-BoRDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 8-Belgium.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 15-18. One commentator noted that the National Bar Council is playing
a greater, and usually welcomed, role in determining policy issues, which are then
adopted by the local bars. He noted as an example that the National Bar Council has
been at the forefront of efforts to legitimize cooperation between the two independent
legal professions of avocat and civil law notary. See Verbeke, supra note 56, at 14.
65. See 1 THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 150-52 (1996) (explaining roles of Euro-
pean Commission and European Council and their location in Brussels); (Mar. 10,
1998) <http://Europa.eu.int/index-en.htm> (referencing home pages of EU institu-
tions) (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
66. See, e.g., Transnational Law Practice, supra note 2, at 797-801, 832-33 (summariz-
ing foreign firms' presence in Belgium); Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 476; CONE,
supra note 1, at 10:2.
67. According to Professor Goebel, the 1988 Martindale-Hubbell Directory listed
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Fourth, in order to understand the Agreement, one must be
familiar with certain terminology. Brussels lawyers who register
with the French or Dutch bar associations are called tableau law-
yers. Before one can become a tableau lawyer, one must serve an
apprenticeship, or stage, during which period one is referred to
as a stagiair.6 s The list on which tableau lawyers and stagiaires are
recorded is colloquially referred to as the "A List." As noted
above, these A List lawyers are also referred to as avocats or advo-
caten. In addition to the A List, since 1984, the Brussels Bar has
maintained a "B List," on which foreign lawyers could register if
they satisfied certain conditions. Because there is no monopoly
on giving legal advice, however, historically, many foreign law-
yers chose not to register on the B List.6 9 The final term which
one should know is jurist. A jurist is a Belgian who graduated
from a Belgian law school but chose not to serve a stage or regis-
ter on any bar list.y°
There are two final background facts that are important and
intertwined. First, the Brussels Bars' ethics rules historically
either prevented or severely restricted licensed Belgian tableau
lawyers, or stagiaires, from joining foreign firms as either part-
ners or employees. Secondly, some foreign firms responded to
these ethics rules by hiring Belgian law school graduates or ju-
eight U.S. law firms, either independent or branch offices, a half dozen English solici-
tor or barrister firms, five Dutch law firms, and several other firms from France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 477.
In contrast to these figures, by 1991 there were more than 200 non-Belgian firms.
Additionally, the number of U.S. firms increased from seven firms before 1987 to over
30 firms in 1991. See Transnational Law Practice, supra note 2, at 801 (noting that there
were 350 foreign lawyers in 250 firms and 3100 Belgian lawyers at end of 1991); Steven
Greenhouse, Aggressiveness of U.S. Lawyers Offends Members of Old World Bar, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 14, 1991, at 3 (noting that more than 20 large U.S. firms opened offices in
last two years, seeking to cash in on expected avalanche of rule-making that will inevita-
bly accompany EC's plans to form barrier-free market in 1992). See alsoJoel Havemann,
U.S. Law Firms Chasing New Clients in Brussels; They Hope to Cash in on the European Commu-
nity's Quiet Revolution in the Way Businesses on the Continent Do Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1990, at H4 (noting presence of more than 25 U.S. law firms in Brussels in response to
EC); Verbeke, supra note 56, at 14 (noting present wave's impressiveness in terms of
numbers of foreign firms, and that Belgian lawyers were better equipped to meet chal-
lenge from outside than they were in previous invasions). See generally CONE, supra note
1, at 10:18 (discussing influx of foreign firms in expectation of barrier free market in
1992).
68. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 9, 13-Belgium; Agreement, supra note 3, at
first "Whereas" clause.
69. See Agreement, supra note 3, at sixth "Whereas" clause.
70. Id. at thirteenth "Whereas" clause.
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rists who did not register with the Brussels Bars and thus were
not avocats or advocaten.71 Over the years, the Brussels Bars ex-
pressed concern that some of the "best and brightest" Belgian
legal minds chose not to become Belgian lawyers, but instead
worked for foreign firms, sometimes at triple the salary they
would have earned as a Belgian lawyer.72
B. A Summary of the Brussels Bars' Dealings with Foreign Lawyers
up until the Agreement
The Brussels Bars' dealings with foreign lawyers has ranged
from hostility to acceptance. The mid to late 1960s and early to
mid 1970s were periods in which Brussels lawyers worried about
competition from foreign lawyers and there was much hostility
towards foreign lawyers.73 Under pressure from the bars, the
Belgian Government began to issue work permits, or profes-
sional cards, that contained numerous restrictions on foreign
lawyers.7 ' For example, many of these professional cards pro-
71. See Hague Proceedings, supra note 19; Patrick Stewart, Partners in Belgium,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at A4 (noting that Brussels rules unintentionally encouraged
best graduates to join international firms without registering locally); U.S. Lawyers to
Register with Brussels Bar, INT'L LAw., Apr. 1994, at 2 (noting that high quality local law-
yers joined international firms without registering as avocats) [hereinafter U.S. Lawyers].
This became a concern for the bar and a major incentive to resolve the issue.
In this context, the term "foreign firms" refers to firms having "foreign", or non-
Brussels-qualified, lawyers because the Brussels Bars' ethics rules prohibited member-
ship with foreign lawyers who were not qualified as Brussels lawyers.
72. See Greenhouse, supra note 67 (noting that "high-paying American firms, for
example, are bidding up salaries for young Belgian law school graduates, in some cases
tripling their pay."). Also, "Belgian firms often complain about the starting salaries
American firms pay to 25-year-old-lawyers - often $65,000 or more, at least twice what
many Belgian firms pay." Havemann, supra note 67 (quoting Carl Bevernage, president
of Brussels' Dutch Language Bar, as noting that U.S. firms pay double local going rate
for starting attorneys); see also U.S. Lawyers, supra note 71 (noting that Agreement
should help ease tension in Brussels, where local bar tried unsuccessfully to bring for-
eign law firms under its wing).
73. See CONE, supra note 1, at 10:4-8; Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 476-77; Inter-
view with Walter Oberreit, Agreement Negotiator, in Brussels, Belgium (July 4, 1995)
[hereinafter Oberreit July 4, 1995 Interview].
74. See CONE, supra note 1, at 10:2-6; Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 476. See also
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACrICE, supra note 2, at 57-58 (describing policies and restric-
tions implemented in 1972). These restrictions were possible because, although U.S.
and other foreign lawyers did not need to be licensed as Brussels liwyers in order to
provide legal advice, they did need a professional card issued by the immigration au-
thorities in order to reside and practice in Brussels. CONE, supra note 1, at 10:3. These
professional cards, however, were only required of foreign lawyers who were partners.
Associates only needed work permits. See SPEDDING, supra note 2, at 225.
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vided that foreign lawyers could not cooperate with Belgian law-
yers, could not have Belgian lawyers as partners or employees,
and could not advise on Belgian law.75 Indeed, the restrictions
on these cards were so severe that the U.S. embassy became con-
cerned about the issue and a series of diplomatic negotiations
ensued.1
6
After this period of hostility, the late 1970s and early 1980s
ushered in a period of relatively peaceful coexistence.77 The bar
leadership in Brussels realized that foreign lawyers were there to
stay. As a result, there seemed to be less pressure with respect to
the work permit issue. 78 In 1984, the Brussels Bars created a spe-
cial status, called the B List, for foreign lawyers who were not
avocats. Among other provisions, the new B List contained
"scope of practice" provisions which permitted B List lawyers, in-
cluding U.S. lawyers, to practice European Community law. The
B List rules also relaxed the rules prohibiting registered Belgian
lawyers from associating with foreign lawyers, although there still
were many restrictions which limited the usefulness of the "B
75. See CONE, supra note 1, at 10:3-6 (describing "The Professional-Card Wars");
SPEDDING, supra note 2, at 225, (describing system for issuing professional cards, and
importance of Brussels to foreign lawyers); Verbeke, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that
most permits were issued with proviso that permit holder will not practice Belgian law
and, in many cases, will not hire Belgian lawyers).
One of the leading foreign lawyers in Brussels concluded that this policy was a big
mistake on the part of the Belgians. He believes that if Belgian lawyers worked as part-
ners with foreigners, there would have been six to eight big international firms in Brus-
sels with dominant Belgian lawyers. See OberreitJuly 4, 1995 Interview, supra note 73.
76. See CONE, supra note 1, at 10:7-11; Brussels Bars' Position Paper, supra note 61.
The Brussels Bars' Position Paper explains that "these cards or permits have been issued
with the express proviso that the applicant may not practice Belgian law, nor hire or
employ Belgian lawyers. The latter condition has not been enforced for many years."
Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 476 n.85. (noting that "Bertouille & Konyk, Belgium,
in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE ... discuss policies of the Ministry of Middle Classes
and the Brussels Bar as of 1972 that do not reflect the curTent policies of the Ministry
and may no longer represent the views of the Brussels Bar."
77. OberreitJuly 4, 1995 Interview, supra note 73.
78. Id.; see also CONE, supra note 1, at 10:12. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Brussels
Bar,
began to question its policy of discouraging its members from associating with
these firms ... and began to cast around for an appropriate way to encourage
cooperation between EU and Belgian lawyers in Brussels, and, not so inciden-
tally, to bring the EU lawyers within the ambit of the Brussels bar.
Id.
Additionally, the Brussels Bars noticed the lack of enforcement of card restrictions
and the fact that the card quotas were not reached.
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List."7 9 Within five years of the creation of the B List, a number
of American, English, Dutch, German, and Japanese lawyers
were employed by, or had become partners of, Belgian avocat
firms.80 In 1991, the Brussels Bars further relaxed their ethics
rules when they permitted Belgian lawyers acting as partners at
the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Hamilton & Steen, Brussels
("Cleary Gottlieb") to become tableau lawyers, provided several
conditions were satisfied.8
The Brussels Bars recognized that when the 1992 European
Integration occurred, they would have to consider more fully the
role of the many European Community lawyers, especially Eng-
lish, French, and Dutch lawyers, who practiced in Brussels. The
Brussels Bars were particularly concerned about unregulated for-
eign lawyers.82 Their concerns included risk of confusion on the
part of clients, as well as concerns that the foreign lawyers were
unfairly advantaged because they were not bound by, and were
not necessarily complying with, restrictive Brussels ethics rules
on advertising, for example.83 At approximately the same time,
79. The new rules authorized Brussels avocats to form associations in Brussels with
members of non-Belgian Bars who registered with the Brussels Bar. The new rules also
treated members of non-Belgian Bars as associates, or if the foreign lawyers registered
with the Brussels Bar for at least three years, as partners. The U.S. lawyers taking advan-
tage of these new rules were subject to the rules of the Brussels Bar and its disciplinary
procedures. SPEDDING, supra note 2, at 225-26; see also Transnational Law Practice, supra
note 2, at 797 (noting both 1984 relaxation and corollary informal quota of 25 work
permits per year for non-EC lawyers); Verbeke, supra note 56, at 15 (summarizing 1984
regulations); CONE, supra note 1, at 10:13-15 (describing in detail history of regulations
and scope of practice provision).
80. Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 478.
81. See Verbeke, supra note 56, at 15 (explaining reasons why Brussels Bar recently
admitted Belgian lawyers working for Cleary, Gottlieb, Hamilton & Steen, Brussels
("Cleary Gottlieb") to full membership); CONE, supra note 1, at 10:15-16, 39-40.
82. See Carl Bevernage, President of the Dutch Order of the Brussels Bar, Brussels:
The Meeting of National and Transnational Practices and the Nature of Community
Practice, The Regulatory Framework, speech at Lawyers in Europe Third Annual Prac-
tice Conference (Nov. 20, 1992) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
83. See Brussels Bars' Position Paper, supra note 61 (noting that there were approxi-
mately 350 foreign lawyers in Brussels, 120 of whom registered on B List and expressed
an interest in working together to achieve greater registration); see also Greenhouse,
supra note 67 (reporting complaints by Belgian lawyers that some U.S. lawyers acted
unprofessionally when they placed advertisements to announce their arrival in Brus-
sels); Havemann, supra note 67 (quoting an unnamed source as saying "Many [Brus-
sels] lawyers feel that they are being invaded by foreigners who are playing by different
rules."). This story noted that the Brussels Bar sharply limits advertising. Local law
firms cannot even widely distribute informational brochures about themselves. It also
prohibits lawyers from lobbying, yet lobbying is precisely why many U.S. law firms came
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the French Order of the Brussels Bar adopted a policy statement
that recites that a "policy of open welcome .... is the one and only
policy worthy for the Bar of the main capital of EEC institutions,
a few months before the single market comes into effect."84
Thus, in 1992, the Brussels Bars approached several different bar
associations, including the ABA, in the hopes of negotiating
agreements requiring foreign lawyers to register with one of the
Brussels Bars and binding them to the Brussels Bars' ethics
rules. 5 The Bars' negotiations with the ABA lasted two years. At
the same time that the Brussels Bars negotiated with the ABA,
they also negotiated with the English and the Paris Bars, among
others.8 6 It is against this backdrop that the Agreement must be
to Brussels. Sheila Kaplan, Backlash in Brussels, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at 1, 20.
Verbeke, supra note 56, at 15-16 (noting existence of unsatisfactory marketing situation
because everyone except notaries, avocats, and foreign lawyers admitted on B list are
permitted to advertise or otherwise directly market their services). Thus, there are no
restrictions on unregistered foreign law firms and auditing firms. In explaining the
special 1991 exemption for Belgian lawyers who were Cleary Gottlieb partners, the au-
thor pointed out "[t]he firm's reputation as the one U.S. firm which had always sought
to comply with the Brussels ethical code," but noted Brussels lawyers' concern about
whether this treatment would be extended to other firms "some of which show a fairly
reckless disregard of local norms."
84. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ISSUED UNANIMOUSLY ON MAY 5, 1992 BY THE FRENCH
LANGUAGE ORDER OF THE BRUSSELS BAR FOR THE 'ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN LAWYERS IN
BRUSSELS' (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see CONE, supra note 1, at
10:19.
85. See generally Brussels Bars'Position Paper, supra note 61 (noting that Brussels Bars
also approached Law Society of England and Wales in order to reach agreement on
conditions under which foreign lawyers could practice in Brussels); Carl Bevernage,
Interview: On the Legal Scene in Belgium, 12 LAw. IN EUR. 18, 19 (1992) (noting desire for
registration of all foreign lawyers and referring to ongoing discussions with Law Society
of England and Wales and ABA). The Brussels Bars also realized that they needed to
address the issue of the differential treatment of lawyers at Cleary Gottlieb. Id.; see
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:21 (explaining that some of Brussels Bars' officers and re-
cently arrived U.S. lawyers believed ABA might be "a promising interlocutor that might
help find a consensual escape from the dead end of regulatory inadequacy").
86. See English and Belgians Agree on a Deal, INT'L LAw., May 1994, at 4; U.S. Lawyers,
supra note 71 (noting that Brussels Bars also engaged in parallel talks with Law Society
of England and Wales); Update, Solicitors Report on Progress with Paris and Brussels Bars, 27
LAw. IN EUR. 8 (1993); John de Forte, Brussels: Defending the Local Market, 23 LAw. IN
EUR. 23 (1993) (noting agreement between Brussels and Paris Bars); Update, Paris-Brus-
sels Agreement on Access, 23 LAw. IN EUR. 11 (1993) (providing further details of Paris-
Brussels agreement); CONE, supra note 1, at 10:17-18, 29-34 (summarizing agreements
entered into by Brussels Bars with Bars of Strasbourg, Lille, Paris, England, Geneva,
Montreal, Italy, and Netherlands); Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Guidelines and
Information Concerning the Registration of Foreign Lawyers in Belgium and With the
Brussels Bar (May 22, 1996) (containing full text in original languages of Brussels
Dutch Bar's 1977, 1988 and December 23, 1992 agreements with Paris Bar Council;
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understood.
C. The Legislative History of the Agreement
The Agreement is the product of approximately two years of
negotiations. The parties consisted of representatives from the
Brussels Bars and the ABA. Approximately six U.S. lawyers and
six representatives of the Brussels Bars participated in the negoti-
ations.87
1. The Genesis of the Agreement
The genesis of the Agreement was a letter sent to the ABA
President by the President of the Dutch Order of the Brussels
Bar, Carl Bevernage, in July of 1992. Mr. Bevernage indicated
that he and a colleague from the French Order of the Brussels
Bar would be at the August 1992 ABA Annual Meeting in San
Francisco. 8 He reported that "[o]ur respective Bar Councils
have asked us to seize upon this occasion to discuss with the rele-
vant committee or section of the ABA the practice rules for
American lawyers and law firms in Brussels."89 The President of
the ABA responded to this letter by asking these Brussels lawyers
to brief the ABA's Special Advisory Committee on International
September 18, 1993 agreement with Geneva Bar Council; May 26, 1994 agreement with
St. Petersburg Bar; June 13,1994 agreement with [Italian] National Bar Council; July 7,
1994 agreement with Law Society of England and Wales; March 22, 1995 agreement
with Dutch Bar Council (Netherlands); andJune 15, 1995 agreement with Bologna Bar
Council) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
87. In contrast with talks between the ABA and CCBE, for example, none of these
negotiation sessions included official government representatives. See, e.g., Agreed Min-
utes of Meeting Between Representative of The American Bar Association (ABA) and
The Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE), New York
City, Oct. 12, 1991 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Oct.
CCBE Minutes]. The minutes reflect the attendance of U.S. State Department repre-
sentatives and EC Commission representatives.
88. See Letter from Carl Bevernage, President of the Dutch Order of the Brussels
Bar, to Talbot D'Alemberte, ABA President (July 9, 1992) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
89. Id. This letter explained the reason for the request as follows:
Now that the practice by and with foreign lawyers has been reshaped in France
and more particularly in Paris as well as in London, it has become urgent to
revisit unresolved issues of the same nature in Brussels. We therefore welcome,
the opportunity to prepare the way in San Francisco for meaningful discus-
sions between the Brussels Bar and the ABA at an appropriate level.
Id. This July 1992 letter to the ABA followed a March 1992 letter the Brussels Bar sent
to the English Law Society with a similar request to negotiate. See English and Belgians
Agree on Deal, INT'L LAw., May 1994, at 4.
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Activities and to meet with the ABA Section of International Law
and Practice's Transnational Legal Practice Committee. 90 The
Brussels representatives accepted the invitation of the ABA Presi-
dent and met with these groups.
2. The ABA Negotiators
Following the presentation by the Brussels representatives at
the ABA Annual meeting9 ' and upon the recommendation of
the Special Advisory Committee, the ABA President asked Steve
C. Nelson and Joseph P. Griffin to pursue discussions with the
Brussels Bars along the lines indicated.92 Mr. Nelson and Mr.
Griffin were past chairs of the ABA's International Law Section,
were chair and vice-chair, respectively, of the Transnational
Legal Practice Committee, and both had spent several years
practicing in Brussels.93 They immediately enlisted the assist-
ance of Walter Oberreit, who had practiced in Brussels for over
twenty-five years.94 The three then began to seek other lawyers
to add to the ABA negotiating team. Their goals were to provide
90. See Letter from Talbot D'Alemberte, ABA President, to Carl Bevernage, Presi-
dent of the Dutch Order of the Brussels Bar, (July 16, 1992) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
91. At the ABA Annual Meeting in San Francisco, the representatives of the Brus-
sels Bars presented a "Position Paper." See Brussels Bars'Position Paper, supra note 61. A
"Statement of Principles Issued Unanimously on May 5, 1992 by the French Language
Order of the Brussels Bar for the 'Establishment of Foreign Lawyers in Brussels"' pre-
ceded this position paper. In their September 4, 1992 response to the Position Paper,
the ABA negotiators indicated that they also received a copy of this "Statement of Prin-
ciples." See Letter from Steven C. Nelson & Joseph P. Griffin, Chair and Vice Chair
respectively, ABA Committee on Transnational Legal Practice, to Mr. Carl Bevernage
and Mr. Edouard Jakhian, Presidents of the Dutch and French Orders of the Brussels
Bars, respectively, 2 (Sept. 4, 1992) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
[hereinafter Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter].
92. See Memorandum Regarding the Proposed Protocol with the Brussels Bar
Councils from James H. Carter, Chair of the ABA Section of International Law and
Practice, to the Board of Governors, 4 (Mar. 24, 1994) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter Mar. 24, 1994 Carter Memorandum]; Nelson Mar. 10,
1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42. See also Minutes of the Meeting of the Special
Advisory Committee on International Activities, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 9, 1992 (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that Steve Nelson briefed entire
group on recent developments in Brussels and "agreed to prepare comments on the
Brussels Bar's [sic] proposal by the end of August.").
93. Id.; see also Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91; Letter from Jo-
seph P. Griffin to Laurel S. Terry (June 27, 1997) (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter Griffin June 27, 1997 Letter].
94. Telephone Interview with Joseph Griffin, Agreement Negotiator (Feb. 14,
1997) [hereinafter Griffin Feb. 14, 1997 Telephone Interview].
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balance as to geography, firm size, and type of practice. They
believed that such balance was important to their goal of ob-
taining approval of a final agreement from the ABA hierarchy.95
Six U.S. lawyers, all private practitioners, ultimately joined
the ABA negotiating team. This negotiating team was very sta-
ble. No additional personnel were added over the course of the
two-year negotiation, no one left the team, and all remained very
involved.96 These six representatives included Joseph P. Grif-
fin,97 John H. Harwood 11,98 Steven C. Nelson,99 Walter W. Ober-
reit,100 Paul D. Sher,' 0 1 and Thomas C. Vinje 0 2 Attorneys Nel-
son and Griffin were designated as co-chairs of the ABA negotiat-
ing team. 1°3 Of these six, all except Steve Nelson and Joe Griffin
were based in Brussels at the time of the negotiations.
The Belgians usually had the same number of people at a
negotiating session as did the ABA, although the composition of
the Belgian group changed as the bar officials changed."0 4 Carl
95. Id.
96. Interview with Joseph Griffin, Agreement Negotiator, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview].
97. Mr. Griffin was Co-Chairman of the ABA/CCBE Joint Working Group and
Vice-Chairman of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice's Committee on
Transnational Legal Practice. He also was a partner resident in the Washington, D.C.
office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. Id. Mr. Griffin described himself as the "bad
cop" to Steve Nelson's "good cop" in the "good cop/bad cop" negotiations that some-
times occurred. Id. He indicated that after awhile, these roles were so obvious that it
was humorous, and that the Belgian negotiators sometimes assumed similar roles. Id.
98. Mr. Harwood was with the Brussels office of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Id.
99. Mr. Nelson was a past-chair of the ABA's Section on International Law and
Practice. He was also chair of that section's Committee on Transnational Legal Prac-
tice. He is a partner resident in the Minneapolis office of Dorsey & Whitney.
100. Mr. Oberreit was a partner with Cleary Gottlieb, and a resident of Brussels.
Mr. Griffin described Mr. Oberreit to me as "the dean of foreign lawyers in Brussels."
Id. At the time of the negotiations, Mr. Oberreit had practiced law in Brussels for over
25 years and was well-regarded by the Belgians. Id. See also Verbeke, supra note 56, at
15-16. In explaining the special 1991 exemption for Belgian lawyers who were Cleary
Gottlieb partners, the author noted "[t]he firm's reputation as the one U.S. firm which
had always sought to comply with the Brussels ethical code."
101. Mr. Sher was a member of Paul D. Sher & Associates, and a resident of Brus-
sels. Mr. Sher's firm was a relatively small firm, providing balance to the representatives
from large law firms. See Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
102. Mr. Vinje was with Morrison & Foerster LLP, and a resident of Brussels. In
addition to providing representation of a West Coast firm, Mr. Vinje was a partner of
Robert D. Raven, a former ABA President. He thus had access to information which
would help the group shepherd any final agreement through the ABA hierarchy. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Bevernage, who was President of the Dutch Bar Council at the
time the negotiations began, took the dominant role in the ne-
gotiations for the Belgians. 05 According to Joe Griffin, the
negotiators for the Brussels Bars, like the ABA negotiators, were
private practitioners. 1 6
3. The History of the Negotiations
The first ABA response to the Brussels Bars was a five page
letter sent by Mr. Nelson and Mr. Griffin approximately one
month after the August 1992 ABA Annual Meeting in San Fran-
cisco.107 By the time negotiations concluded, the parties had
met over fifteen times'0 8 and exchanged over thirty drafts."0 9
105. Id.
106. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. Several of the negotiators oc-
cupied leadership positions within the Brussels Bars. According to Joe Griffin,
although these positions required significant time commitments, as does the presidency
of the ABA, these lawyers came from private practice and intended to return to private
practice. Id.
107. See Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91. The five page single
spaced letter expressed interest in cooperating and then set forth the criteria by which
they believed one must judge the legitimacy, in an open global economy, of any condi-
tion of, or restriction upon, the right of any lawyer who is duly qualified as a member of
a recognized legal profession to practice outside the jurisdiction in which he is so quali-
fied. This portion of the letter stated:
In our view, any such condition or restriction must be objectively justified as a
means of achieving either or both of the purposes of (i) protecting the public,
as consumers of legal services, against the risks of relying upon legal advice
rendered by those who are not competent to render such advice and (ii) pre-
serving the integrity of, and public respect for, the legal profession as a whole.
We do not regard as a legitimate purpose of professional regulation the limita-
tion of economic competition among lawyers, as we do not believe lawyers can
properly claim exemption from the rules of competition that apply to persons
providing other services, provided of course that such competition is not car-
ried out in a manner which tends to interfere with the achievement of either
of the two legitimate purposes referred to above. We have taken this position
with regulatory authorities of various jurisdictions in the United States who
have been or are now considering the adoption of legal consultant rules, and
we intend to continue to work toward a global system based upon these princi-
ples.
Id. The letter continued by stating: "We believe the restrictions and conditions you
propose to implement can be fairly said to be objectively justified for the achievement
of the two purposes it recognized, subject to [five points.]" The letter sought "your
thoughts and clarifications on the various questions we have raised" at the upcoming
meeting on September 14, 1992. Id.
108. The meetings between the negotiating parties included the following: Aug. 8,
1992 (San Francisco); Sept. 14-15, 1992 (Brussels); Oct. 29, 1992 (Brussels); Jan. 18,
1993 (Brussels); May 7, 1993 (Brussels); May 13, 1993 (Brussels); May 27, 1993 (Brus-
sels); June 23, 1993 (Brussels); Aug. 8, 1993 (New York City); Aug. 9, 1993 (New York
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Until the very end of the negotiations when numerous letters
and corrections were exchanged, progress occurred primarily as
a result of face-to-face meetings. 110 These meetings were held
on an ad hoc basis, when the two U.S. based participants were in
Brussels.' These meetings, which generally happened every
one to two months, took place in a conference room at the Pa-
City); Sept. 16, 1993 (Brussels); Oct. 18, 1993 (Brussels); Oct. 21, 1993 (Brussels); May
6, 1994 (Brussels); May 17, 1994 (Brussels); Aug. 6, 1994 (New Orleans).
The parties did not necessarily realize at the outset that their negotiations would
take so long. In February 1993, for example, Carl Bevernage stated that he hoped to
have a signed agreement by the time of the ABA Annual Meeting in August 1993. See
Update, 19 LAw. IN EUR. 7 (Feb. 1993). That date came and went, however, without a
final agreement. Indeed, there is a handwritten comment on a February 1, 1994 cover
memo from Steve Nelson noting that the English "solicitors expect to reach agreement
with our Belgian colleagues this week. I remember thinking that once." See Cover Memo
from Steven Nelson, ABA Negotiator, to ABA NegotiatingTeam (Oberreit, Harwood,
Griffin, Sher, Vinje) (Feb. 1, 1994).
109. The written exchanges between the parties can be sorted into four different
groups. The first items exchanged were the Brussels Bars' Position Paper, supra note 61,
and the Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91 (responding to Position
Paper).
The second set of exchanges were drafts of the Agreement, then called a Protocol.
These drafts included the following, identified by the date of the draft and party circu-
lating the draft: Jan. 14, 1993 (Brussels); Mar. 2, 1993 (ABA); Apr. 30, 1993 (Brussels);
May 14, 1993 (ABA); May 19, 1993 (ABA); May 25, 1993 (ABA; Article 8 and Annex
only); June 17, 1993 (Brussels); Aug. 3, 1993 (Brussels); and Aug. 5, 1993 (ABA).
In August 1993, at the ABA Annual Meeting in New York, the parties decided to
develop a consensus on general principles, to be called "Heads of Agreement," rather
than negotiate specific agreement language. The exchanges that occurred during this
third stage of negotiation included the following, identified by the date of the letter
and party circulating the draft or comment: Sept. 13, 1993 (Brussels; Bevernage draft
and Slootmans draft of art. 9 on ethics); Sept. 14-15, 1993 (ABA); Sept. 16, 1993 (Brus-
sels); Sept. 18, 1993 (ABA); Sept. 21, 1993 (Brussels); Oct. 13, 1993 (ABA); Oct. 18,
1993 (Brussels); Oct. 19, 1993 (Brussels); Oct. 20, 1993 (ABA); Oct. 21, 1993 (Brussels);
Oct. 22, 1993 (Brussels); Nov. 16, 1993 (Brussels); Dec. 15, 1993 (ABA); Dec. 31, 1993
(Brussels); Jan. 13, 1994 (ABA);Jan. 27, 1994 (Brussels; para.,12); Feb. 2, 1994 (Brus-
sels); Feb. 11, 1994 (ABA); Mar. 2, 1994 (Brussels; noting that French and Dutch Or-
ders had approved Heads of Agreement on Feb. 21 and 22, 1994).
The fourth set of documents were exchanged after agreement on the Heads of
Agreement; the documents concerned the specific language of the Agreement. In-
cluded in these exchanges were the following, identified by date of the letter and party
circulating the draft or comment: May 6, 1994 (ABA); May 11, 1994 (ABA); May 18,
1994 (Brussels; partial changes); June 6, 1994 (ABA). In addition to the above, there
was a series of correspondence that were more in the nature of "technical corrections."
These include letters on June 24, 1994 (Brussels, noting approval of the June 6, 1994
agreement by the two Brussels orders); June 27, 1994 (ABA); June 30, 1994 (Brussels);
June 30, 1994 (ABA);July 1, 1994 (Brussels; noting they reached Agreement).
110. Griffin Feb. 14, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
111. Id.
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lais dejustice, where the Brussels Bars had their offices.11 2 The
parties conducted the negotiations in English. 113 Unlike negoti-
ation sessions between the ABA and the CCBE, these did not
include any U.S. or European Government representatives." 4
The negotiations were very informal. 5 No minutes were
kept of the negotiating sessions. 1 6 Although the participants
kept their own files," 7 no particular effort was made to keep an
official file of all the paperwork generated in connection with
the negotiations." 8 There rarely were agendas for the meeting.
When there were, they were often delivered the morning of the
meeting.119 Because the ABA negotiators did not have any sort
of model as to how they should be proceeding, they basically
were "making it up" as they went along. 12  Thus, in the early
meetings, both sides were trying to develop a list of issues that
needed to be covered in any agreement and to learn more about
the other side's concerns.
Following a negotiating session, the ABA representatives
would assign someone to document the progress made during
the discussion and someone to prepare a response, if one was
required.' 2 1 That response might appear shortly thereafter or
months later.1 22 The ABA representatives generally circulated
draft responses to each other, and sometimes to the greater U.S.
112. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
113. Id.
114. See Oct. CCBE Minutes, supra note 87 (showing representatives of U.S. State
Department and EC Commission attending this meeting).
115. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
116. Id. This practice stands in contrast to the practice of the ABA/CCBE Work-
ing Group. This group, which included many of the same people as the ABA/Brussels
Bar negotiations, Steve Nelson,Joe Griffin, Carl Bevernage, issued "Agreed Minutes" on
several occasions. See Oct. CCBE Minutes, supra note 87.
117. Joe Griffin was kind enough to share his file concerning the Agreement with
this author [hereafter cited as ABA/Brussels file] (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal). Where I am citing a specific document, I have given the date, author and
recipient of the document. For the sake of brevity, however, when summarizing numer-
ous documents or the negotiations, I used a "see generally ABA/Brussels file" cite. Cop-
ies of this file and these documents are available from the author. I also used the "see
generally" cite on a few occasions where I am citing a document merely as an example of
a reaction and where I thought it appropriate to omit the name of the particular lawyer
in order to protect the lawyer's privacy.
118. Griffin Feb. 14, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
119. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
1414 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1382
legal community in Brussels, before sending any response to the
Brussels representatives.12
3
Between September 1992 and June 1993, the negotiators
met approximately eight times and exchanged seven different
drafts of the Agreement, then called a Protocol. 124 In June 1993,
the parties seemed relatively close to an agreement. 12' There
was a hiatus, however, until the August 1993 ABA Annual Meet-
ing in New York City. At that time the Brussels negotiators
presented their own, completely new document entitled "Heads
of Agreement. ''126 This document, containing the principles to
be embodied in the proposed agreement rather than the actual
agreement, was a distillation of the most important points in the
May 1993 drafts of the Protocol.1 27 As reported to the ABA
Board of Governors, the Brussels Bars intended to present the
document to their memberships in order to obtain authority to
proceed with the actual drafting and signature of the final text.
"This procedure was designed to get the Bar Councils around
internal difficulties that had apparently arisen when they at-
tempted to present the more detailed document to their full
membership. 128
The ABA negotiators agreed to use this Heads of Agree-
ment approach proposed by the Brussels Bars. 129 It required
over fifteen exchanges and several meetings before the parties
could agree on the Heads of Agreement.1"' The parties finally
reached an agreement in principle on January 28, 1993. On
February 21 and 22, 1994, the two Brussels Bars approved the
agreement headings, subject to ABA approval. 3' The ABA
Board of Governors approved these Heads of Agreement during
123. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
124. See supra note 109.
125. See Mar. 24, 1994 Carter Memorandum, supra note 92, at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Memorandum on Proposed Protocol with the Brussels Bar Coun-
cils from Virginia M. Russell, Director, Presidential Administration and International
Liaison, to Operations Committee, ABA Board of Governors (Mar. 31, 1994) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
128. See Mar. 24, 1994 Carter Memorandum, supra note.92, at 2.
129. See id.
130. See supra note 109.
131. See Letter from Erik Carre and Pierre Legros, Presidents of the Dutch and
French Orders of the Brussels Bars, respectively, to Steven Nelson and Joseph Griffin,
ABA Negotiators, (Mar. 2, 1994) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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its April 15-16, 1994 meeting. 13 2
Meanwhile, as soon as the Heads of Agreement had been
finalized; the parties began negotiating the specific language of
an agreement. This stage of the negotiations proceeded quite
quickly compared to the earlier negotiations. Whereas it took
approximately six months to agree on the Heads of Agreement,
it took less than three months for the parties to agree on the
specific language of the final Agreement.1 3  These negotiations
concerning the specific language of the final Agreement were
handled primarily by an exchange of correspondence between
Steve Nelson and Carl Bevernage . 3' Finally, on July 1, 1994, al-
most two years after his initial letter, Carl Bevernage sent a letter
to Steve Nelson announcing that they had an agreement. 135
During the August 1994 ABA Annual Meeting in New Orleans,
132. See Minutes of the Meeting of the American Bar Association Board of Gover-
nors 1996 [sic], Washington, D.C., April 15-16, 1994 (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). These minutes state:
UPON MOTION DULY MADE, SECONDED AND CARRIED:
The Board of Governors approved the request of the Section of Interna-
tional Law and Practice to conclude a Protocol with the Brussels Bar Councils
with the understanding that the text of the final draft of the Protocol will be
submitted to the Board for final approval at the June or August 1994 meeting,
and further, that (1) the text of the final draft will incorporate the substance
of footnote I on page 3 of the request concerning the term "mandatory," and
(2) that clarification will be provided with respect to the extent of the Associa-
tion's commitment as it relates to "undertake to use its best efforts" to en-
courage adoption of the ABA Model Rule on the Licensing of Legal Consul-
tants.
Id. at 2. This motion was made at the recommendation of the Operations Committee
of the ABA Board of Governors. Id. The Special Advisory Committee on International
Activities had submitted to the Operations Committee a two page memorandum, dated
March 31, 1994, introducing the three attached items: 1) a March 24, 1994 Memoran-
dum from James H. Carter, Chair of the Section of International Law and Practice to
the ABA Board of Governors regarding the Proposed Protocol with the Brussels Bar
Councils; 2) the Heads of Agreement document; and 3) the May 19, 1993 draft of the
"Protocol."
133. See supra note 109.
134. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
135. Letter from Carl Bevernage, President of the Dutch Language Order of the
Brussels Bar, to Steven C. Nelson, ABA Negotiator (June 27, 1994) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). This letter also discussed the logistics of preparing
the French Language and Dutch Language versions of the Agreement, each of which
would be considered equally authentic. Id. The file reveals only one translation issue
which arose during this period; a minor question arose as to title in English which
would best correspond to the titles given in French and Dutch for the committee that
ultimately became the "Joint Supervisory Committee." Other possibilities were the Joint
Implementation Committee and the Joint Oversight Committee. Id.
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the Agreement was presented to the entire Board of Governors
of the ABA and approved. 136 On Saturday, August 6, 1994, the
Agreement was signed by R. William Ide III, President of the
ABA, Pierre Legros, Bdtonnier of the French Language Order of
the Brussels Bar, and Erik Carre, Stajhouder of the Dutch Lan-
guage Order of the Brussels Bar.13 7
4. Consultations with the U.S. Legal Community in Brussels
The final Agreement did not come as a surprise to the U.S.
legal community in Brussels because the community had been
regularly consulted during the negotiation process. When the
136. See Minutes, American Bar Association Board of Governors 1996 [sic], New
Orleans, La., Aug. 4-5, 1994. These minutes state, "UPON MOTION DULY MADE,
SECONDED AND CARRIED; The Board approved the Agreement with the Brussels Bar
Councils proposed by the Section of International Law and Practice as contained in
Exhibit 3.8 of the August 3-5, 1994, agenda books." Id.
These minutes explain the history of the Agreement between the April, 1994 pre-
liminary approval and August, 1994 final approval by the ABA Board of Governors:
At its June meeting, the Board deferred consideration of a request from the
Section of International Law and Practice for an Agreement with the Brussels
Bar Councils. The Agreement superseded a draft Protocol proposed by the
Section at the April meeting. The Board deferred action on the Agreement
and directed the Section to prepare a black-lined copy, noting changes from
the Agreement, for consideration by the Executive Committee. In reviewing
the black-lined copy, the Executive Committee noted that the Agreement in-
cluded substantial changes that had not been considered by the Board previ-
ously, and referred the matter to the full Board. The Operations Committee
advised that it had received a full report from Governor Shestack, Board liai-
son to the Section, on the changes contained in proposed Agreement. The
Committee recommended that the Agreement be approved as presented.
See Minutes, American Bar Association Board of Governors 1994, New Orleans, La.,
Aug. 4-5, 1994. In addition to the above items, the Minutes from the June 2-3, 1994
meeting note that the conditions imposed by the Board at the April Meeting had been
satisfied. See Minutes of American Bar Association Board of Governors 1994, Chicago,
Ill., June 2-3, 1994 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
137. Agreement, supra note 3, at 10. Present at the signing of the French, Dutch
and English versions of the Agreement were: R. William Ide III, President of the ABA;
Pierre Legros, Bdtonnier of the French Language Order of the Brussels Bar; Erik Carre,
Stafhouder of the Dutch Language Order of The Brussels Bar; ABA negotiators Steven C.
Nelson and Joseph Griffin; Brussels negotiators Carl Bevernage and Michel Van Doosse-
laere; Virginia Russell, ABA Director, Presidential Administration and International Li-
aison; and Gayle Ide. See Letter from R. William Ide, III, ABA President, to Pierre Le-
gros, Bdtonnier of the French Language Order of the Brussels Bar, Erik Carre, Stafhouder
of the Dutch Language Order of the Brussels Bar, Steven C. Nelson and Joseph Griffin,
ABA negotiators, and Carl Bevernage and Michel Van Doosselaere, Brussels negotiators
(Sept. 26, 1994) (enclosing copy of photograph taken at signing) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Virginia Russell, ABA Direc-
tor, Presidential Administration and International Liaison (Mar. 10, 1997).
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ABA negotiators first appeared in Brussels, the reaction of some
of the U.S. lawyers based in Brussels was to ask the negotiators
"who are you and who appointed you God?"'13 8 Many U.S. law-
yers in Brussels initially resisted the idea of an agreement be-
cause they believed the status quo was fine and that an agree-
ment was risky.139 The negotiators responded by telling these
lawyers about the Brussels Bars' threat to have their Government
enforce stricter standards against U.S. lawyers.' 40 ABA negotia-
tors believed, and most U.S. lawyers in Brussels were convinced,
that it was necessary for U.S. lawyers to reach an agreement with
the Brussels Bars because there was a real risk that U.S. lawyers
would not be permitted to continue practicing as they had
been.'
The U.S. legal community in Brussels remained apprised of
the status of the negotiations through periodic meetings held
shortly before or after the negotiating sessions.1 42 In addition,
the ABA negotiating team circulated many of the Agreement
drafts to the U.S. legal community in Brussels, seeking input. 14 3
The ABA team incorporated many of the comments and sugges-
tions received into their drafts and negotiating posture.'44
138. Griffin Feb.' 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. With respect to the issue of
who should be doing the negotiating and the authority of the negotiating team, Joe
Griffin advises that he responded to these questions by asking if anyone wanted to take
over instead, to which he got no answer. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The first briefing of U.S. firms occurred on September 17, 1992, at the offices
of Cleary Gottlieb in Brussels with representatives from approximately 30 U.S. law firms
in attendance. See, e.g., -Memorandum from Walter Oberreit, ABA Negotiator, to U.S.
Law Firms in Brussels (Sept. 22, 1992) (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal); Memorandum from Walter Oberreit, ABA Negotiator, to U.S. Law Firms in Brus-
sels (Oct. 23, 1992) (reminding 34 U.S. law firms of informational meeting on October
28, 1992 with Steve Nelson and Joe Griffin, and asking them for any additions to list of
U.S. firms in Brussels; see also Updated List Showing 35 U.S. Firms (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal)', see C6NE, supra note 1, at 10:21 (noting initial meet-
ing with 35 U.S. law firms). Additional meetings with U.S. firms occurred on Oct. 13,
1992, Oct. 28, 1992, Jan. 15, 1993, Mar. 2, 1993, June 3, 1993, Feb. 1, 1994, and May 5,
1994. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
In addition to speaking with U.S. lawyers, the ABA negotiators occasionally com-
municated with the English representatives, who simultaneously negotiated with the
Brussels Bar representatives. The two bars were not negotiating in tandem, however,
because the starting premises were quite different and thus the issues were quite differ-
ent. See Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
143. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
144. Id.
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Among other things, the ABA sought specific details of the Bel-
gian lawyers working in U.S. firms in order to better negotiate
the transition provisions which would attempt to grandfather in
or ease the restrictions on U.S. firms' current arrangements.
145
The March 1994 report to the ABA Board of Governors
summarized the reactions of U.S. lawyers in Brussels to the nego-
tiations.146 While the report's title Absence of Known Opposition
may not be completely accurate, the content accurately reflects
the reaction of U.S. lawyers in Brussels to the final Agreement
and earlier drafts. Although most U.S. lawyers in Brussels sup-
ported the Agreement, there was some opposition. For exam-
ple, following the August 3, 1994 meeting at which the parties
circulated the final Agreement, the ABA negotiators received a
letter from a U.S. lawyer documenting his previously expressed
concerns about the procedure leading to the Agreement and its
substance. With respect to procedure, the lawyer complained
that the negotiations excluded the Belgian jurists most affected
by the Agreement. With respect to substance, this lawyer com-
plained about the transition provisions, which required very se-
nior Belgian jurists working in U.S. firms to complete a stage or
apprenticeship before the mandatory registration as a tableau
lawyer. 147
5. The Major Concerns
The ABA negotiators clearly benefited from the input of the
145. Id.
146. See Mar. 24, 1994 Carter Memorandum, supra note 92, at 5 (describing U.S.
lawyers' sentiments towards action). The Carter Memorandum states:
Absence of Known Opposition
Our negotiating team has consulted continuously with the American lawyers
and law firms practicing in Brussels. They have met with representatives of all
of the firms, as a group, on at least six occasions and have encouraged them to
make their concerns known. While there are concerns about the specific situ-
ation in which some of the firms will find themselves, particularly insofar as
the transition rules for Belgian jurists are concerned, it appears to be recog-
nized by all concerned that the situation in Brussels will change regardless of
what the ABA or anyone else does and that the American legal profession will
be better served if the ABA attempts to shape that change than if it is simply
permitted to happen, There is no other bar organization that is perceived to
be in a position of authority to represent American interests in this area.
Id.
147. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
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larger U.S. legal community in Brussels. 4 Through these dis-
cussions, and the discussions among the ABA negotiating team
itself, some key positions quickly emerged. Some of the most
important and difficult issues from the perspective of U.S. law-
yers in Brussels included the desire that they not be placed at a
disadvantage in comparison with other law firms in Brussels;
maintaining continuity of their firms, some of which had very
senior Belgian lawyers not registered with the Belgian Bars; and
maintaining their current practices with respect to advice on EU
law.1 49 In contrast, the Belgian concerns included an interest in
having the Belgian jurists, who were working for foreign firms,
become licensed tableau lawyers; the desire that all foreign law-
yers in Brussels register with the Bars and be subject to their eth-
ics rules; and an interest in protecting Belgian clients and law-
yers. The latter two concerns formed the basis for numerous
specific proposals, many of which became the subject of lengthy
negotiations. 150
In addition to these key points, many of the negotiators had
particular issues they considered important. Joe Griffin was par-
ticularly concerned about the European Court of Justice's
AM&S decision, 151 which refused to recognize the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in a situation involving a non-EU attorney. Mr.
Griffin lobbied successfully to include language that provides
that the Brussels Bars will protect and defend U.S. lawyers' pro-
fessional privileges, including the attorney-client and attorney-
attorney privileges. 15 2 Other negotiators, both ABA and Belgian,
148. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
149. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
150. See supra note 82-83 and accompanying text (regarding these concerns).
Some of the Belgian proposals include limitations on U.S. lawyers' ability to advise on
Belgian law; waiting requirements before U.S. lawyers could form partnerships, or coop-
erations, with tableau lawyers or stagiaires; requirements regarding the training period of
stagiaires; requirements regarding firm names and stationery; mandatory registration;
and submission of firm partnership agreements to the bar, among other issues. See also
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:22 (identifying three principal points of difference between
ABA and Brussels negotiators, all of which involved application of specific Brussels eth-
ics rules to U.S. lawyers).
151. AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [19821 E.C.R. 1575, [1982]
2 C.M.L.R. 264; see also CONE, supra note 1, at 8:28 (evaluating impact of this case, which
he believes turned out to be "a tempest in a teapot").
152. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 3. Joe Griffin explains that AM&S was
of particular concern to him because it was decided while he was practicing law in
England. He also helped lead the ABA's fight challenging the AM&S decision. This
resulted in the ABA House of Delegates' adoption of the Section of International Law
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presented points that they wanted included in the Agreement.
Thus, part of the negotiation process became an effort to in-
clude these points, address the underlying concerns, or other-
wise ensure that each negotiator would be willing to support the
Agreement. 153 This "horsetrading" effort ultimately proved suc-
cessful as demonstrated by the signed Agreement. Hence, as of
September 1, 1994, the effective date of the Agreement, U.S. law-
yers in Brussels theoretically received new rights and responsibil-
ities with respect to their provision of legal services in Brussels. 154
The nature of these new rights is set forth below.
III. EXPLORING THE SUBSTANCE DEVELOPED UNDER A
HYBRID MODEL: THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
ABA AND THE BRUSSELS BARS
There are several important aspects to the Agreement that
should be discussed in order to fully understand its impact. Who
the Agreement applies to and the binding force of the Agree-
ment are two important subjects. Additionally, it is necessary to
examine the particular treatment of various issues, including
scope of practice, forms of association, and ethics and discipline.
A. An Overview of the Agreement
The Agreement is ten pages long.15 5 It consists of fourteen
"whereas" clauses, which state the background premises, and
justifications for the Agreement. These provisions are followed
and Practice's January 18, 1983 Report and Recommendation regarding AM&S. See
Griffin June 27, 1997 Letter, supra note 93.
153. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. When I first studied the Agree-
ment, it seemed to be mutually advantageous to both parties. Indeed, I wondered how
useful a model the Agreement would be for it might be unusual to get a situation in
which both sides perceive a cross-border practice agreement to be mutually advanta-
geous. Thus, I was surprised to hear from Joe Griffin that when the negotiations first
began, it was not at all clear to him that an agreement would be possible or that they
were in a "win-win" situation. Id.
154. Meanwhile, the Brussels Bars also reached agreements with the Law Society of
England and Wales and the Paris Bar. See, e.g., Update: Paris-Brussels Agreement on Access,
23 LAw. IN EUR. 11 (1993); Business and the Law: English and Brussels Lawyers Reach Agree-
ment, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at 16 (stating that agreement with Law Society of Eng-
land and Wales and French and Dutch-language Brussels Bars -becomes effective Sep-
tember 15, 1994).
155. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14, para. 3. The final version of the Agreement
was prepared in English, Dutch, and French. The Agreement provides that each ver-
sion is equally authentic. Id.
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by fourteen articles.'56
The key to understanding the Agreement is to realize that it
created, for the first time, a mandatory registration requirement
for all U.S. lawyers practicing in Brussels. 57  The Agreement
made mandatory registration more palatable to U.S. lawyers by
creating a new third list, called the 'Joint List", to supplement
the A List and the B List. A U.S. lawyer's rights and responsibili-
ties differ depending on whether the lawyer chooses to register
156. The titles of these fourteen articles are: Article 1: Registration; Article 2: Co-
operations; Article 3: Partnerships; Article 4: Practice; Article 5: Stationery and Firm
Name; Article 6: Conduct and Privileges; Article 7: Discipline; Article 8: Administra-
tion; Article 9: Registration Fees; Article 10: Non-Discrimination; Article 11: Implemen-
tation; Article 12: Transitional Provisions; Article 13: Reciprocity; Article 14: Final Provi-
sions. See generally Agreement, supra note 3.
157. The Brussels Bars' position paper indicated that one of their major goals in-
cluded mandatory registration of all U.S. lawyers in Brussels. See Brussels Bars' Position
Paper, supra note 61. The ABA negotiators opposed this requirement for over one year.
Their initial response asserted their understanding that any agreement would not apply
to U.S. lawyers who "do not choose to engage in either vertical or horizontal integra-
tion, who would continue to be entitled to carry on a full international practice, includ-
ing advice on the law of the European Economic Community, provided that they do not
advise on matters of Belgian national law." See Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter,
supra note 91. The January 14, 1993, Brussels draft required registration on the B List
of all U.S. lawyers who wished to formally cooperate or form a partnership with mem-
bers of the Brussels Bars; it also required registration, presumably on another list, of "all
holders of a professional card." See supra note 109. The ABA's next draft, however,
used the language "should" rather than "shall" with respect to registration on the Joint
List. This standoff lasted until the August 6, 1993, ABA draft which provided that Joint
List registration would be mandatory "unless the U.S. Lawyer has been seconded for a
limited period of time, not exceeding three years, to the Brussels office of the law firm
of origin in the United States." Id. In the September 18, 1993 ABA draft the ABA
dropped this requirement and agreed to mandatory registration on one of the two lists.
Id.
In contrast to the Agreement which requires all U.S. lawyers in Brussels to register,
the agreement between the Brussels Bars and the English Law Society apparently only
requires solicitor firms with Belgian lawyers to register. See Memorandum of Under-
standing Between the French and Dutch Language Orders of the Brussels Bar and The
Law Society of England and Wales, pt. I(A) (2), reprinted in Nederlandse Orde van Advo-
caten, Guidelines and Information Concerning the Registration of Foreign Lawyers in
Belgium and With the Brussels Bar (May 22, 1996) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). "Other English solicitors who establish in Brussels may be regis-
tered on one of the Bar's Lists of Foreign Lawyers. The Law Society, while having no
statutory power to impose any obligations on English solicitors in this respect, com-
mends the provisions of this Memorandum to English solicitors established in Brussels
. ... "; U.S. Lawyers, supra note 71; Business and the Law: English and Brussels lawyers reach
agreement, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at 16. "English solicitors will be able to practice
under their established firm names in Brussels from September 15 without registering
on one of the Brussels Bars' lists of foreign lawyers." CONE, supra note 1, at 10:29 (sum-
marizing agreement).
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on the B List maintained by each of the two Brussels Bars, re-
ferred to in the Agreement as the "Foreign Lawyer List," or the
newly created Joint List, which is jointly maintained by the two
Brussels Bars. 58 Moreover, unlike some other cross-border ar-
rangements, mandatory registration did not require the U.S. law-
yer to take an examination or satisfy additional requirements,
such as length of practice requirements.1 59
This three category registration system used in the Agree-
ment differs somewhat from the Foreign Legal Consultant
("FLC") concept found in proposals from the NAFTA Working
Party, the IBA, and the ABA.16° The FLC approach contem-
158. The Agreement refers to what had been the B List as the "Foreign Lawyer
List." The latter term is a new term, selected because the parties did not like the term B
List. Despite the change in terminology in the Agreement, however, the list is still re-
ferred to colloquially as the B List. Nelson Mar. 10, 1997, Telephone Interview, supra
note 42. I also have used the term B List in this article to refer to what is described in
the Agreement as the Foreign Lawyer List.
159. Compare New York Rules of Court, Rules of the Court of Appeals, pt. 251
(requiring practice for five of past seven years) with Diploma Directive, supra note 18,
OJ. L 19/16 (1989) (permitting one EU Member State to select either waiting period
or aptitude test before permitting establishment of professionals from another EU
Member State).
160. As its name suggests, the IBA's REJECrED FLC GUIDELINES use the term "For-
eign Legal Consultant" and envision a two-tier system. See supra note 9. Although the
IBA's prior Draft Guidelines did not include the word "foreign," it did contemplate a
two-tier system, rather than the three-tier system adopted in Brussels. Id. at D(1). The
limited licensing approach in the IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES also appears to
contemplate two tiers. See IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 9.
Although the ABA's MODEL RULE FOR THE LICENSING OF LEGAL CONSULTANTS does
not use the term "Foreign Legal Consultant," it also employs a two-tier concept, rather
than the three-tier concept adopted in the Agreement. See ABA Model FLC Rule, supra
note 10.
The EU Establishment Directive is another example of a two-tier approach that
does not employ the term "Foreign Legal Consultant." See supra note 19. The directive
permits the migrant lawyer to practice either under the lawyer's Home State's title or to
integrate into the Host State's profession and use the Host State's title for lawyer. In
other words, like the FLC statutes, the directive contemplates only two tiers of lawyers;
unlike many FLC provisions, however the two types of lawyers have substantially similar
rights and responsibilities. Compare EU Establishment Directive, art. 4 (practicing
under Home State's professional title); art. 10 (allowing integration as lawyer of home
Member State). See supra note 19. In contrast to the EU Establishment Directive, the
EU's Diploma Directive arguably only provides for a one-tier approach in which a pro-
fessional from one EU country can become integrated into, and recognized by, the
profession of another EU country. See supra note 18.
NAFTA uses the term "Foreign Legal Consultant." See NAFTA, supra note 4, at
Annex 1210.5, Section B - Foreign Legal Consultants, 32 I.L.M. at 652. One commenta-
tor observed that although NAFTA does not define the term "Foreign Legal Consult-
ant,"
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plates only two categories of lawyers: 1) the fully integrated law-
yer, who is equivalent to the Home State's own lawyers; and 2)
the FLC, who generally has lesser rights and obligations than the
fully integrated lawyer. The Agreement differs from these other
regulatory systems because it provides two different categories of
FLCs, each with different levels of rights and responsibilities.
The Agreement does not go as far as the recent EU Establish-
ment Directive, which treats an EU lawyer practicing under
home title substantially similar to the Hostjurisdiction's own law-
yers, and permits full integration into the Host State legal profes-
sion provided certain minimal conditions are met.161 Although
the Agreement created three categories of lawyers in contrast to
the traditional FLC approach, it should be noted that the Agree-
ment created strong incentives for U.S. lawyers to register on the
B List since the B List provides significant benefits over the Joint
List on the key issues of scope of practice, ethics and discipline,
and forms of associations.
B. To Whom Does The Agreement Apply?
The Agreement is structured so that Article One requires
"Established U.S. Lawyers" to register with one of the Brussels
Bars.1 6 2 The Agreement's only definition of "Established U.S.
Lawyer" is found in the preliminary section in which the term is
the meaning of the term can be construed from paragraph 1 of Section B to
mean nationals of a NAFTA country who are authorized to practice or advise
on the law of their home country (or a third country) under the licensing
authority of that jurisdiction and now seek to provide their legal expertise to
consumers in another NAFTA country.
See Sciarra, supra note 46, at 4 n.5.
For a discussion of the evolution of the three-list approach used in the Agreement,
see supra note 157.
161. One of the topics of vigorous debate with respect to the EU Establishment
Directive was whether there should even be two categories of lawyers, at least on a per-
manent basis. France, for example, thought that an EU lawyer providing legal services
in another EU country should only be allowed a limited period of time in which to
practice law in the Host State under the Home State title. France believed that after the
limited period of time, the migrant lawyer must either return to his or her Home State
or become fully integrated in the Host State's legal profession by complying with its
normal licensing requirements. Other countries, .such as Britain, believed that an EU
Lawyer providing legal services in another EU country should be able to practice indefi-
nitely using the lawyer's Home State title. This debate was limited to EU lawyers prac-
ticing in another EU country. There is no EU. requirement with respect to. non-EU
lawyers who want to provide legal services in an EU country. See supra note 19; CONE,
supra note 1, at 8:14-25.
162. "A U.S. Lawyer who becomes an Established U.S. Lawyer shall, within six
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first used. This section states: "WHEREAS certain members of
bars of the United States who are not Tableau Lawyers or
Stagiair(e)s (hereinafter "U.S. Lawyers") are resident or regu-
larly present in Brussels and maintain respective establishments
in Brussels from which they provide legal services (hereinafter
"Established U.S. Lawyers")." ' Although the parties negotiated
over the terminology to be used to describe those required to
register, they made no effort to define the term "regularly pres-
ent." '64 One of the chief ABA negotiators indicated to the rest
months thereafter, register with one of the Orders in accordance with this Article."
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1.
163. Id. at fourth "Whereas" clause.
164. It was not until late in the negotiations that the parties had occasion to de-
velop the definition of persons to whom the Agreement would apply. Whereas the May
6, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109, required registration of those "resident and estab-
lished," the May 11, 1993, ABA draft required registration only of those resident in
Brussels. Id. When the Brussels representatives apparently proposed replacing the
term "resident" with "established," Steve Nelson responded,
[f]irst, as I indicated in our conversation, the proposed replacement of the
term "resident" with "established" ... would have produced a number of unin-
tended consequences that neither of us would have been happy with. I under-
stand that this change is more than simply a drafting issue, in that you want to
bring within the ambit of the mandatory registration requirements U.S. Law-
yers who are not technically "resident" in Brussels but who may carry on a
regular practice from an office there and are in that sense "established." I
don't believe we have any difficulty with that concept, but the change destroys
a very fine distinction between those U.S. Lawyers who are actually practicing
in Brussels and those who are "established" only in the sense that their firms
have offices there. This is a distinction that has considerable importance in
terms of the operative provisions of the Agreement.
What we have done, accordingly, is to define a new term - "Established U.S.
Lawyer" - which incorporates the notion you want to include but is distinct
from the more general term "U.S. Lawyer," which is no longer limited to those
that are "established" in Brussels. This definitional change requires some cor-
responding changes at various points in the draft, but I think you will find the
original intent is preserved. Along the same lines, and to make the text more
readily understandable, we have also replaced the term "U.S. Law Firm" with
the term "established U.S. Law Firms" to make it clear that we are speaking of
firms that have offices in Brussels.
June 6, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109. The Brussels representatives accepted the con-
cept and objected only to the fact that "[t]he use of the plural 'maintain establishments'
could be construed as a possibility for a U.S. lawyer or law firm to have more than one
office in Brussels." June 24, 1994 Brussels draft, supra note 109. See also June 27, 1994
ABA draft, supra note 109 (suggesting insertion of word "respective" before "establish-
ments" to eliminate multiplicity of offices concern); June 30, 1994 Brussels draft, supra
note 109 (accepting ABA'sJune 27th change). This legislative history thus supports the
conclusion that the Agreement applies both to U.S. lawyers resident in Brussels and
those who travel there regularly.
Unlike the issue of the residence of U.S. lawyers to whom the agreement would
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of the ABA negotiating team that he was comfortable with the
term "established" because it "is so well defined in international
practice, including FCN/FEN treaties, as well as EC/EU law it-
self, as not to be subject to argument .... 65 This confidence
may or may not turn out to be well-placed. 166 It is clear from the
legislative history, however, as well as the "whereas" clause, that
the parties contemplated the Agreement's application to U.S.
lawyers residing in Brussels and U.S. lawyers residing outside
Brussels who travel to Brussels regularly, if they maintain an of-
fice in Brussels.' 67
apply, the parties were able to resolve very early in the negotiations the type of U.S.
lawyer to whom the Agreement would apply. The January 14, 1993 Brussels draft had
required registration on the B List of all U.S. lawyers who wished to formally cooperate
or form a partnership with members of the Brussels Bars; it. also required registration,
presumably on another list, of all "holders of a professional card." See supra note 109.
The ABA negotiators advised the Brussels Bars at their January 18, 1993 meeting that
they wanted the provisions of the Agreement to include U.S. lawyers with work permits,
generally, law firm associates, as well as those with professional cards, generally law firm
partners. See Memorandum from Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator, to American
Law Firms in Brussels (Jan. 18, 1994) located in ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117. This
was accepted in the March 2, 1993 Brussels draft. See supra note 109.
165. See Memorandum from Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator, to ABA Nego-
tiating Team (May 9, 1994). FCN refers to Friendship, Commerce and Navigation trea-
ties; FEN, which refers to Friendship, Establishment and Navigation treaties, are similar
but include investment. Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42.
166. The distinction between "established lawyers" and those merely providing oc-
casional services is beyond the scope of this Article. As an aside, however, it is not
completely obvious to me that the term "established" is so well defined as to be beyond
dispute. One of the leading commentators in this area remarked,
Commentators also tend to assume that the [Lawyers Services] Directive only
enables the visiting lawyer to provide 'occasional' services, with the implication
that a certain degree of frequency or regularity would take the services outside
its scope. This is an area of some doubt on which there is a lack of authority.
An attempt by one Member State (Spain) in its transposing legislation to im-
pose an arbitrary limit of five times a year on the frequency with which services
could be provided under the Directive met with objections from the EC Com-
mission and was withdrawn.
HAMISH ADAMSON, FREE MOVEMENT OF LAwYERs 34 (1992). See also CCBE Code, Part II,
supra note 11, at nn.42-43 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, given that there will be line-drawing problems, it is not clear
that a definition would have added much. Moreover, this issue has not presented any
problems to date. Thus, it may have been a good decision to ignore this issue, and to
avoid disagreement over the definition of this term.
167. See supra note 164. Joe Griffin reports that he is a good example of someone
covered by this "regularly present" language; his firm has an office in Brussels and he
visits there frequently, i.e. once every month or six weeks, which is not an uncommon
pattern. He also reports that some U.S. law firms had no U.S. partner resident in Brus-
sels but did have U.S. visitors to their Brussels office. The ABA negotiators were con-
cerned from personal experience that people in these positions be covered by the
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Determining who is an "Established U.S. Lawyer" in Brussels
does not completely answer the question of "to whom does the
Agreement apply?" The Agreement specifies that it applies only
to U.S. established lawyers registered on either the B List or the
Joint List.' 6 8 U.S. lawyers registered on the A List are specifically
excluded from the definition and excluded from coverage.
They have, by definition, already agreed to be bound by the all
of regular rules of the Brussels Bars with which they regis-
tered.169 Thus, when one reads the Agreement, it purports to
apply to non-A List U.S. lawyers established in Brussels and it
purports to make registration mandatory. However, this impres-
sion is misleading.
C. What is the Binding Force of the Agreement?
After determining to whom an agreement applies, a likely
second question is to ask how an agreement will be enforced
and, as a corollary, what are the consequences of its violation.
These two questions are among the most interesting questions
with respect to the Agreement. The simple answer is that in
many respects, the Agreement has no binding force whatso-
ever. '7 The Agreement can be analogized to the CCBE Code of
Conduct, which was not independently binding, but became so
because of the ways in which the parties treated it. t 7'
The parties to this Agreement are the ABA and the two
Agreement. He believed the Belgians were happy to include that group of non-resi-
dents because it expanded theirjurisdiction. See Letter fromJoseph P. Griffin to Laurel
S. Terry (June 26, 1997) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
168. See generally Agreement, supra note 3.
169. The definitions were carefully crafted so that the Agreement does not apply
to U.S. lawyers who have qualified as Tableau lawyers. Id. at art. 1, para. 2. There is no
need for U.S. lawyers who have qualified as tableau lawyers to be covered by the Agree-
ment because, by definition, they have agreed to become "normal" Brussels lawyers and
abide by the regular rules that apply to Brussels tableau lawyers.
170. Although the Agreement speaks in terms of the obligations of an "Established
U.S. Lawyer," the Agreement does not, in fact, bind these individuals. Thus, it cannot
be enforced and discipline cannot be imposed.
The Agreement does, however, impose two obligations on the ABA. First, "the
ABA undertakes strongly to urge U.S. Lawyers to comply with the terms hereof [the
Agreement.]" Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 2. Second, the ABA undertakes
to use its best efforts to ensure the U.S. states adopt the ABA's model foreign legal
consultant rule. Id. at art. 13, para. 1.
171. See generally CCBE Code, Part I, supra note 11, at 11-15 (describing how CCBE
Code of Conduct is not binding unless adopted by participating countries, and noting
its adoption success).
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Brussels Bars. The Brussels Bars are the regulatory bodies that
set the rules of professional conduct, discipline, and otherwise
regulate the professional lives of Brussels avocats and advo-
caaten.17 2 The Brussels Bars are able to fulfill their part of the
Agreement because they can regulate the conditions to which
their own registered lawyers are subject. The ABA, however, has
no authority to enforce the Agreement language that U.S. law-
yers "shall" register with the Brussels Bars. As the Agreement
itself notes, the ABA has no authority to proscribe the conduct
of U.S. lawyers who are regulated on a state wide basis. Despite
this lack of authority, and in contrast to the Brussels Bars' agree-
ment with the Law Society of England, the Agreement is
couched as a mandatory registration requirement. 173
If the Agreement is an illusory contract, why were the Brus-
sels Bars interested in it? One answer to this question is pro-
vided in the introductory provisions which note that many U.S.
lawyers are members of the ABA and abide by the rules and rec-
ommendations of the ABA.1 74 Another explanation may be the
lack of anyone else with whom to negotiate. Moreover, while the
ABA may not have actual authority, it may have a certain amount
of moral authority in this context because it may be able to con-
vince U.S. lawyers that it will reflect poorly on the U.S. legal com-
munity if that community repudiates an agreement negotiated
by the ABA. The ABA may also be able to convince U.S. lawyers
in Brussels that failure to comply with the Agreement could re-
172. The Brussels Bars, however, are not the Belgian Government and do not con-
trol immigration or the conditions placed on work permits. Thus, so long as Belgium
permits non-lawyers to offer legal advice, then the Brussels Bars do not have authority
to exclude or regulate foreign lawyers who offer legal advice in Brussels. The most they
can do is regulate the conditions to which their own registered lawyers are subject.
173. Agreement, supra note 3, at twelfth "Whereas" clause. According to Joe Grif-
fin, one key point of the early discussions was educating the Brussels representatives
about the fact that the ABA is a voluntary bar association and lacks any regulatory au-
thority over U.S. lawyers. See Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. The Brus-
sels Bars apparently realized this by January 1993 because their first actual draft con-
tained a "whereas" clause which was similar to that found in the final agreement, and
which noted the ABA's lack of regulatory authority over U.S. lawyers. See January 14,
1993 Brussels Draft, supra note 109.
Despite this acknowledgment in the preamble, the Agreement is strikingly differ-
ent from that between the Brussels Bars and the Law Society of England and Wales.
The Law Society/Brussels agreement itself acknowledges the Law Society's lack of au-
thority. It does not even purport to require its members to register. Instead, it "com-
mends" them to do so. See supra note 157.
174. Agreement, supra note 3, at twelfth "Whereas" clause.
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sult in having even more stringent conditions imposed by the
Belgian authorities. The bottom line, however, is that the Agree-
ment only has whatever force the individuals concerned choose
to give it by registering with the Brussels Bars.
D. The Substance of the Agreement
The issues that drove the desire for the Agreement and that
were the subject of much negotiation, are the same issues that
seem to recur in most, if not all, cross-border practice situations.
These key issues are the permissible scope of the migrant law-
yer's legal practice; the acceptable forms of association between
and among migrant lawyers and others; and issues involving the
legal ethics obligations and the Host State's right to discipline
the migrant lawyer.175 Most of the provisions in the Agreement
address one of these three topics. In addition to addressing
these key topics, the Agreement contains several miscellaneous
provisions. For each topic the Agreement distinguishes between
the treatment afforded U.S. lawyers registered on the B List and
those registered on the Joint List.
1. The "Scope of Practice" Provisions
One of the most important issues to a lawyer engaged in
cross-border legal practice is the scope or extent of legal practice
in which the lawyer may engage. The regulatory body in the
Host State decides whether the visiting lawyer may advise only on
his or her Home State law,1 76 on international law, 17 7 on the
175. See Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 277-79. In addition to scope of practice, ethics
and discipline, and forms of association issues, other issues that often arise in cross-
border practice provisions include the relationship of the foreign lawyers to the local
bar association, requirements concerning experience and other qualifications, resi-
dency requirements, local office requirements, and reciprocity requirements.
These last items are not discussed separately in this Article, but are interwoven into
the discussion. With respect to the first item above, U.S. lawyers who register with the
Brussels Bars are treated as full members of the Bar with corresponding rights and
obligations, except as specifically provided elsewhere in the Agreement. As explained
supra note 173, the registration requirement is simply that and contains no examination
or qualification requirement. Finally, the only residency and local office requirements
are those contained within the definition of "Established U.S. lawyer" to whom the
Agreement applies. See supra note 164. Reciprocity is addressed infra notes 294-97 and
accompanying text.
176. This is the approach taken in Florida, for example. See Rules of the Florida
Supreme Court Relating to Admission to the Bar, Ch. 16, R. 16-1.3(a) (2) (F), cited in
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Report to the House
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Host State's law,178 or some combination thereof. In addition,
the regulatory body decides whether the visiting lawyer may work
alone or whether he or she is required to work in conjunction
with a lawyer from that Host State.
179
The Agreement provides different answers to this scope of
practice question depending on whether the U.S. lawyer regis-
ters on the B List or the Joint List. Although the Agreement
begins by granting the same scope of practice authority to both
B List and Joint List lawyers, the exceptions differ, resulting in
different permissible practices for B List and Joint List lawyers.
After much negotiation, the parties agreed that the scope of
practice for U.S. lawyers registered on the B List only excluded
advice on matters governed predominantly by Belgian law.' °
of Delegates, 28 INT'L LAW. 207, 227 n.57 (1994). A legal consultant is required to utilize
a written retainer agreement specifying in bold type that the legal consultant is not
admitted to practice in the state of Florida or licensed to advise on the laws of the
Untied States or any political subdivision and is limited to the laws of the foreign coun-
try where the legal consultant is licensed to practice. Id.
177. Id. at 213-15. This is the approach taken in the New York Foreign Legal Con-
sultant rule. See New York Rules of Court, Rules of the Court of Appeals, pt. 521, cited in
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Report to the House
of Delegates, 28 INT'L LAw. 207, 226-28 (1994).
178. This is the approach used in the EU Establishment Directive. See EU Estab-
lishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 5, para. 1 (stating that "a lawyer may .. .give
advice on the law of his home Member State, on Community law, on international law
and on the law of the host Member State.").
179. Id. at art. 51 para. 3; see Commission v. French Republic, Case C-294/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-3591, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 569. A Member State may not require a for-
eign lawyer (1) to act in conjunction with a local lawyer where a lawyer's service is not
mandatory or before non judicial authorities or (2) to retain a local lawyer in order to
conduct proceedings in civil cases where lawyer services are compulsory. Commission v.
Germany, Case 427/85, [1988] E.C.R. 1123, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 677. A Member State
may require a foreign lawyer to act in conjunction with a local lawyer where a lawyer's
service is mandatory, provided obligations are restricted to enable a foreign lawyer to
comply with applicable procedural and ethical rules. Provisions requiring constant
presence of a local lawyer during oral proceedings, with a local lawyer assuming role as
an authorized representative, are disproportional and therefore incompatible with the
Treaty.
180. The Agreement states that B List lawyers,
shall be free to render legal services in Brussels and to provide advice and
representation regarding all matters as to which they are consulted, provided
that they shall be prohibited from rendering advice and representation as to
matters governed predominantly by the national laws of Belgium, except as is
provided [elsewhere].
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 1.
The substance of the first Brussels draft agreement did not differ substantially from
the substance of the final Agreement. The details of the language, however, required
much negotiation. Issues included "distinctions between casual advice and formal ad-
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The exception applicable to B List lawyers permits them to ad-
vise on Belgian law provided two conditions are satisfied. First,
the U.S. lawyer's advice must be based on the advice of, and ren-
dered in consultation with, a Belgian tableau lawyer, or stagiair
with one year's experience. 18' The second condition is that a
Belgian lawyer must be identified as the source of the advice
through inclusion of the Belgian lawyer's name on the station-
ery, through signature, or otherwise.182 Provided these condi-
tions are satisfied, the B List lawyers may advise on Belgian law,
even if the matter is governed entirely or in material part by Bel-
gian law.183
The authority given to a Joint List lawyer is much narrower.
First, a Joint List lawyer may advise only on "matters involving
ancillary issues of Belgian law." '84 When the Joint List lawyer
does so, the advice must be based on the advice of, and rendered
in consultation with, a Belgian tableau lawyer or a stagiair with
one year's experience. There is no requirement, however, that
this Belgian lawyer be identified.185 This provision was also the
subject of much negotiation.186
vice; between written and unwritten advice; between requiring that the local lawyer
countersign the U.S. lawyer's advice or opinion and simply requiring the U.S. lawyer to
identify the local lawyer in a suitable way, as against no such requirement at all. . . ." See
Memorandum from Sydney Cone, III, Attendee at August 8-9, 1993 Meetings, to ABA
Negotiators (Aug. 23, 1993). The requirement that the advice be based on a stagiaire
with one year's experience was proposed in the October 19, 1993 Brussels draft, supra
note 109. The parties did not resolve these issues until November, 1993. See November
16, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109. Moreover, in the actual drafting stages, numer-
ous corrections were made in these provisions. See, e.g., May 6, 1994 ABA draft, May 11,
1993 ABA draft, May 18, 1994 Brussels draft, June 6, 1994 ABA draft, June 30, 1994 ABA
draft, supra note 109.
181. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 2.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at art. 4, para. 3.
185. Id.
186. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 3. For B List lawyers, the parties agreed
on the basic scope of practice provisions; their disagreement was more a matter of de-
tail and defining the boundaries. See supra note 180. In contrast, with respect to joint
List lawyers, the parties had a fundamental disagreement as to whether Joint List law-
yers ever could be said to advise on Belgian law. The Belgians did not want Joint List
lawyers to have any such authority. Movement on this issue ultimately came when Brus-
sels representatives wrote,
we cannot admit that American lawyers on the Joint List would indirectly ad-
vice [sic] on matters of Belgian law, except in a most ancillary way, as suggested
in article l0bis. If they wish to advice indirectly on matters of Belgian law, they
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The Agreement contains an additional limitation, which is
similar for both B List and Joint List lawyers. The Agreement
ratifies limitations on a U.S. lawyer's ability to appear in a Bel-
gian court.1
l 7
While negotiating the Agreement, the parties reached an
impasse on how to interpret these scope of practice concepts. In
particular, the parties could not agree on how to view the prac-
tice of European Union law. The Belgians considered EU law to
be part of "Belgian law," somewhat analogous to U.S. federal law,
and, thus, covered by the "scope of practice provisions" that re-
quired U.S. lawyers to work in consultation with Belgian law-
yers."' 8 The U.S. lawyers, in contrast, considered EU law to be
international law, not governed by the "Belgian Law" scope of
practice provisions."8
Neither side wanted to yield on this issue. Both sides con-
sidered it a deal breaker.190 The parties ultimately resolved this
issue relatively late in the negotiations when they finally "agreed
are free to register on the B-list and to adhere to the terms and conditions
thereof.
See October 18, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109. This became the basis for agree-
ment. For B List lawyers, the scope of practice provision was the subject of much discus-
sion during the drafting stage, even after agreement had been reached in the Heads of
Agreement. See supra note 180.
187. The Agreement notes that a U.S. lawyer,
shall not have the right to appear as a lawyer before any Belgian judicial or
administrative tribunal except if and to the extent permitted by the rules of
such tribunal and then only in a manner consistent with the limitations and
conditions applicable to such U.S. Lawyer in relation to advice on matters of
Belgian law.
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 4.
188. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96; see generally ABA/Brussels file,
supra note 117; see also CONE, supra note 1, at 10:24 (describing Belgian position).
189. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview supra note 96; see also Hague Proceedings,
supra note 19 at 426-7 (Remarks of Joseph Griffin, Esq.).
Although international law was not in dispute in this Agreement, some authorities
have noted that it is unclear whether the right to practice one's Home State law in-
cludes the right to practice international law. See Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 277 n.12.
"The restriction to home country law is ambiguous as far as international law is con-
cerned. International law is regarded as part of the domestic law of many jurisdictions.
[cite omitted] Domestic law also includes conflict of law rules, which sometimes lead to
the application of foreign law." Id.
190. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. For additional information on
the debate between U.S. and EU lawyers about the characterization of EU law, see
CONE, supra note 1, at 2:6 (concluding that U.S. position "was not sustainable, however,
because EU law frequently takes the effect as the domestic law of the several EU mem-
ber states.").
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to disagree" on this point. Accordingly, much effort was spent
negotiating the precise language of the paragraph which sets
forth this "agreement to disagree" found in the scope of practice
provisions.191 It should be noted that the ABA negotiators were
told that the CCBE, which considers itself the European Com-
munity's bar association, was unhappy with the Brussels Bars for
this concession. The CCBE believed that reasonable minds
could not differ on this point and that the Brussels Bars should
not have conceded. 192
The approach used in the Agreement to these scope of
practice issues shares similarities with, but is also distinguishable
from, other cross-border practice regulation. The Agreement's
courtroom limitation is similar to other regulatory schemes.
191. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 5. Because the Agreement was being
negotiated while the GATS negotiations were ongoing, one of the concerns was that the
language be precise enough so that the Agreement could operate as a "standstill" provi-
sion under GATS. See October 19, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109 (indicating that
"standstill formula on the practice of EC Law by American lawyers is consistent with
CCBE/ABA tentative understanding reached in Geneva in view of the GATT negotia-
tions on i.a. services.").
Thus, much attention was paid on the part of the ABA negotiators to the language
proposed for this provision. See Nov. 16, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109; Dec. 15,
1993 ABA draft, supra note 109 (objecting to the Brussels language); Dec. 31, 1993
Brussels draft, supra note 109; Jan. 13, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109; Jan. 27, 1994
Brussels draft, supra note 109; Feb. 2, 1994 Brussels draft, supra note 109. Indeed, one
of the ABA negotiators noted that "[f] or the first time in the history of this exercise we
seem to be having trouble agreeing on language." See Fax Cover Sheet from Steven
Nelson, Agreement Negotiator, to ABA Negotiating Team (Harwood, Griffin, Oberreit,
Sher, Vinje) (Jan. 10, 1994).
According to one commentator, the Agreement leaves the subject to the B List
rules themselves, which permit the practice of EU law and, because there are no "C
List" rules, the matter is left to the professional cards, which are likely to be silent, and
thus by negative implication confirmed by experience, to permit the practice of EU law.
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:26. The file, however, reveals significant concern on the part
of the ABA negotiators concerning this issue. Language that would have expressly con-
firmed that the issue is left to the B List which permits the practice of EU law was
considered by the ABA negotiators but never adopted. See Memorandum from Walter
Oberreit, Agreement Negotiator, to Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator (Jan. 7,
1994), in ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
192. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96; see also CONE, supra note 1, at
10:24.
Representatives of the Brussels bar said that this text was designed to
avoid problems with other EU member states. Did this mean that France had
asked Belgium to curtail the B-List right to practice under home-country ti-
tle .... ? That Germany did not want a foreign lawyer's scope of practice to be
broader under the Brussels B List than under its own .... ?
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What is somewhat notable about this version is that the ultimate
limitation derives from the courts or administrative tribunals
themselves, rather than from the Host State's regulatory body or
the cross-border practice regulatory scheme. In other words, if
the Belgian courts or administrative tribunals begin allowing
U.S. lawyers to appear, then U.S. lawyers could do so without
violating this Agreement. In this respect, the Agreement is more
liberal than many of. its counterparts. The EU Establishment Di-
rective, the ABA Model FLC Rule, the IBA's Rejected FLC
Guidelines, the IBA's Proposed General Principles, and the
pending NAFTA Model Rule, all permit Host State limitations
on the ability of the migratory lawyer to practice before the
courts of the Host Jurisdiction.' 93 GATS and NAFTA do not con-
tain this level of detail.
194
193. See ABA Model FLC Rule, supra note 10, para. 4(a). An FLC shall not "appear
for a person other than himself or herself as attorney in an), court, or before any magis-
trate or other judicial officer, in this State (other than upon admission pro hoc vice
pursuant to [citation of applicable rule])." EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19,
art. 5. para. 3 (explaining that "[the Host State] may require lawyers practising under
their home-country professional title to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises
before the judicial authority in question and who would, where necessary, be answer-
able to that authority. . . ."); IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note 9, art. G(1)
(stating that "unless specifically authorized by the Host Authority or the law of the Host
Jurisdiction to do so, he/she may not appear as an attorney or plead in any court or
other judicial tribunal in the Host Jurisdiction."); Pending NAFTA Model Rule, supra
note 55, Rule 7 (prohibiting representation of a client "in a court, in an administrative
court, before a magistrate, before any other judicial officer or in a procedure before a
public administrative body, except as may be permitted under the laws of the host
Party.").
The Agreement differs from some other cross-border schemes in that it does not
explicitly refer to, or permit representation of, clients in dispute settlement proceed-
ings such as international or domestic arbitrations. Compare Agreement, supra note 3,
with Pending Nafta Model Rule, supra note 55, rule 8(a) (noting that "[a] foreign legal
consultant in the host Party is not precluded from . . . acting as an arbitrator or as
counsel in an arbitration") and with IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note 9, art.
G, comment (explaining that "[t]his limitation is not intended to, and should not, pro-
hibit a Foreign Legal Consultant from acting as an arbitrator or appearing as counsel in
an arbitration") and with IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at IV(B) (1)
(setting forth principle that "[t]he Host Authority may impose the following conditions
and limitations on the scope of the practice of law by Foreign Lawyers to the extent
necessary.... Foreign lawyers may be prohibited from appearing or pleading in courts
or other judicial tribunals in the HostJurisdiction .... ") and with ABA Model FLC Rule,
supra note 10, at §4 (including no reference to arbitration) and with EU Establishment
Directive, supra note 19, art. 5, para. 3 (lacking any reference to arbitration). See gener-
ally CONE, supra note 1, at 1:12 (summarizing varying approaches to the issue of
whether foreign lawyers may represent clients in dispute settlement proceedings, in-
cluding arbitration).
194. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that NAFTA and GATS
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With certain inherently local transactions, the Agreement
appears broader than either the ABA Model FLC Rule or the
EU's current legislation. Unlike the ABA and EU provisions, the
Agreement has no exclusion for drafting documents to adminis-
ter estates or transferring interests in land.'95 The Brussels nego-
tiators never sought such exceptions, possibly because they be-
lieved it unlikely that these would be large practice areas for U.S.
lawyers.' 96
The Agreement's treatment of a lawyer's ordinary transac-
tional work also differs from these other regulatory schemes. In
some respects, the Agreement is narrower than these other
schemes, and in some respects it is broader. The Agreement's
scope of practice provisions are narrower than those in the EU
Establishment Directive. Whereas the EU Establishment Direc-
tive permits the established lawyer to advise on the Host State's
own law, the Agreement permits such action only if done in con-
sultation with a clearly designated Brussels-registered lawyer. 197
have set framework for future agreement and limitation on adoption of more restrictive
practices in future, but neither purports to reach immediate agreement on details of
this sort). See supra note 193 (discussing pending NAFTA Model Rule's provisions).
195. Compare with Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 1 (stating
that, "Member States may reserve to prescribed categories of lawyers the preparation of
formal documents for obtaining title to administer estate of deceased person, and the
drafting of formal documents creating or transferring interests in land.") and with EU
Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 5, para. 2.
Member States which authorize in their territory a prescribed category of law-
yers to prepare deeds for obtaining title to administer estates of deceased per-
sons and for creating or transferring interests in land which, in other Member
States, are reserved for professions other than that of lawyer may exclude from
such activities lawyers practising under a home-country professional title con-
ferred in one of the latter Member States.
The ABA Model FLC Rule similarly excludes from the FLC's scope of practice both
real property transfers and trusts and estate work, as well as domestic relations and
custody work. See ABA Model FLC Rule, supra note 10, at para. 4(b-d).
196. Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Interview, supra note 42. Mr. Nelson suggested that the
failure to request such an exclusion might also stem from the different perspective from
which civilian lawyers, as compared with common law lawyers, approached these issues.
Id. The civilian lawyers tend to think first of court appearances and the giving of opin-
ion letters, rather than drafting documents when they consider what lawyers do. Id.
Mr. Nelson also thought it possible that these activities were reserved to Belgian nota-
ries, such that no provisions were necessary. Id. If, however, there were a liberalization
or merger of the notarial and avocat professions, U.S. lawyers presumably would not be
banned from these activities. Id. Given the liability exposure, however, it is highly un-
likely U.S. lawyers would want to engage in such activities. Id.
197. Compare Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4, para. 5 with EU Establishment Direc-
tive, supra note 19, art. 5, para. 1 (stating that "[Host Lawyer] may, interalia, give advice
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The scope of practice provisions in the Agreement related
to the giving of advice, however, are broader than those found in
the NAFTA Model Rule and the IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines
or the IBA Proposed General Principles. The proposed NAFTA
Model Rule permitted U.S. law firms to open offices in Mexico,
but prohibited lawyers there from advising clients on Mexican
law. 9 The IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines similarly would have
permitted the Host State lawyers to forbid lawyers from advising
about Host State law; the IBA Proposed General Principles take
a similar approach.199
Future parties negotiating the conditions of cross-border
legal services may find it worthwhile to consider both the sub-
stance and the procedure of the Agreement. In its substance,
the Agreement demonstrates a middle of the road approach.
The scope of practice provisions are neither as broad nor as nar-
row as they might be. The Agreement's procedural aspects
demonstrate an approach that might prove useful when negoti-
ating parties reach an impasse. The most significant aspect of
the Agreement may be the "agreement to disagree" on the scope
of practice issues related to EU law. Future negotiators may, for
the sake of reaching an agreement, want 1o consider "agreeing
to disagree" on certain scope of practice issues. This is especially
on the law of his home Member State, on Community law, on international law and on
the law of the host Member State."). Perhaps not surprisingly, the Agreement is very
similar to the ABA Model FLC rule on this point. The ABA negotiating team described
the scope of practice provisions in the Agreement as nearly identical to those found in
the ABA's Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants. See Mar. 24, 1994 Carter
Memorandum, supra note 92, at 4. While there certainly are differences between the
two, these differences are relatively insignificant with respect to transactional work and
the giving of legal advice. Compare Agreement, supra note 3 with ABA Model FLC Rule,
supra note 10, para. 4(e). The ABA rule, for example, similarly permits the FLC to
advise on U.S. law "on the basis of advice from a person duly qualified and entitled."
Unlike the Brussels rule, however, there is no specific requirement to identify the law-
yer relied upon for local law.
198. See NAYJ7A Model Rule, supra note 55, at Rule 9 (explaining that "[a] foreign
legal consultant may only practice or advise on the host Party law in the host Party,
when and to the extent that he or she is permitted to do so by the host Party."); Han-
sen, supra note 55, at 19 (noting limitations on practice of Mexican law).
199. See IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note 9, art. G, para. 2; IBA PRO-
POSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at IV(B) (2). The Agreement's scope of prac-
tice provisions regarding transactional work are substantially similar to those found in
the ABA Model FLC Rule. The Agreement cannot be compared to CATS because GATS
itself does not address specific issues such as the scope of practice and because the
Working Party has not yet begun to address the topic of legal services.
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true if they may be resolved at some point by external parties. 200
2. Ethics and Disciplinary Issues
A second major issue addressed in the Agreement is the
topic of ethics and discipline. One of the motivating factors for
the Brussels Bars was the desire to regulate foreign lawyers prac-
ticing in Brussels and subject them to the Brussels ethics rules.0 1
The ABA negotiators understood how important this issue was to
the Belgians and wanted to comply. However, the ABA negotia-
tors were also sensitive to the concerns that some U.S. lawyers
might have with respect to this issue, especially those who had
not previously registered with a Brussels bar and who had no
Belgian lawyers or jurists in their offices.202 Accordingly, the
Agreement treats B List and Joint List lawyers differently. Just as
the B List lawyers receive more scope of practice rights than the
Joint List lawyers, B List lawyers also face more responsibilities in
the form of ethics rules to which they are bound and the disci-
pline to which they are subject.
With one exception, B List lawyers are bound by all of the
Brussels Bars' rules of ethics, provided that they are applied in
accordance with the principles set forth in the CCBE Code of
Conduct.20 3 The exception is that unlike tableau lawyers and
200. The debate about whether EU law constitutes the "local law" of its Member
States should not be a unique issue. For example, in the NAFTA context, a comparable
issue might be whether a European lawyer who desires to practice in the United States
is entitled to advise on NAFTA law. Although comparable debates theoretically are
available, however, to date there appears not to have been any comparable disputes
concerning NAFTA or whether the law of an economic integration unit is "local law."
Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Interview, supra note 42.
201. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
202. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. See generally ABA/Brussels file,
supra note 117.
203. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 1. This provision evolved over the
course of the negotiations. The Brussels representatives initially proposed that U.S.
lawyers be subject to the Brussels ethics rules. See Aug. 3, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note
109. The ABA representatives responded by noting that a provision would have to be
made for situations in which there was a conflict between the U.S. and Brussels rules.
See Sept. 4, 1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91: TheJan. 14, 1993 Brussels draft,
supra note 109, provided that U.S. lawyers on the B List were subject to the stricter of
the Brussels rules or the CCBE Code of Conduct; Joint List lawyers were subject to the
CCBE Code of Conduct. The Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109, proposed that
both B List and Joint List lawyers be subject to the CCBE Code of Conduct, except as
modified in accordance with Annex A (which had not been drafted). The Apr. 30,
1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109, contained the same provision that had been in its
Jan. 14, 1993 draft. The ABA May 14 and May 19, 1993 drafts, supra note 109, which
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stagiaires, B List lawyers are permitted to have. the status of em-
ployees in a law firm or partnership. 204 This "employee" excep-
were circulated following the May 13, 1993 meeting, indicate that at the May 13th meet-
ing, the Brussels representatives tentatively had agreed to the ABA approach. The ABA
May 25, 1993 draft, supra note 109, contains a revised provision which specifies that U.S.
B List andJoint List lawyers were subject to the CCBE Code of Conduct, subject to the
modification and understandings set forth in the Appendix and without prejudice to
the continued application of U.S. rules of professional conduct. It further provided
that the rules of the Brussels Bars applied to U.S. lawyers to the extent they were em-
bodied in the CCBE Code, as so modified and understood in the Annex, or as expressly
referred to in the Appendix. TheJune 17,1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109, accepted
the "Annex approach" for Joint List lawyers, but proposed that B List lawyers "shall
comply with the rules of the competent BRUSSELS BAR COUNCIL without prejudice
for the U.S. Lawyer to abide by those United States rules of Professional conduct and
responsibilities in as far as such rules concern cross-border activities and are not con-
trary to the CCBE Common Code of Conduct." The Aug. 3, 1993 Brussels draft, supra
note 109, contained the same language, except added a caveat that the requirements
for B List lawyers were "subject, however, to the understandings set forth in the Appen-
dix." The Aug. 6, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109, required U.S. Joint List lawyers to
comply with the CCBE Code, subject to the reservations and understandings set forth in
the appendix, and required B List lawyers to comply with the rules of the relevant Brus-
sels Bar Council to the extent that such rules are consistent with the CCBE Code, as
modified by the reservations and understandings set forth in the Appendix and without
prejudice to the obligations of the U.S. lawyers to abide by the U.S. rules.
At the August 8 and 9, 1993 meetings in, New York, during which the ABA and
Brussels representatives agreed to negotiate Heads of Agreement rather than specific
agreement language, the representatives also agreed the "Appendix" approach "might
prove difficult to interpret and apply." See Memorandum of New York Meetings August
8-9, 1993 Between Representatives of the ABA and the Brussels Bar Councils ("BBC")
from Sydney M. Cone, III, to ABA Agreement Negotiators (Oberreit, Nelson, Griffin,
Pickering, Harwood) (Aug. 23, 1993) at 5. Accordingly, the Sept. 13, 1993 Brussels
draft by J. Slootmans, supra note 109, which was the first date on which the Heads of
Agreement approach was used, adopted the basic approach which was embodied in the
final agreement. Although Slootmans' draft did not provide that the Joint List lawyers
need not comply with the CCBE Code when inconsistent with the U.S. rules, the ABA's
clarification of this point was accepted without objection. There continued to be nu-
merous exchanges, however, as to the exact language to be used in this provision. See
generally supra note 109.
204. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 5. See Letter from Walter Oberreit, ABA
Negotiator, to Steven Nelson, ABA Negotiator (Mar. 2, 1994) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal). Mr. Oberreit reported as follows concerning a meeting of
the B List Committee [representatives of foreign attorneys in Brussels]:
[T]he Counsel de l'Ordre had reexamined the question of whether an avocat can
be an employee and had reaffirmed its view that employee status is incompati-
ble with being a "member du tableau" or a stagiaire. However, the Counsel de-
cided that employee status is not incompatible with being a "member associe' du
barreau de Bruxelles" (i.e. a B List member) provided
(i) the home bar permits employee status, and
(ii) such status does not affect the "independence" of the foreign lawyer.
Id. See generally CCBE Code, Part I, supra note 11, at nn.88-90, nn.240-41, and accompany-
ing text (discussing prohibitions on employment found in some European countries
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tion is justified on the grounds that the independence of U.S.
lawyers is guaranteed by the rules of professional conduct of
their U.S. bar.20 5 However, one might wonder whether this dif-
ferential treatment of U.S. and Belgian lawyers will create pres-
sure to change the Brussels ethics rules because Brussels lawyers
are also subject to rules regarding independence. If Belgian law-
yers see B List lawyers who are employees of law firms, and if the
Belgian lawyers believe that the independence of these lawyers is
not comprised by their employment status, that might lead the
Belgian lawyers to question the premises of their local bar rules
and to press for change. This is especially true if Belgian law
firms or lawyers believe that the ban on employment status puts
them at a competitive disadvantage.
Under the terms of the Agreement, B List lawyers are sub-
ject to discipline by the Brussels Bars if they violate any of the
applicable Brussels Bars' ethics rules.20 6 Although the Agree-
ment subjects B List lawyers to the Brussels Bars' discipline sys-
tems, the Agreement also provides a dispute resolution mecha-
nism.20 7. The Agreement establishes a committee, called the
Joint Supervisory Committee, which consists of representatives of
the ABA and the two Brussels bar associations. The Agreement
specifies that at the request of either the ABA or the Brussels
Bars, any disciplinary dispute involving lawyers covered by the
Agreement be submitted to, and if possible, resolved by the Joint
Supervisory Committee. 2 8
In addition to the Joint Supervisory Committee, the Agree-
ment contains a second requirement that acts as a safety valve
before one of the Brussels Bars imposes discipline. The Agree-
and the differing conceptions of independence and conflicts of interest which this re-
flects).
205. Id. This issue was important to U.S. lawyers, because they obtained favorable
tax treatment by virtue of being an employee. See Letter from Richard Temko, Brussels
lawyer, to Steven Nelson, ABA Negotiator (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
206. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 1.
207. The idea of having this kind of committee stems from the exchanges between
the parties. See Brussels Bars'Position Paper, supra note 61. This concept was endorsed in
the Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109, which was the first draft agreement the ABA
sent to the Brussels Bars. See also supra note 203 (describing the legislative history of
ethics rules).
208. Id. at art. 7, para. 3. This provision actually covers more than discipline of
U.S. lawyers on the B List or Joint List. It also covers discipline of lawyers who are
"participating in relationships referred to in [this Agreement]." Id.
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ment states that if it is determined that a U.S. lawyer breached a
Brussels Bar rule, which irreconcilably conflicts with a U.S. ethics
rule to which the lawyer is subject, the Brussels Bar "shall invite
and consider" the views of the ABA or relevant State Bar before
imposing sanctions. The Brussels Bars nonetheless retains the
absolute right to discipline B List lawyers who violate their
rules.2 "9 Although the Agreement does-not specify who makes
the determination of the existence of an "irreconcilable con-
flict," the Joint Supervisory Committee, together with the lawyer
in question, presumably would play a role in defining this situa-
tion.
In contrast to B List lawyers, Joint List lawyers are bound by
the rules found in the CCBE Code of Conduct except in situa-
tions where they conflict with the U.S. ethics rules to which the
U.S. lawyer is bound.210 Moreover, Joint List lawyers are not sub-
ject to discipline by the Brussels Bars for violation of these ethics
rules. The only sanctions available are "suspension or deregistra-
tion" from the Joint List and referral of the issue to the Joint List
lawyer's Home State discipline authorities.211 Once again, how-
ever, the Agreement permits either the ABA or the Brussels Bars
to invoke the Joint Supervisory Committee to resolve the prob-
lem. 212
This rather flexible "dispute resolution" approach, which is
used for both B List and Joint List lawyers, is quite different from
the approach initially contemplated. Initially, the ABA negotia-
tors envisioned an appendix to the Agreement identifying the
CCBE or Brussels ethics provisions with which a U.S. lawyer need
not comply.213 The ABA negotiators sought outside assistance
on this point from various academics, including Professors
Roger Goebel and Mary Daly of Fordham University School of
Law, and this author. After receiving input about possible con-
flicts among the CCBE Code of Conduct, the ABA Model Rules
209. See id. at art. 5, paras. 1, 3.
210. Id. at art. 6, para. 2. See also supra note 203 (providing legislative history of
this provision).
211. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 2. This point was not addressed until
late in the negotiations. In the May 18, 1994 Brussels draft, supra note 109, Carl
Bevernage writes "we hope that our text of Article 7.2 will give the USA lawyers the
reassurance they seek that they can be 'tried' in the USA under U.S. Bar rules, without
depriving the local Orders of the possibility to protect local interests."
212. Id. at art. 7, para. 3.
213. See supra note 203.
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of Professional Conduct, and other U.S. state ethics rules, the
ABA negotiators developed such an appendix.214 They contin-
ued to use this "appendix" approach to the issue of conflicts
through several drafts.215 The ABA and Brussels negotiators ulti-
mately decided that the flexibility of the Joint Supervisory Com-
mittee's dispute resolution approach was more desirable than
the rigidity of the appendix approach.216 Although Joe Griffin
reported that the ABA team found it amusing to imagine various
scenarios that would give rise to "irreconcilable conflicts", they
thought it likely that the first irreconcilable conflict to arise
would be one they had not contemplated.217 Moreover, by the
time they abandoned the appendix approach, the ABA negotia-
tors had built up enough trust in their Brussels counterparts as a
result of their year of negotiations, so that the flexible Commit-
214. This author, for example, sent Steve Nelson seventeen pages of materials re-
lated to this issue on May 23, 1993 and a three-page follow-up letter on May 24, 1993
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Among other things, these materi-
als (as supplemented) identified: 1) provisions which may conflict with a U.S. lawyer's
duty under the relevant U.S. regulations; 2) provisions that a U.S. lawyer would want to
construe in a certain manner so that they do not conflict with the relevant U.S. provi-
sions; and 3) provisions with which a U.S. lawyer could comply, but which the U.S.
lawyers might want to limit to the lawyers based in Brussels as these provisions are
stricter than the relevant U.S. provisions. For a discussion of the differences between
the CCBE Code of Conduct and the ABA Model Rules, see generally CCBE Code, Part I,
supra note 11, at 17-45.
The ABA negotiators first circulated a draft of the "Annex" to the Brussels Bar
representatives on May 27, 1993. This Annex stated that "[flor purposes of the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Common Code to U.S. Lawyers under and in accordance
with the [Agreement], the provisions of the Common Code shall be deemed modified
as provided in Part I hereof and interpreted in accordance with the understandings set
forth in Part II hereof." May 27, 1993 ABA Draft, supra note 109, at A-1. The Annex
listed the following as CCBE Rules to which "modifications" were required: CCBE
Rules 1.4 (Field of Application Ratione Personae); 1.5 (Field of Application Ratione Mater-
iae); 2.3.2 (Confidentiality); 5.9.1 - 5.9.3 (Disputes Among Lawyers).
The Annex identified the following CCBE Rules as provisions subject to "under-
standings" as to their scope: CCBE Rules 2.5.1 (Incompatible Occupations); 3.2.1 and
3.2.2 (Conflict of Interest); 3.2.3 (Conflict of Interest - New Client); 3.2.4 (Conflict of
Interest - Attribution); 3.3.1 - 3.3.3 (Pactum de Quota Litis [Contingency Fees]); 3.8.1
and 3.8.7.1 (Clients' Funds); 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 (Correspondence Between Lawyers); 5.6.1
(Change of Lawyer).
As set forth supra note 203, the "Annex" approach lasted until August 1993, at
which time the negotiators agreed to abandon the "Annex" approach in favor of the
more flexible approach now found in the Agreement.
215. See supra note 203.
216. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
217. Id.
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tee approach seemed desirable.21 Thus, the final Agreement
makes the Joint Supervisory Committee available both for B List
lawyer disputes and Joint List lawyer disputes.
In addition to the general provisions on conduct and disci-
pline, two more specific provisions are found in these sections.
First, the Agreement obligates the Brussels Bars to protect and
defend the professional privileges of U.S. lawyers in the same
manner as they defend the professional privileges of their own
members.219 The ABA negotiator Joe Griffin requested the in-
sertion of this provision. His request was in response to the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice's AM&S case, which opined that the at-
torney-client privilege was not available in EU institutions with
respect to communications between non-EU lawyers and their
clients. 2 20 This section requires the Brussels Bars' support of
U.S. lawyers' efforts to have the EU institutions recognize this
privilege for U.S. lawyers.
The second additional provision found in the "conduct"
and "discipline" sections is a non-discrimination provision.2 2 1
This provision represents the evolution of the negotiations. In
early drafts of the Agreement, U.S. lawyers were subject to differ-
ent bar rules than other foreign lawyers on the B List. The Brus-
sels Bars, for example, wanted U.S. lawyers to wait three years
before forming a partnership with a tableau lawyer, even though
other B List lawyers were not subject to this rule.222 This provi-
218. Id.
219. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 4. The ABA raised this issue at the first
meeting, but it was not included in any of the Brussels' drafts until after the parties met
on October 18, 1993. See Oct. 19, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109. The language
was refined thereafter, but the principle was accepted at that time. See generally ABA/
Brussels file, supra note 117.
220. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96. According to Cone, the prede-
cessor B List similarly protected a B List foreign lawyer's attorney-client privilege.
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:14.
221. The nondiscrimination provision states:
To the extent permitted by Belgian law, and except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this Agreement, U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer List
["B List"] of either of the Orders shall have the rights and privileges, and be
subject to the obligations, of Tableau Lawyers who are members of the Order.
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 4.
222. See Brussels Bars'Position Paper, supra note 61. U.S. Lawyers in Brussels primar-
ily objected to the "three year waiting period" contained in the Position Paper. Among
other reasons for their objections, U.S. lawyers did not want to be disadvantaged when
compared to other lawyers. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117. Each side
stuck to their respective position until the June 17, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109.
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sion represents the ultimate success of the ABA negotiators in
convincing the Brussels Bars that as a general rule, U.S. lawyers
should not be subject to stricter rules than other lawyers in Brus-
sels.
There are two other provisions, not located in the "Conduct
and Privileges" section of the Agreement, that should be consid-
ered "ethics" provisions. One provision specifies that the trust
account rules apply only to B List lawyers in a partnership or
cooperation with tableau lawyers or stagiaires, and only with re-
spect to matters having a primary nexus with Belgium. 22' An-
other provision provides that B List lawyers must comply with the
professional liability insurance requirements, but may do so by
providing written assurances that the U.S. lawyer possesses the
level of coverage required.224
The Agreement contains rules concerning discipline, as well
as provisions specifying the appropriate conduct. However, be-
cause cross-border practice is involved, conflicts of laws issues in-
evitably arise with respect to discipline. In comparison to other
cross-border practice situations, the conflicts of laws provisions
in the Agreement are deceptively simple. If a B List lawyer vio-
lates a rule of the Brussels Bar, then the lawyer is responsible for
In that draft, Brussels negotiators agreed to immediate partnership provided a lawyer in
the U.S. firm had been established in the B List for one year or the firm had been
established in Brussels for one year before the Agreement. The ABA agreed to this one
year waiting period in the Sept. 18, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. See also CONE, supra
note 1 at 10:22 (identifying this issue as one of three primary points on which there was
disagreement); Kilimnik, supra note 2, at 276-77. Some jurisdictions give foreign law-
yers less than full membership in the bar association or impose limitations on foreign
lawyers that are not imposed on local lawyers, particularly limitations on the foreign
lawyers' ability to associate in firms with local lawyers.
223. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 2. This concept appeared in the ABA's
first draft. See Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. This draft limited this provision
to situations in which U.S. lawyers were in a cooperation with tableau lawyers and to
matters involving the practice of Belgian law. Id. The Brussels Bar questioned the lat-
ter condition in their next draft by bracketing this language. See Apr. 30, 1993 Brussels
draft, supra note 109. This issue was not resolved until several drafts later. See Aug. 3,
1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109 (accepting ABA proposals). The language was re-
vised for the final agreement, but the concepts remained substantially the same.
224. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 3. This concept appeared in the ABA's
first draft. See Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. The Brussels Bars indicated in
their next draft that they wanted the assurances to cover both the level and the scope of
coverage. See Apr. 30, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109. This issue was not resolved
until several drafts later. See Aug. 5, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109 (accepting "scope"
requirement). The language was revised for the final agreement, but the concepts re-
mained substantially the same.
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that violation, regardless of whether that rule conflicts with any
other rule to which the lawyer is subject. Conversely, if a lawyer
is on the Joint List, and if the Brussels rule conflicts with a U.S.
ethics rule to which the lawyer is subject, the U.S. rule takes pre-
cedence. The advantage of this approach is that it appears to
provide a clear decision on the "conflicts" issue. This contrasts,
for example, with certain CCBE Code of Conduct provisions,
which do not specify which rule to use if two rules conflict.22 5
This also contrasts with the approach used in the revised ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5, which does not always
provide a clear rule, but instead requires the lawyer to use the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct has "its
predominant effect." 226
With closer scrutiny however, the "conflicts" rule in the
Agreement may not be as entirely clear as it first seems. The
Agreement requires U.S. B List lawyers to use the Brussels ethics
rules with respect to their practice "within and relating to
Belgium."227 In contrast, the Agreement requires U.S. Joint List
lawyers to use the Brussels ethics rules with respect to his or her
practice "within or relating to Belgium. 228 Issues could thus
arise concerning the significance, if any, between the use of "and
relating" for B List lawyers, and "or relating" for Joint List law-
yers; the difficulty of defining "within" Belgium in the age of
telecommunications; the difficulty of defining "relating to
Belgium"; and the difficulty of determining whether to recog-
nize the difference between the B List's use of the word "and"
and the Joint List's use of the word "or", especially because one
225. See CCBE Code, Part I, supra note 11, at 36-37 (discussing whether conflict ex-
ists between CCBE's confidentiality provisions and candor to court provisions and, if so,
how they should be resolved).
226. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, Rule 8.5(b) (2) (ii) (1997). This
rule provides that if the lawyer is licensed in more than one jurisdiction and if the
lawyer is not involved in litigation, then the applicable ethics rules are the rules of the
jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices unless the particular conduct
clearly has its predominant effect in the other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is li-
censed, in which case those rules apply. See generally Symposium: Ethics and the Multijuris-
dictional Practice of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 715 (1995) (containing articles supporting
and criticizing revised ABA Model Rule 8.5).
227. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 1.
228. Id. at art. 6, para. 2. No explanation appears in the correspondence for this
discrepancy. The Heads of Agreement did not contain language this specific. The
"and/or" distinction was contained in the first drafts of the Agreement following the
Heads of Agreement, but was never discussed or addressed. Thus, it appears simply to
be an oversight. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
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expects more obligations under the B List to be broader, but the
disjunctive used in the Joint List creates greater obligations.
Consequently, the conflicts of law provisions in the Agreement
may be vulnerable to many of the same critiques directed against
ABA Model Rule 8.5. The dispute-resolution mechanism of the
Joint Supervisory Committee, however, may reduce the potential
for problems with these conflict issues. Lawyers may be more
comfortable with the possibility of conflicting provisions when
they know their conduct will be reviewed by a committee with
representatives from both jurisdictions, rather than by represent-
atives with an interest in enforcing their own provisions.
This "dispute resolution" approach is one of the major fea-
tures that distinguishes the Agreement from the "ethics and dis-
cipline" provisions found in any of the other comparable regula-
tory schemes. Even with respect to the other "ethics and disci-
pline" provisions, the Agreement compares favorably with other
schemes for regulating cross-border practice. For example, the
Agreement provides far more guidance than is currently found
in GATS. The parties to the GATS agreement could not agree
on an Annex for Legal Services and the very general provisions
in GATS do not provide this level of detail.229 Moreover, the
Working Party responsible for these tasks under GATS has not
yet begun to provide any specific guidance on the appropriate
ethics and discipline rules in a cross-border practice setting.
2 °
The Agreement also offers far more detail on ethics and dis-
cipline to facilitate cross-border practice than NAFTA. With re-
spect to Foreign Legal Consultants, Annex 1210.5 to NAFTA sets
forth some requirements for the parties involved.231 Paragraph
229. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing negotiations surround-
ing inclusion of legal services in GATS). One article has offered a proposed annex for
legal services. This proposed annex provided that registered legal consultants be sub-
ject to the same disciplinary procedures and consequences as full members of the host
bar. It also required the host authorities to notify the home jurisdiction of the results of
any proceeding in the host jurisdiction and vice-versa. The proposed annex addition-
ally required the Member States to create a GATS Common Code of Professional Con-
duct to be applied to registered legal consultants. As envisioned, however, the GATS
Common Code of Professional Conduct apparently is not a substantive code, but rather
establishes principles for resolving conflicts in the rules of professional conduct be-
tween different Member jurisdictions. Chapman & Tauber, supra note 2, at 978-79.
230. See supra notes 42-43.
231. NAFTA requires the parties to "to encourage its relevant bodies to consult
with the relevant professional bodies designated by each of the other Parties regarding
the development ofjoint recommendations on the matters referred to in paragraph 2."
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2 of Annex 1210.5 presumably includes authority to address eth-
ics and discipline. 212 To date, however, the Trilateral Lawyers
Working Group formed to develop such standards has barely
broached the topic of the ethics and discipline systems that ap-
ply to Foreign Legal Consultants.233
In contrast to GATS and NAFTA, the existing EU legislation
is reasonably specific with respectto the issues of ethics and dis-
cipline. The EU Establishment Directive, like the Agreement,
requires the migrant lawyer to use the Host State's ethics rules
NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 1210.5, § B, para. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 652, Annex 1210.5 ' B,
para. 4, 32 I.L.M. at 652. Section A of Annex 1210.5 contains a comparable provision.
It requires the parties "to encourage its relevant bodies in their respective territories to
develop mutually acceptable standards and criteria for the licensing and certification of
professional service providers and to provide recommendations on mutual recognition
to the Commission." Id. at Annex 1210.5, § A, para. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 652. See also supra
note 55 (regarding whether TLWG was formed pursuant to Annex 1210.5 Section B or
pursuant to both Sections A and B).
232. Paragraph 2(b) encourages "development of standards and criteria for the
authorization of foreign legal consultants in conformity with Article 1210" and para-
graph 2(c) encourages consultation regarding "other matters relating to the provision
of foreign legal consultancy services." Id. at Annex 1210.5, §B, paras. 2(b-c), 32 I.L.M.
at 652. Thus, the TLWG clearly has authority to reach an agreement which addresses
ethics and discipline. By way of comparison, Section A of Annex 1210.5 explicitly pro-
vides that these standards may be developed with regard to "conduct and ethics -
standards of professional conduct and the nature of disciplinary action for non-con-
formity with those standards .... Id. at Annex 1210.5, 'A, para. 3(d), 32 I.L.M. at 652.
Thus, one would expect the TLWG formed pursuant to Section B to address these
topics as well.
233. Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone interview, supra note 42. Unlike the Agree-
ment, the NAFTA Model Rule negotiated, but not yet recommended, by the TLWG
does not contain separate sections entitled "ethics" or "discipline." Nor does the
NAFTA Model Rule address these topics in any comprehensive manner. Id. Instead,
there are a few isolated provisions in the NAFTA Model Rule which touch on these
topics. For example, Rule 4(a) (ii) of the NAFTA Model Rule conditions FLC status on
a lawyer being "subject to effective regulation and discipline by a legally recognized
body or public authority." See NAFTA Model Rule, supra note 55, at Rule 4(a) (ii). The
primary motivation for this provision is Mexico's lack of a mandatory discipline system.
Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42. Rule 20, which is entitled
"Professional rights and duties," refers to only one ethics provision. See NAFTA Model
Rule, supra note 55, at Rule 20. It states that a FLC "enjoys the same professional rights,
and has the same professional duties respecting client confidentiality, that apply to law-
yers in the host Party." Id. Other than Rule 20, nothing in the NAFTA Model Rule
governs the status of the FLC in the Host's Bar Association. Although there has been
no comprehensive treatment of ethics and discipline, other rules, such as those involv-
ing advertising, scope of practice rules, and forms of association, touch on matters that
might be covered in the signatory countries' ethics codes. See generally NAFTA Model
Rule, supra note 55.
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with respect to "all the activities he pursues in its territory. "234
Unlike the Agreement, however, no provision is made for the
situation in which such rules might conflict with the Home
State's rules. With respect to the issue of discipline, the EU Es-
tablishment Directive, like the Agreement, subjects the estab-
lished lawyer to the disciplinary system of the Host State.23 5
However, although the EU Establishment Directive provides for
a consultation process between the Home and Host States, it
does not establish a regularly-constituted committee nor does
the "consultation" process appear to have a "dispute resolution"
focus. 2 3 6
One difference between the EU Establishment Directive
and the Agreement concerns the conduct by the migrant lawyer
which triggers application of the Host State's ethics provision.
Interpreted literally, the EU Establishment Directive seems to
use geography as its touchstone when it states that the Home
State ethics rules apply with respect to activities pursued in the
territory. The Agreement, in contrast, uses an approach that is
both geography and. subject matter bound. 237 Thus, in my view,
234. EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 6, para. 1. For comparison
purposes, the Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 16, provides in relevant part that:
1) a lawyer representing a client in legal proceedings or before public authorities "shall
observe the rules of professional conduct of the host Member State, without prejudice
to his obligations in the member State from which he comes." Id. at art. 4, para. 2.
2) a lawyer pursuing other activities "shall remain subject to the rules of professional
conduct of the member state from which he comes without prejudice to respect for the
rules, whatever their source, which govern the profession in the Host Member State,
especially those concerning the incompatibility of the exercise of the activities of a law-
yer with the exercise of other activities in that State, professional secrecy, relations with
other lawyers, the prohibition on the same lawyer acting for parties with mutually con-
flicting interests, and publicity." Id. at art. 4, para. 4.
This Directive contained other provisions as well indicating for a specific issue
whether Host or Home State ethics rules applied. The Directive may be less than satis-
factory, however, insofar as it expects a lawyer to abide by both Host and Home State
rules. Id. This may not be possible in all situations.
235. EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 7, para. 1.
236. Id. at paras. 2-5. For comparison purposes, the Lawyers' Services Directive,
supra note 16, permitted the Host State to refer. violations of the Host State's ethics
rules to the Home State, but did not grant the Host State disciplinary power over the
lawyer. Id. at art. 7, para. 2. In this respect, the Lawyers' Services Directive is similar to
the treatment of Joint List lawyers.
As an aside, a regularly-constituted dispute resolution committee might be difficult
to maintain in the EU given the number of states subject to the EU Establishment
Directive in comparison to the bilateral Agreement.
237. Compare supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text with supra note 234. As
discussed earlier, the Agreement provides that B List lawyers are bound by the Brussels
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the Agreement clearly covers a fax sent from the United States to
Brussels concerning a Brussels matter, whereas this result would
not be so obvious in a comparable EU situation under the EU
legislation.
Another difference between the Agreement and the EU Es-
tablishment Directive concerns the issue of the migrant lawyer's
membership in the Host Bar Association. Problems arise con-
cerning the rights and responsibilities associated with such mem-
bership. The language in the Agreement which prohibits dis-
crimination against the migrant lawyer is arguably stronger and
provides more rights than the language in the EU legislation.2 38
The ethics and discipline provisions in the Agreement are
both similar to, and different from, the provisions in the ABA
Model FLC Rule and the IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines and
Proposed General Principles. Similar to the Agreement, the
ABA Model FLC Rule provides that an FLC is subject to both the
ethics rules and discipline system of the Host U.S. State, protects
the FLC's professional privilege, and implicitly contains a non-
discrimination provision by making the FLC entitled to all the
rights and obligations that apply to a member of the bar of the
State.2 9  The IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines would have re-
quired the FLC to abide by the ethics rules and discipline system
ethics rules with respect to their practice "within and relating to Belgium." In contrast,
Joint List lawyers are subject to the CCBE Code with respect to matters "within or relat-
ing primarily to Belgium." In other words, for Joint List lawyers, this geographic re-
quirement is explicitly an alternative to the subject matter requirement. My prediction,
however, is that if the issue arises, the Joint Supervisory Committee would construe the
Agreement similar to NAFTA so that the subject matter and geographic requirements
are alternatives. Compare NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1210(1) with Sciarra, supra note 46,
at 2 n.3.
238. See EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 6, para. 2. Article 6 states
that "[l]awyers practicing under their home-country professional titles shall be granted
appropriate representation in the professional associations of the host Member State. Such
representation shall involve at least the right to vote in elections to those associations'
governing bodies." Id. (emphasis added). In contrast to the "appropriate" language,
the Agreement grants foreign lawyers the right to full membership in the Bar, with
corresponding rights and obligations, except as specifically exempted; these exemp-
tions generally redound to the benefit of the U.S. lawyer. See Agreement, supra note 3,
art. 6, para. 4.
239. See ABA Model FLC Rule, supra note 10, §§ 5(a) (ethics provisions) and 6
(discipline). The ABA Model FLC Rule, and the IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, actu-
ally go further than the Agreement with respect to professional privilege. Whereas the
Agreement requires the Brussels Bars to take steps to protect the U.S. lawyer's privilege,
the ABA Model FLC Rule and the IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES affirmatively provide
that the FLC is entitled to the privilege. Id. at § 5(b) (iii); IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDE-
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of the Host State, contained a nondiscrimination requirement,
and required that the FLC be entitled to the lawyer's privileges.
The Proposed General Principles are substantially similar. 40
None of these other schemes, however, employ the flexible dis-
pute resolution mechanism found in the Agreement nor do they
contain a conflicts of law provision.
In sum, with respect to ethics and discipline, the substantive
provisions in the Agreement do not differ profoundly from the
provisions found in other cross-border arrangements. The legis-
lative history, however, suggests that the Agreement negotiators
considered these issues with a new degree of particularity and
consideration. The bilateral nature of the Agreement permitted
the parties to anticipate the likely issues with a degree of specific-
ity not possible in a multilateral agreement. Once again, the
most innovative aspect of the Agreement is its dispute resolution
mechanism for resolving concerns over ethics and discipline.
Time will tell, but the flexible "dispute-resolution" approach
may represent a new and interesting way to deal with the issue of
conflicts in ethics rules, rather than simply subjecting the estab-
lished lawyer to the Host State's discipline. At the same time
that the dispute resolution provisions promote flexibility, the
rigid ethics and discipline provisions provide needed clarity as to
the applicable rules.
3. The "Forms of Association" Rules
The "forms of association" rules in the Agreement, like the
scope of practice provisions, provide distinct advantages to U.S.
lawyers registered on the B List rather than on the Joint List.
The Agreement authorizes U.S. lawyers registered on the B List
to form, at any time, "Partnerships with Tableau Lawyers" and
LINES, supra note 9, art. H, para. 3. No specific reference to privilege is found in the
IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES. IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 9.
240. See IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note 9, §§ F(4) (b) and H (ethics
provisions) and I (discipline). Although the IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES require
the "Code of Ethics or its equivalent, and all other laws, rules and regulations of the
Host Authority ... [to be] non-discriminatory and objectively justifiable by the public
interest," a later provision notes that the Host Authority may subject the FLC to the
same limitations as those imposed on regular lawyers, especially with respect to permis-
sion to affiliate with a law firm. Id. at § 4(H) (1 - 2); IBA compare IBA PROPOSED GENERAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, IIB (nondiscrimination provision), III(A)(4) and IV(B)(4)
(providing that lawyer must use Host ethics rules).
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"Cooperations with Stagiair[e]s and/or Tableau Lawyers."2 4 1 In
contrast, U.S. lawyers registered on the Joint List are not permit-
ted to form co-operations or become partners with stagiaires or
tableau lawyers.2 42 The terms "partnership" and "cooperations"
are specifically defined in one of the "whereas" clauses.2 43
The Agreement thus grants U.S. lawyers three of the items
they wanted: 1) the ability to become partners with Belgian tab-
leau lawyers without a waiting period of three years, as initially
proposed by the Belgians; 2) the ability to employ and work with
Belgian stagiaires; and 3) the ability to work with Belgian
stagiaires without a waiting period of one to two years, as pro-
posed by the Belgians once they agreed that U.S. lawyers could
hire Belgian stagiaires. These points represent clear victories for
the ABA.244 In return, however, the Brussels Bars received some-
241. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 1 (Cooperations) and art. 3, para. 1
(Partnerships). The Partnership provision has two conditions. First, all U.S. lawyers in
the partnership who are established in Brussels must register on the B List. Second,
one of the U.S. lawyers in the partnership must have been registered on the B List for
one year or, alternatively, as of the effective date of the Agreement, the U.S. law firm
had maintained an establishment in Brussels for one year. Id.
242. Id. at art. 2, para. 2 (Cooperations) and art. 3, para. 2 (Partnerships).
243. The terms "Cooperations" and "Partnerships" are defined as follows:
WHEREAS the ABA wishes to maximize the opportunities for U.S. Lawyers to
practice within their fields of competence in Brussels; to form cooperations,
including but not limited to arrangements involving association (i.e. relation-
ship with a "collaborateur" or "medewerker," whether or not reflected on the
stationery of the lawyers involved), cost-sharing, and mutual recommendation,
but not including partnerships (hereinafter collectively "Cooperations"), with
Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s; and to form partnerships with Tableau Law-
yers (hereinafter '"Partnerships").
Id. at eleventh "Whereas" clause.
This definition was refined relatively late in the drafting stage. See, e.g., May 11,
1994 ABA draft, supra note 109 (revising language to be more inclusive); May 18, 1994
Brussels draft, supra note 109, (agreeing that cooperations "may include so-called exter-
nal cooperations").
244. See supra note 222 (discussing elimination of three year waiting period to be-
come partners with Belgian tableau lawyers). On the second issue, the Brussels Bars
initially took the position that U.S. lawyers registered could form cooperations with
stagiaires only if they were registered on the B List and also were partners with tableau
lawyers; the Bar rules also prohibited Belgian stagiaires from serving as an employee.
This Brussels position was unacceptable to the U.S. lawyers. Compare Jan. 14, 1993 Brus-
sels Draft, art. 5 with Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, art. 6, supra note 109. By the next draft,
Brussels team dropped its requirements; it proposed that B List lawyers who were part-
ners with tableau lawyers could enter into cooperations with stagiaires immediately; all
other B List lawyers could enter into cooperations with stagiaires once the stagiaires had
completed the first year of their stage. See Apr. 30, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109.
The Brussels negotiators agreed to drop this waiting period requirement at the same
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thing they wanted because the Agreement provides that
"[s]ubject to the transitional provisions of Article 12, U.S. law-
yers shall not form or maintain Cooperations with Belgian Ju-
rists. ' 4 5 A similar provision prohibits U.S. lawyers from becom-
ing partners with Belgian Jurists.2 4 6 Moreover, although the
Brussels Bars abandoned their position requiring a one year
time they agreed to drop the three year partnership wait. See Sept. 16, 1993 Brussels
draft, supra note 109. The employment status issue was not resolved until Mar. 1994.
See supra note 204. See also CONE, supra note 1, at 10:22 (identifying this issue as one of
three primary points on which there was disagreement).
245. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 3. This issue remained hoty contested
for a lengthy period. For example, even after the parties switched to the Heads of
Agreement approach, they still could not agree on this concept. In September 1993 for
example, ABA representatives wrote:
This [issue] appears to be the most difficult part of the Summary [of Heads of
Agreement] in terms of substance. We have found that the language of the
draft you presented on Thursday created some serious concerns among some
of our colleagues because it would have breached a fundamental premise on
which we have been operating, namely that the eventual agreement must not
impair the ability of those American lawyers who do not wish to register on the B-list to
cary on their practices as they have thus far done and as permitted under Belgian law.
(emphasis in original).
Letter from Steven Nelson, ABA negotiator, to Carl Bevernage, Brussels negotiator
(Sept. 18, 1993) accompanying Sept. 18, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. This issue
appears to have been resolved at a meeting on October 18, 1993, at which time the U.S.
representatives agreed to the Brussels approach. Compare Oct. 19, 1993 Brussels draft
with Oct. 19 and 22, 1993 ABA drafts, supra note 109.
This issue was among the most difficult, however, for U.S. lawyers in Brussels. This
issue appears throughout the correspondence from U.S. lawyers in Brussels to the ABA
negotiators. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117. Indeed, even after the
agreement was signed, one of the U.S. lawyers in Brussels complained, inter alia, about
the agreement's "lack of attention that has been given to the specific interests of the
Belgian lawyers who are currently partners or associates with U.S. firms in Brussels."
The response included the following:
I assume from your letter that your principal concerns continue to be those
relating to the application to senior Belgian lawyers of the requirements of the
stage. While the ABA negotiators made every effort to obtain the agreement
of the Bar to provisions that would have exempted from at least some require-
ments of the stage Belgian lawyers having a certain level of experience in the
practice of law, that effort met with unalterable opposition from the bar for
reasons of fundamental principle. This was not a result that could have been
altered by any sort of "last minute effort" on anyone's part, nor was it a result
that should have come as a surprise to anyone. As I made clear to those who
attended our consultations, and to you... during the course of our telephone
conversation in May, this was an area in which we simply did not expect the
Bar to compromise, notwithstanding our best efforts.
Letter from Steven Nelson, ABA negotiator, to U.S. lawyer in Brussels (Aug. 16, 1994),
found in ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
246. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 2.
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waiting period before a U.S. lawyer could cooperate with a
stagiair, the Agreement does provide that a U.S. lawyer may not
rely on a stagiair with less than one year's experience for advice
on Belgian law.2 4
7
The Agreement is also significant because it permits stagiair
and tableau lawyers to cooperate with, or be partners of, the en-
tire U.S. law firm provided that two conditions are satisfied.
24
The conditions specify first, that all lawyers in the firm who are
or become established in Brussels must register on the "B List."
Secondly, they require that one of the firm lawyers registered on
the B List must be a partner. 24" This provision stands in contrast
to requirements in some countries, such as Mexico, which do
not permit local lawyers to be partners with an entire U.S.
firm 250
One of the issues facing the Agreement drafters involved
the issue of the Belgian patron, who is the stagiair, or apprentice
lawyer's mentor. The issue arose because the Agreement per-
mits U.S. lawyers to form cooperations with Belgian apprentices,
or stagiaires, and because the Agreement does not require the
U.S. lawyer to associate with a registered Belgian tableau lawyer.
After some negotiations, the drafters agreed that any tableau law-
yer, including lawyers outside the firm, could serve as the men-
tor, or patron, of the Belgian stagiair.
251
247. Id. at art. 4, para. 2; see supra note 244 (discussing historical background of
this provision).
248. Id. at art. 2, para. 5 (Cooperations) and art. 3, para. 4 (Partnerships). See also
id. at art. 12, para. 5 (applying to transition provisions).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g. Hansen, supra note 55, at 19 (regarding Mexican partnership with
Mexican law firms); NAFTA Model Rule, supra note 55, at Rule 15(b). During the final
drafting stages, the ABA negotiators and U.S. legal community in Brussels took a close
look at, and revised the Agreement language on this point. As Steve Nelson reported to
the ABA negotiating team, "[t]here was some concern [by U.S. law firms in Brussels]
that the Bar might try to limit participation in the Cooperations or Partnerships to U.S.
Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer List thus requiring, in the case of a Partner-
ship, that it be separate from the U.S. Law Firm's global partnership." Letter from
Steven C. Nelson, Agreement Negotiator, to ABA Negotiating Team (Harwood, Griffin,
Oberreit, Sher, Vinje) (May 9, 1994).
251. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 2. The original proposal by the Brussels
Bars required the firm itself to have a "foster parentship" with a member of the Brussels
bar of at least ten year's seniority if the firm employed stagiaires. This first proposal also
provided that no member of the firm could qualify as the stagiaire's patron, even if the
firm lawyer otherwise satisfied the requirements. See Aug. 8, 1992 Brussels Position Pa-
per, supra note 109. The ABA response objected to these requirements. See Sept. 4,
1992 Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91. The Jan. 14, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note
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In addition to these key provisions, the Agreement contains
many provisions that specify the nature of these arrangements.
For example, the Agreement explicitly addresses the office shar-
ing arrangements of U.S. lawyers who have entered into a coop-
eration with a stagiair or tableau lawyer. If the cooperation is lim-
ited to "mutual recommendation," then the U.S. and Belgian
lawyers may maintain separate premises. 252 In contrast to this
provision, U.S. lawyers are required to share premises with the
tableau lawyers with whom they are partners.253
The Agreement also specifies that the permissible coopera-
tions and partnerships may include multi-national partnerships
("MNPs") .24 The Agreement permits the stagiair or tableau law-
yer to form a cooperation with, or be a partner of, the entire
U.S. law firm, even if some U.S. lawyers are not registered on the
lawyer lists. The Agreement also stipulates that U.S. lawyers may
be employees of the firm, even though registration and the Brus-
109, required a "third party 'patron' unless the firm had -a tableau lawyer of 5 year's
seniority." The ABA's Mar. 2, 1993 draft, supra note 109, employed different language,
but essentially accepted the requirement of five years seniority because the ABA draft
noted that the stagiaire's patron would have to have the requisite seniority, which cur-
rently was five years. Thus, although the language was refined in later drafts, agree-
ment in principle on this point was reached relatively early in the negotiations. See also
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:22 (identifying this as one of three principal points of differ-
ence).
252. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 1. This paragraph states that,
"[e]stablished U.S. Lawyers participating in or associated with any such Cooperation
may share office premises with the participating Tableau Lawyer(s) and/or Stagiair[e] or,
in the case of a Cooperation that is limited to mutual recommendation, may maintain
separate premises." Id. The use of the word "may" in the first clause suggests that U.S.
lawyers may, but need not share office premises with tableau lawyers or stagiaires. On
the other hand, the use of the word "may" in the second clause suggests that mutual
recommendation is the only type of cooperative arrangement in which U.S. lawyers may
maintain separate premises. Thus, the word "may" in the first clause effectively means
"must" unless a mutual recommendation cooperation is involved. This interpretation is
consistent with the legislative history. SeeJune 6, 1994 letter from Steven Nelson to Carl
Bevernage.
[W]e have had considerable difficulty understanding the difference between
'internal' and 'external' cooperation.... [W]e are proposing that the opera-
tive provision in which the issue really arises, namely paragraph 1 of Article 2,
be revised simply to make it clear that separate premises are permissible only
where the cooperation is limited to mutual recommendation.
Id. This change was accepted.
253. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 1.
254. Id. at art. 2, para. 3 (Cooperations) and art. 3, para. 3 (Partnerships).
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sels Bar rules ordinarily prohibit that.2 55
Other details covered by the Agreement include the man-
ner in which a firm utilizing such cooperations or partnerships
should hold itself out to the world. The Agreement permits a
U.S. law firm to "carry on its practice in Brussels under the name
that it uses in the United States" provided that the firm has at least
one partner, U.S. or Belgian, in the Brussels office.2 56  The
Agreement permits the-use of this name even when a tableau law-
yer is a partner and even though the Brussels ethics rules previ-
ously prohibited this.25 7
The Agreement is also quite specific with regard to the sta-
tionery U.S. lawyers must use. The basic approach is similar to
that used in Rule 7.5 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.258 If U.S. lawyers form a partnership with a tableau law-
yer, the Agreement requires the partnership stationery to name
the partnership and to identify all resident partners in Brussels
and the bars of which they are a member.2 59 The Agreement
permits, but does not require, the partnership stationery to iden-
tify other resident lawyers practicing in Brussels, including their
bars and professional titles of origin. There are also rules gov-
erning stationery where collaboration, rather than a partnership
is involved. 260
On the one hand, one could argue that regulation should
not operate at this level of detail, but should be left to the mar-
ketplace.261 On the other hand, from the perspective of the law-
yers engaged in cross-border practice, it may be desirable to ne-
255. Id. at art. 6, para. 5; see supra note 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing
Brussels Bars' relaxation of no employees rule for U.S. lawyers).
256. Id. at art. 5, para. 3.
257. Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 5, para. 3; see also Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 42.
258. This provision provides, that "[a] law firm with offices in more than one juris-
diction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in
an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to
practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 7.5, Firm Names and Letterheads (1997).
259. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 1.
260. Id. at paras. 1-2. The stationery issue with respect to collaborations was one of
the topics of the final negotiations. The Brussels Bars wanted to add a statement that,
"[t]he names of the external collaborators may not be mentioned in the stationery." See
May 18, 1994 Brussels draft, supra note 109. This issue ultimately was resolved by refer-
ring to the Brussels Bars rules and noting that U.S. lawyers should follow those rules.
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 2.
261. See Transnational Law Practice, supra note 2, at 762-63.
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gotiate an Agreement on these kinds of mundane points so that
the firm knows exactly what the position of the regulators will be
and thus knows exactly where it stands.2 6 2 Indeed, the impor-
tance of these "firm name" and "stationery" issues to the negotia-
tors is demonstrated by the fact it required approximately one
year for the parties to resolve these issues.2 6 3
The "stationery" provision that applies to cooperations is
comparable to the "partnership" stationery provision. The sta-
tionery must include several items. It must state the name of the
law firm, if any; identify any established U.S. lawyer who is a part-
ner and the bars of which that person is a member; identify the
stagiair or tableau lawyer with whom the U.S. lawyer is cooperat-
ing, and the bars of which that person is a member; and provide
"an indication of the nature of the Cooperation in a form consis-
tent with the nomenclature and representation ordinarily ap-
proved by the Orders for use by Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[els
in respect of similar Cooperations among themselves." 264 As
with partnerships, the Agreement permits the stationery of firms
involved in cooperations to identify other resident lawyers in the
Brussels office, including their bars and professional titles of ori-
gin.265
Two additional sets of provisions related to the "form of as-
sociation" proved controversial in the negotiations. The first
group of provisions was the transitional provisions found in Arti-
cle 12. The problem was that U.S. firms in Brussels wanted to
ensure their ability to continue with their existing personnel
with minimal disruption. But the Brussels Bars wanted to stop
U.S. firms from employing Belgian jurists and did not want to
compromise on the training period or "stage" that is normally
required before a Belgian jurist could become a tableau lawyer.
262. For example, one attorney told me about a situation that occurred in Ger-
many in which one agency purported to require the firm to list the names of all part-
ners, whereas another agency found that misleading and forbade the firm from doing
so. The firm was caught in the middle of the warring agencies.
263. The first exchanges between the parties revealed their disagreement. The
Belgians indicated that they wanted the firm name, as used in Brussels, to include the
name of at least one Belgian partner provided there were any. This was not acceptable
to U.S. negotiators. Compare Brussels Bars'Position Paper, supra note 61 with Sept. 4, 1992
Nelson/Griffin Letter, supra note 91; accord CONE, supra note 1, at 10:22. The parties
reached agreement on this issue in August 1993, when the Belgians agreed to the ABA
approach. See Aug. 3, 1993 ABA Draft and Aug. 6, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109.
264. Id. at art. 5, para. 2.
265. Id.
CROSS-BORDER LEGAL PRACTICE
Additionally, the Brussels Bars did not want a different set of
rules for tableau lawyers working in a U.S. firm than for other
tableau lawyers.
The "grandfathering" compromise reached is detailed and
the result of much input from the U.S. firms in Brussels, many of
whom were trying to address the situation of a specific lawyer or
lawyers in their offices. 26 6 Generally; the Agreement "grandfa-
thers in" partnerships and cooperations existing shortly before
the parties signed the Agreement. U.S. lawyers who were part-
ners with Belgian jurists in June of 1994, when the parties final-
ized the Agreement, could continue that partnership with that
individual. The jurist, however, was required to register as a
stagiair and serve the training period. This partnership is per-
mitted as part of the "transition" even though the Agreement
otherwise forbids partnerships between U.S. lawyers and
stagiaires.267 Moreover, U.S. lawyers are permitted to form new
partnerships, even with Belgian jurists turned stagiaires, provided
that the U.S. lawyer was in cooperation with the jurist in June
1994, and the cooperation lasted three years. 268 The Agreement
further provides that if a Belgian jurist who is licensed in the U.S.
resided outside Belgium, then the Belgian jurist can continue his
or her partnership or cooperative arrangement with a U.S. firm.
However, the jurist must register on the tableau or stagiair list
266. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117. These transition provisions
first became the focus of negotiation in approximately May 1993. These provisions
generated strong discussion within the U.S. legal community in Brussels as the ABA
negotiators attempted to refine the language and address the specific concerns of as
many firms as possible. See, e.g., Letter from Steven C. Nelson, Agreement Negotiator,
to Joseph P. Griffin and Walter Oberreit, Agreement Negotiators (May 3, 1993) (noting
intention to ask U.S. firms "to give us in written form descriptions of the factual situa-
tions that they are concerned with that they feel might not be consistent with either our
draft or the counterdraft of the Bar Councils, together with any solutions they would
propose by way of transitional measures."). Not all firms were happy with the ABA
negotiations, however. See supra notes 146 and 245 and accompanying text.
One commentator has described these provisions as,
"somewhat similar to those that had been adopted in France when the conseits
juridiques became a regulated profession .... Generally, the Brussels provisions
allowed cooperations and partnerships between legal counselors existing on
June 1, 1994 to become cooperations and partnerships under the ABA Agree-
ment if appropriate entries on the A and B Lists were made or applied for
prior to January 1, 1995."
CONE, supra note 1, at 10:28.
267. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 12, para. 3.
268. Id. at art. 12, para. 2.
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when the jurist moves back to Brussels.2 6 9
Without these "transition provisions" the Agreement proba-
bly could not have been completed. Unless it addressed the spe-
cific situations of the various lawyers and firms, the ABA negotia-
tors undoubtedly would have lost the support of U.S. firms in
Brussels, and thus lost their credibility. By the end of the negoti-
ations, both sides appeared relatively satisfied. The Brussels Bars
made available the names of Brussels lawyers who could offer
advice to stagiaires and suggested that the training period could
be adjusted to suit the more senior status of the jurists, some of
whom had been practicing law for years.270
The final provision related to the "forms of association" was
also controversial. One of the "Administration" provisions of the
Agreement requires two actions from U.S. lawyers who form
partnerships with tableau lawyers. They must first submit the
agreement between the U.S. lawyer and the tableau lawyer con-
cerning the formation of any partnership for approval to the
Brussels Bar with whom they register. 271  The U.S. lawyers must
then submit, for information purposes, the partnership agree-
ment among themselves. Or if no written agreement exists, a
written confirmation that the partnership agreement does not
conflict with the provisions of their agreement with the tableau
lawyers. 272
According to ABA negotiatorJoe Griffin, some Belgians had
269. Id. at art. 12, para. 4. Comparable to the other transition provisions discussed
supra notes 267-68, this provision permits the U.S.-licensed Belgian jurist to become a
partner of the U.S. firm after three years of cooperation, even if the jurist becomes a
stagiair and even though a U.S. lawyer ordinarily cannot be partners with a stagiair. Id.
This issue appears first to have been flagged in the cover letter accompanying the Feb.
11, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109 (reporting telephone call from Belgian jurist resi-
dent in New York who was willing to comply with Agreement upon his return to
Belgium, but who would not be able to satisfy stage until then and did not want this fact
to disqualify lawyers in his firm from registering on B List or Joint List). At the end of
the negotiations, the Brussels representatives indicated that they were concerned that
this would be a large loophole. To the extent that few lawyers were involved, they sug-
gested handling these cases on an ad hoc transitional basis. See Letter from Joseph P.
Griffin, Agreement Negotiator, to Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator (May 19,
1994) (reporting concerns of Brussels representatives). Apparently the ABA represent-
atives allayed these concerns because the provision remained in the Agreement.
270. See Letter from Carl Bevernage, Brussels Negotiator, to Steven Nelson, ABA
Negotiator (July 26, 1994) (identifying representatives who could advise Belgian jurists
and French order stagiaires).
271. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 1.
272. Id.
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heard stories of Belgian partners treated like second class citi-
zens in foreign firms. 273 Because the heads of the Brussels Bars
retain the power under their rules to examine partnership agree-
ments and intervene in the event of a dispute, some of the Belgi-
ans wanted this same power with respect to the partnerships be-
tween U.S. and Brussels lawyers. 274 This prospect disturbed
many of the U.S. lawyers. Joe Griffin stated that one of the U.S.
lawyers in Brussels explained that he would not even show his
partnership agreement to God.27 5 Some other U.S. lawyers in
Brussels said their partnership agreements forbade them from
showing the agreement to anyone, even their spouses. 2 7 6 When
the U.S. lawyers checked, however, they discovered that the Brus-
sels Bars' rules did give them the right to see these partnership
agreements.
After learning more about the concerns of the Belgians and
the importance of this issue to some of the Belgian negotiators,
the ABA negotiators agreed to this provision.277 The ABA nego-
tiators based their agreement on the belief that the discrimina-
tion situation that concerned the Belgians would not arise often,
if at all. Additionally, there was a safety valve in the form of the
Joint Supervisory Committee. Finally, the negotiators knew that
many firms would have a summary of their partnership agree-
ment they submit for tax purposes that would be sufficient to
satisfy the Belgian requirements. 27 Finally, as shown in the "Im-
273. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
274. Id. The first draft submitted by the Brussels Bars stated: "Article 9 Submission
to the Bar of cooperation and partnership agreements." See Jan. 14, 1993 Brussels draft,
supra note 109. The ABA countered with a proposal that U.S. lawyers be permitted to
provide written assurances that the partnership agreement does not contain any provi-
sions that improperly discriminate against tableau lawyers or stagiaires and invited the
Brussels Bars to provide a list of the substantive criteria against which they judged part-
nership agreements. See Mar. 2, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109, art. 10. The ABA
included this requirement in its next draft, however, and added a sentence that those
firms without written partnership agreements could provide written assurances of non-
discrimination. See May 14, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. The Brussels representa-
tive initially had a difficult time believing that some U.S. firms did not have a written
partnership agreement, but ultimately agreed to the additional proviso. See Oct. 18,
1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109. Once an agreement in principle was reached, the
drafting of the final agreement language was not controversial. See generally ABA/Brus-
sels file, supra note 117.
275. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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plementation" section, this provision has not proven to be a
great problem since the signing of the Agreement.
These provisions constitute the "forms of association" provi-
sions in the Agreement. Judged from the perspective of the mi-
grant U.S. lawyer, the Agreement contains among the most lib-
eral forms of association provisions. For example, the forms of
association provisions in the Agreement are certainly more spe-
cific than GATS because the GATS working party had not yet
had the opportunity to develop standards for lawyers. 27 9 The
NAFTA legislation similarly lacks substantive content. The
Agreement is substantially more liberal than even the pending
NAFTA Model Rule which permits U.S. lawyers to form partner-
ships with Mexican lawyers, but requires Mexican lawyers to
maintain the majority interest in such a firm.28 ' As a result, the
pending NAFTA Model Rule would not permit U.S. firms to
open a branch office with Mexican lawyers. The Agreement is
also more liberal than the IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines be-
cause the Agreement permits U.S. lawyers who are employees to
work in a Brussels office, whereas the IBA's Rejected FLC Guide-
lines would have reserved to the Host State the right to prohibit
this. The IBA Proposed General Principles are silent on this is-
sue except for a general nondiscrimination provision.28' Even
the EU Establishment Directive allows EU Member States to pro-
hibit lawyers from serving as salaried employees in a firm, pro-
vided the prohibition applies with equal force to the Host State's
279. See supra notes 4043 and accompanying text.
280. See generally NAFTA Model Rule, supra note 55, at Rule 15(b); Hansen, supra
note 55, at 19. As discussed supra note 55, joint recommendation of this Model Rule is
being withheld pending a determination of the Mexican Government's position on
these issues.
281. Compare supra note 204-05 and accompanying text (discussing "employees"
exception under terms of Agreement) with IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note
9, § H(2) and with IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at II(B).
"[T] he rights and obligations of members of the legal profession regulated by
the Host Authority, including permission to affiliate with a law firm with one
or more persons who are fully licensed by the Host Authority only if and to the
extent that they comply with, and are subject to, the same ethical and profes-
sional rules and standards as applied to fully licensed lawyers in the HostJuris-
diction."
See IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra. The comment provides that "Foreign Legal
Consultants should be permitted to affiliate with local law firms as partners and/or
employees, subject to regulation by the Host Authority and in a manner which pre-
serves the independence of the legal profession of the Host Jurisdiction." Id.
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lawyers .282
Interestingly, the Commission's first draft of the EU Estab-
lishment Directive was even more restrictive with respect to
"forms of association." That early draft contained an "up or out"
provision. This provision forced the established lawyer to inte-
grate into the Host Profession after five years or leave the Host
State. This "up or out" provision would certainly have disturbed
existing office arrangements and forms of association. After vig-
orous objection, the Commission revised its proposal. The final
EU Establishment Directive eliminated the "up or out" provi-
sion.2 3 Thus, the Agreement and the EU Establishment Direc-
tive are substantively similar in that both permit the migrant law-
yer to practice indefinitely using the lawyer's Home State title,
without completely integrating into the Host State's legal profes-
sion although the Establishment Directive makes full integration
easy to accomplish.
In addition to their having similar underlying principles,
many of the details of the Agreement and the EU Establishment
Directive are similar. The EU Establishment Directive contains a
"firm name and stationery" rule. It leaves to the Host State the
decision whether to require the resident migrant lawyers to be
identified and the legal form of the grouping to be men-
tioned.2" 4 Like the Agreement, the EU Establishment Directive
endorses the idea of multinational partnerships. It notes
though, that a firm has to comply with the Host State's rules on
branch offices and groupings, insofar as compliance therewith is
justified by the public interest in protecting clients and third par-
ties.28 5
The integrated approach to forms of association issues
282. Compare EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 8 (stating that "[a]
lawyer using the home-state title in a Host State may practise as a salaried lawyer in the
employ of another lawyer, an association or firm of lawyers, or a public or private enter-
prise to the extent that the host Member State so permits for lawyers registered under
the professional title used in that State.") with id., art. 11, para. 1 (noting that Article 11
permits joint practice in the same manner as in the Home State unless "incompatible
with the fundamental rules laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the
host Member State... [provided] compliance therewith is justified by the public inter-
est in protecting clients and third parties.").
283. See supra note 19 (discussing history of EU Establishment Directive); Hague
Proceedings, supra note 20, at 429-30 (Remarks of John Toulmin, C.M.G., Q.C.) (sum-
marizing relationship of CCBE Draft Directive and Commission draft directive).
284. EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19, art. 12.
285. Id. at art. 11.
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found in the Agreement is similar to that found in the ABA
Model FLC Rule. The ABA Model FLC Rule provides that FLCs
may be partners with, employed by, or in turn employ, U.S. law-
yers licensed in that jurisdiction.286 Moreover, because FLCs are
subject to the same ethics rules as U.S. lawyers, the rules on firm
names and stationery operate similarly to the provisions in the
Agreement. 2
87
In sum, the forms of association provisions in the Agree-
ment appear to be among the more liberal provisions addressing
these issues. Other than the obligation to submit one's partner-
ship agreement, the forms of association provisions do not treat
B List and Joint List lawyers substantially different than tableau
lawyers. Indeed, with respect to the employment status of U.S.
lawyers, the Agreement permits U.S. lawyers to do something
which Brussels lawyers cannot do. What may be most notable
about the Agreement, however, is the ability of the parties to
negotiate the detailed "transition" or "grandfathering" provi-
sions which attempt to address the concerns of all parties, while
still reaching an agreement. The ability of the parties to com-
promise and to treat Belgian jurists differently depending on
whether they were employed by, or partners in, U.S. law firms
before the Agreement was signed, may be one of the Agree-
ment's most interesting and creative aspects.
4. Miscellaneous Provisions
In addition to the scope of practice, "ethics and discipline,"
and "association" rules, the Agreement contains additional rules
which can be characterized as "miscellaneous provisions." The
Agreement provides, for example, guidance for the charging of
fees. The Brussels Bars may charge B List lawyers fees that are
"reasonable and comparable" to those charged to ordinary tab-
leau Brussels lawyers and may charge Joint List lawyers "reason-
ably reduced fees. "288
286. See ABA Model FLC Rule, supra note 10, § 5(b).
287. See supra note 260.
288. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 9, para 2.
ForJoint List lawyers, the ABA initially proposed a "nominal" fee. See Mar. 2, 1993 ABA
draft, supra note 109. Although the Brussels Bars initially questioned the term "nomi-
nal," see Apr. 30, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109, they accepted it in their June 17,
1993 Brussels draft. In the Heads of Agreement, however, the approach was much
more general. The relevant paragraph did not distinguish between B List andJoint List
lawyers and only said fees should be "reasonable." See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra
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Another miscellaneous provision is the "non-discrimina-
tion" provision found in Article 10. Like the "non-discrimina-
tion" provision found in the "conduct and privileges" section, 28 9
this provision stems from the early negotiations during which
the Brussels Bars proposed that U.S. lawyers be treated substan-
tially different than other foreign lawyers in Brussels.2 9° The
ABA negotiators, echoing comments heard from the U.S. legal
community in Brussels, insisted that U.S. lawyers not be treated
disadvantageously in comparison with each other, in comparison
with other non-EU firms, and even in comparison with lawyers
and firms from EU countries.2 91  The parties ultimately sepa-
rated the single nondiscrimination clause contained in early
drafts and placed it both in the "conduct and privileges" section
and in its own section. 92 The current version of this section
states that the rights of a U.S. lawyer under the Agreement, or
otherwise, shall not be abridged by reason of nationality, profes-
sional qualification, or membership in a bar or legal profession
of any third country.
Other miscellaneous provisions are found in the final sec-
tion of the Agreement. They specify that all three language ver-
sions of the Agreement are authentic. They also note the date
when the Agreement becomes effective and that the Agreement
continues in force indefinitely unless and until terminated by
either party upon one year's written notice.29
Article 13, entitled "Reciprocity," provides one reason why
the Agreement might be terminated. The Agreement obligates
note 117. Although "nominal" was used in the May 6, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109,
the May 11, 1994 ABA draft, supra note 109, used the "reasonably reduced fees" lan-
guage found in the final agreement.
289. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 10, paras. 1, 2.
290. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. firm in Brussels to Walter Oberreit, Agreement Ne-
gotiator (Oct. 26, 1992) (noting that agreement should contain "most favored nation"-
type clause with respect to U.S. firms so that no U.S. firm could be treated better than
any other U.S. firm); Mar. 2, 1993 ABA Draft, supra note 109, art. 4 (stating that "[t]he
BRUSSELS BAR COUNCILS will afford U.S. Lawyers on Foreign Lawyer Lists, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, the same rights and privileges as those to which members of
the bars of Member States of the European Communities other than members of the
BRUSSELS BAR COUNCILS are entitled; provided that .. "); Memorandum from
Joseph P. Griffin and Steven C. Nelson, Agreement Negotiators, to U.S. Law Firms in
Brussels (Oct. 29, 1992) (attaching list of issues given to Brussels group at October 29,
1992 meeting); accord Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42.
- 292. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
293. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14, paras. 1, 3.
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the ABA to use its best efforts to ensure that Brussels lawyers
have access to the U.S. legal market.294 The Agreement further
provides that after a three year period, the Brussels Bars will be
free to impose restrictions on U.S. lawyers from States without a
Foreign Legal Consultant rule.295 Reciprocity often is a conten-
tious issue when lawyers or countries attempt to negotiate cross-
border practice agreements. 296 Here too, much disagreement
centered around the subject of reciprocity. 297 The Agreement's
294. Id. at art. 13, para. 1.
295. Id. at art. 13, para. 2.
296. See generally CONE, supra note 1, at 1:14, 2:28-31. The IBA's REJECTED FLC
GUIDELINES, which initially contained a "reciprocity requirement" abandoned this con-
cept. This change was explained in the "Discussion and Analysis" section which accom-
panied the guidelines:
In light of the concerns expressed by numerous organizations, including the
German Bar Association, the Netherlands Order of Advocates, the Norwegian
Bar Association, the Belgian National Order of Advocates and the Swiss Bar
Association, to the effect that (i) reciprocity was excluded from CATS, and (ii)
liberalization of trade in legal services is unlikely to be promoted by a reciproc-
ity requirement, this clause has been deleted from the current draft.
IBA's REJECTED FLC GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 14. The IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES similarly omit any reciprocity requirement. IBA PROPOSED GENERAL PRINCIPLES,
supra note 9. Interestingly, some U.S. commentators have concluded the opposite,
namely that the lack of reciprocity requirement hinders rather than promotes liberali-
zation of trade in legal services. See, e.g., Flores, supra note 2, at 179-80; see also Chap-
man & Tauber, supra note 2, at 970-71.
297. The topic of reciprocity was the subject of disagreement. The reciprocity pro-
vision first made its appearance approximately eight months into the negotiations in a
rather cryptic note by the Belgians. See Apr. 30, 1993 Brussels draft, supra note 109
(stating that "ARTICLE 15 BELGIAN/BRUSSELS LAWYERS PRACTICING IN THE
U.S.A. Mutatis mutandis offer draft model rules for the licensing of Foreign Legal Con-
sultants"). The ABA counter-offered with a provision that would have stated, "[t] he
ABA will make best efforts to persuade the bars of the states of the United States to
adopt the provisions of any ABA recommendation on foreign legal consultants." See
May 14, 1993 ABA draft, supra note 109. In subsequent drafts, the Belgians used the
ABA language, but bracketed it to indicate that it required further discussion. SeeJune
17 and Aug. 3, 1993 Brussels drafts, supra note 109. Then, in the first draft of the Heads
of Agreement, the Belgians once again used language suggesting the ABA had the
power to enact reciprocity provisions. See Sept. 13, 1993 Brussels draft (Bevernage),
supra note 109. The ABA negotiators responded that they could not "agree to 'state-by-
state' reciprocity, which [they] believe [d] [went] beyond what is reasonably needed to
ensure the ability of Belgian lawyers to practice in the relevant states." The ABA's re-
vised language opened the way for the "3 year review" period when it provided, [t]he
Agreement assumes the members of the Brussels Bar will continue to have reasonable
and practical opportunity, either as legal consultants or full members of the State Bars
in the United States to carry on the practice of law in commercially-important States
such as New York which already permit such practice." See Sept. 18, 1993 ABA draft,
supra note 109. Discussion ensued through many more drafts. The ABA ultimately
helped end the deadlock when it suggested the three year review. See Sept. 22, 1993
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handling of the issue is interesting because it postponed the eval-
uation of reciprocity until after the Agreement's existence for
several years, perhaps postponing or avoiding entirely some of
the battles that hampered other negotiations. Thus, it is unclear
at this time whether this reciprocity provision will significantly
affect the ability of U.S. lawyers to provide legal services in Brus-
sels.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
The first, and probably most difficult, step to take to facili-
tate cross-border practice is reaching an agreement. But, as the
EU experience has shown, implementation of any agreement
can also raise problems.2 98 To date, the anecdotal evidence sug-
Brussels draft, Oct. 15, 1993 ABA draft, Oct. 18, 1993 Brussels draft, Oct. 19, 1993 ABA
draft (proposing three year review), October 19, 1993 Brussels draft, Oct. 21, 1993 Brus-
sels draft, December 15, 1993 ABA draft, Jan. 3, 1994 Brussels draft, Jan. 13, 1994 ABA
draft, supra note 109.
298. Having legislation does not mean it will be implemented without question.
Numerous issues arose over the years about the scope of the EU's Lawyers' Services
Directive, the Diplomas Directive, and the right to establishment for lawyers (even in
the absence of a directive). See, e.g., Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, Case C-55/94, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (discussing suspension by
Milan Bar Council of German lawyer with office in Milan; ECJ held, inter alia, that
holding oneself out on stable and continuous basis from ongoing established base in-
vokes establishment not services; that Host Member State conditions that may hinder
establishment must fulfill four conditions; and that Member States must take account of
equivalence of diploma and, if necessary, compare knowledge and qualifications re-
quired with those persons concerned); Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium fhrJustiz, Bundes-
und Europaangelegenheiten, Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R.
221 (noting Germany's refusal to recognize credentials of Greek lawyer practicing in
Germany; ECJ ruled that Germany must examine to what extent knowledge and qualifi-
cations obtained correspond to those required by rules of Host State; Host State can
ignore qualifications only if they did not satisfy "real and imperative" requirements);
Kraus v. Baden-Whrttemberg, Case C-19/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1663 (discussing German
law graduate who used Scottish LL.M. degree without paying required fee to bar; ECJ
held that use of postgraduate university degree obtained in another Member State may
be subject to authorization proceeding proportionate to subject matter and restricted
to verify propriety of grant of degree); Commission v. French Republic, Case C-294/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-3591, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 569 (explaining why ECJ struck down several of
France's requirements implementing "in conjunction with" provision in Lawyers' Serv-
ices Directive; opining, inter alia, that Member States may not require foreign lawyers:
1) to act in conjunction with local lawyer where lawyer's service is not mandatory or
before non-judicial authorities; or 2) to retain local lawyers in order to conduct pro-
ceedings in civil cases where lawyer services are compulsory); Commission v. Germany,
Case 427/85 [1988] E.C.R. 1123, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 677 (discussing that ECJ consid-
ered, inter alia, several points in Germany's regulations implementing "in conjunction
with" requirement in Lawyers' Services Directive; first, provisions must be limited to
1464 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1382
gests that the process of implementing the Agreement has been
relatively satisfactory, if somewhat slow.
The Agreement calls for registration of all established U.S.
lawyers within six months of the signing of the Agreement. 299
When U.S. lawyers tried to comply with this provision, however,
they discovered that the Brussels Bars' failed to develop the ap-
propriate registration forms.300 Some U.S. lawyers who applied
before the forms' development were told to simply send a letter
requesting registration, which they did.30 ' Ultimately, however,
after consultation with U.S. lawyers, the Dutch and French Or-
ders of the Brussels Bars jointly developed their registration
forms.30 2 According to one of the Joint Committee members,
enable foreign lawyer to comply with applicable procedural and ethical rules; second,
provisions requiring constant presence of local lawyer during oral proceedings, with
local lawyer assuming role as authorized representative, are disproportional and there-
fore incompatible with Treaty); Gullung v. Counsel de l'Ordre des Avocats du Barreau
de Colmar & Saverne, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57 (examin-
ing where France had denied admission to dual French and German national previ-
ously disciplined in France for violations of professional ethics, who thereafter became
rechsanwalt in Germany; ECJ rejected, inter alia, argument that Lawyers' Services Direc-
tive required France to recognize German license where licensed was denied for rea-
sons relating to dignity, good reputation, and integrity); Ordre des Avocats au Barreau
de Paris v. Klopp, Case 107/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2971, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99 (examining
Paris Bar's rejection of application of lawyer practicing in both Paris and Dusseldorf
offices; ECJ held that Treaty forbids Host States from denying access solely on ground
that he simultaneously maintains office in another Member State); Thieffry v. Counsel
de l'Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, Case 71/76, [1978] E.C.R. 765, [1977] 2
C.M.L.R. 373 (discussing Belgian avocat excluded from Paris Bar after he passed French
Bar exam and his Belgian law degree was recognized as equivalent by University of
Paris; ECJ found this incompatible with establishment); See Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur
van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (discussing Netherlands lawyer residing in Belgium who was
denied right to appear in Netherlands court; ECJ held that national law cannot impose
residency requirement in these circumstances and held that Articles 59 and 60 had
direct effect). Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, Case 2/74, [1974] E.C.R. 631 (explaining
how Belgium excluded lawyer from list who was Dutch national and otherwise qualified
as Belgian lawyer; ECJ held, inter alia, that lawyer may not be prohibited from carrying
on profession by reason of nationality in another EC Member State, and Treaty of
Rome's exclusion for governmental authority did not exclude lawyers).
299. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1.
300. Griffin Feb. 14, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
301. Id. Joe Griffin reported, for example, that when he sent his letter asking to
register, he received a letter back telling him to consider himself registered. To his
knowledge, no fee was requested or paid. Id.
302. Telephone Interview with Walter Oberreit, Agreement Negotiator (Mar. 3,
1997) [hereinafter Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview]. Mr. Oberreit indi-
cated that he had commented on drafts of the registration forms before they were
made final.
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the forms appear daunting, but the Brussels Bars handle them in
a very flexible manner."°'
It appears that there is no easily accessible way of determin-
ing the numbers of U.S. lawyers who register with the Brussels
Bars. The ABA maintains no such list.304 Nor does the list ap-
pear to be readily accessible from the Brussels Bars.30 5 At my
request, Walter Oberreit estimated that as of March 1997, the
Brussels Bars registered approximately eighty U.S. lawyers, virtu-
ally all of whom chose the B List.30 6 Mr. Oberreit observed that
this figure of eighty lawyers represents a sharp increase over the
handful of U.S. lawyers who had registered on the B List before
the signing of the Agreement.30 7 He further estimated that this
figure represented approximately fifty percent of the U.S. law-
yers in Brussels. 0 ' When queried as to the Brussels Bars' satis-
faction with a registration percentage close to fifty percent, he
indicated his belief of their satisfaction with the level of compli-
303. Id.; see Forms (Appendix B).
304. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
305. This author initially asked Joe Griffin how I could determine the number of
U.S. lawyers who registered with the Brussels Bars. He was not sure and, at his sugges-
tion, I contacted Walter Oberreit in Brussels. Among other things, I asked Mr. Oberreit
if this information was publicly available. He indicated that it was not. Mr. Oberreit's
figures came from conversations with officials of the Brussels Bars and he was not given
precise numbers by the French Bar. See Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview,
supra note 302.
306. Id. Mr. Oberreit reported that at his request, the Brussels Bars checked their
files to come up with a number. He was advised by the Dutch Language Order of the
Brussels Bar that 80 lawyers had registered on the B List, 36 of whom were U.S. lawyers.
The French Language Order reported that 200 lawyers had registered on the B List, but
that it could not report how many of these were U.S. lawyers. Based on these figures,
the recent increase in registration on the B List, and the fact that the U.S. lawyers have
encouraged relatively equal registration among the Dutch and French Bars, Mr. Ober-
reit estimated that 75 to 80 U.S. lawyers were registered on the B List. Id.
Although there is only one Joint List, a lawyer must register on it either through
the French Order or the Dutch Order. By March 1997, no lawyers had registered on
the Joint List via the Dutch Order; three U.S. lawyers had registered on the Joint List via
the French Order. See Letter from Walter Oberreit, Agreement Negotiator, to author
(Mar. 4, 1997) (on file. with the Fordham International Law Journal).
307. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
308. Id. Mr. Oberreit suggested that to estimate the percentage of U.S. lawyers in
Brussels registered, I compare the number 80 with the listings in the 1997 Martindale-
Hubbell listing for Brussels, scheduled to be released in March 1997. He indicated that
prior Martindale-Hubbell directories would be less useful since "things change very
quickly" regarding U.S. lawyers practicing in Brussels.
Before the Agreement was signed, U.S. negotiators predicted that most U.S. law-
yers would register. See Stewart, supra note 71 (quoting Walter Oberreit as saying he
was "confident that most American firms will register once the rules are in effect.").
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ance under the Agreement." 9 The Brussels Bars apparently rec-
ognize that some U.S. lawyers not yet registered may do so at
some point in the future when Belgian jurists in their firms re-
tire.3 10 Thus, while not all Belgian jurists affiliated with U.S.
firms registered on the list of tableau lawyers or stagiaires, many
jurists have.31'
One of the most interesting things, according to Walter
Oberreit, is that in light of the Agreement the Brussels Bars re-
vised their B List forms for all lawyers, not just U.S. lawyers.3 12
Hence, although there are some differences for U.S. lawyers, the
Brussels Bars generally treat all the lawyers on their B List in a
manner similar to that negotiated in the Agreement for U.S. law-
313yers. 1 Furthermore, he reports that it is the Agreement, rather
than the Agreement with the Law Society of England and Wales,
that served as the model for the B List revisions.314
In short, the Agreement appears relatively effective in facili-
tating registration on the B List. Judging by the results, the con-
ditions in the Agreement are apparently more acceptable to U.S.
lawyers than the conditions placed on the prior B List. In con-
trast, the Agreement appears less effective in encouraging regis-
tration on the Joint List by U.S. lawyers with no desire or need to
be on the B List. Unless the U.S. lawyers have something to gain
from registration, they appear not to be following the Agree-
ment, which, after all, is not binding because of the ABA's lack
of authority to bind all U.S. lawyers.315
309. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
310. Id. If, for example, a firm had a senior Belgian jurist, who did not want to sit
for the Belgian Bar exam, the choices facing the lawyers in the firm would be to remove
the Belgian jurist from the firm or wait until the Belgian jurist retires to register. Obvi-
ously, in this situation, the U.S. lawyers might prefer to wait before registering on the B
List.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.; accord Letter from Marc van der Haeger, President of the French Order of
the Brussels Bar, to Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal). "[T) he [French] Bar has decided to apply the
principles of the ABA agreement to all foreign lawyers established in Brussels in order
to preserve equal treatment and to facilitate all future registrations on the Foreign Law-
yer List and the Joint List." It will be interesting to observe whether the Brussels Bars
change the B List rules for EU lawyers because of the adoption of the EU Establishment
Directive.
314. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
315. See supra note 308 and accompanying text; accord Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 302.
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The Agreement permits the Brussels Bars to charge a fee in
connection with registration. With respect to B List lawyers, the
fees are to be "reasonable and comparable to those charged by
the Orders to Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s of equivalent sen-
iority."3 16  The Agreement appears to permit the Orders to
charge reasonably reduced fees to U.S. lawyers on the Joint List.
The Brussels Bars initially set the fees for B List lawyers at a rate
comparable to that paid by the most senior tableau lawyers.317
After protest by the English, however, the Brussels Bars revised
these fees. 18 The revised fees are now set according to the sen-
iority of the B List lawyer as measured by the number of years
the lawyer has been admitted to any bar.319 The current fees for
the B List range from BEF'15,000 to 25,000. The Dutch Order
charges the same fees for registration on the Joint List as on the
B List whereas the French Order charges a reduced flat fee of
BEF 8,000.320 Although Mr. Oberreit heard no complaints from
US lawyers about the level of these fees, he suspects that these
fees may contribute to the reasons why certain U.S. firms remain
unregistered on the B List.3 21
The Agreement itself contained a section entitled "Imple-
mentation." Among other things, this Implementation section
established a Joint Supervisory Committee that was assigned sev-
eral tasks. The Joint Supervisory Committee was to monitor the
316. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 1.
317. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
318. Id.; see also Lawyers'Fury Over Brussels 'Tax', THE LAWYER 9, Mar. 28, 1995, at 5
(reporting British law firms' protest over proposals to charge up to £400 per lawyer per
office for registration on foreign lawyer list, noting that British expected fees on "C
List" to be around £30 per person); Brussels: UK firms protest over Brussels fees', INT'L
LAw., May 1995, at 3.
The fact that English lawyers were the ones protesting might strike some as ironic.
According to a report prepared by the ABA Section on International Law and Practice,
if a law firm with which a lawyer is affiliated has a practice in England and wishes to add
a partner who is an English solicitor, all partners in the firm, regardless of location,
must register with the Law Society and pay a substantial registration fee. The result can
be annual fees for the law firm in excess of US$100,000. ABA Model FLC Rule, supra
note 10, at 234 n.71.
319. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
320. See Letter from Walter Oberreit, Agreement Negotiator, to author (Mar. 4,
1997) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). As of May 1, 1997, the ex-
change rate for the Belgian franc was approximately 35 BEF/US$1. See N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 1197, at D15. Therefore, computed at this exchange rate, the fees for B List lawyers
range from US$420 to US$700; the fees forJoint List lawyers are equivalent to US$224.
321. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
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implementation and observance of the Agreement and attempt
to resolve any problems or issues arising in connection with its
implementation.322 It was to consider any adaptations or revi-
sions of the Agreement that may be required by reason of any
changes in applicable law, regulations, intergovernmental agree-
ments, or other circumstances beyond the control of the Orders
or the ABA.3 21 It was to review the Agreement in light of actual
experience after it had been in operation for three years.324 The
Joint Supervisory Committee also was to provide consultation to
the Orders in connection with disciplinary matters involving U.S.
lawyers. 25
The Belgians identified six individuals as members of the
Joint Supervisory Committee.326 U.S. members of the Joint Su-
pervisory Committee include Steven Nelson, Joseph Griffin, Wal-
ter Oberreit, and Paul Sher, all of whom were among the negoti-
ators of the Agreement.32 7 The ABA did not develop any special
procedures for the appointment, retention, or rotation of the
U.S. members of this committee.328 Rather, the ABA's Special
Advisory Committee on International Activities selected as the
Joint Committee members several of the Agreement negotiators
because of their extensive contacts with their Belgian' counter-
parts and the relationship of trust that had evolved.3 29 The Joint
Committee met one time, for dinner, after the signing of the
Agreement.330
The monitoring required by the Agreement has been pas-
sive rather than active, but the U.S. members of the Joint Super-
visory Committee assume that, given the size 'of the U.S. legal
community in Brussels, they would hear if U.S. lawyers had any
322. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 3.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at art. 7, para. 3.
326. See Letter from Karel Van Alsenoy, Stafhouder of the Dutch Order of the Brus-
sels Bar, and Georges-Albert Dal, Bdtonnier of the French Order of the Brussels Bar, to
the President of the ABA (unidentified) (Jan. 25, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). These individuals include: Georges-Albert Dal, Karel Van Alse-
noy, Francois Glansdorff, Carl Bevernage, Marc van der Haegen (with the substitute
Lucette Defalque), and Jacques Steenbergen (with the substitute Jozef Slootmans).
327. Griffin Feb. 14, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
CROSS-BORDER LEGAL PRACTICE
problems with the Agreement. 3 1 One of the Joint Committee
Members, Joe Griffin, described fellow Committee member and
longtime Brussels practitioner Walter Oberreit as their "early
warning system. 332
Only one incident came to the attention of the U.S. mem-
bers of the Joint Committee.3 3 After a U.S. lawyer registered on
the B List in early 1996, the Brussels Bar with whom he regis-
tered asked him to complete the registration form's section re-
quiring details of the cabinet, or office, of the avocat with whom
he was established. The Bar then requested a copy of the firm's
agreement with the Belgian lawyer. The inquiring lawyer was
concerned about providing the document because it included
compensation levels for the Belgian lawyer. The lawyer sought
advice from Joint Supervisory Committee Member Joe Griffin
and information about how other lawyers handled such a re-
quest. Joe Griffin responded with an explanation of the negoti-
ating history of the "partnership" provision. Although he noted
that in his view, the Agreement did not require production of an
agreement in the absence of partnership with a Belgian lawyer,
he nevertheless encouraged the lawyer to turn over details of the
agreement with the Belgian lawyer. He pointed out that the
ABA had been assured of confidentiality, that Belgian firms rou-
tinely turned over these documents, and that the Bar's concern
was discrimination against Belgian lawyers.
At Mr. Griffin's request, the inquirer then spoke with Walter
Oberreit, anotherJoint Committee Member. Mr. Oberreit knew
of no other inquiries of this sort. He recommended that the
inquirer not "make a big deal out of it," but "white out" the com-
pensation levels and ensure the clarity of the "independence
notwithstanding employment" provisions. Accordingly, the in-
quirer stated his intention to prepare a short form summary of
the agreement, to be signed by the Belgian lawyers. As far as Joe
Griffin recalls, this solution proved satisfactory. 4 Committee
representatives report that they have not heard of any other
problems or concerns with respect to the partnership agreement
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
334. Telephone Interview with Joseph Griffin, Agreement Negotiator (May 1997).
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provision.
In addition to monitoring the implementation of the Agree-
ment and attempting to resolve any problems, the second obliga-
tion of the Joint Committee is to monitor changes in applicable
law, regulations or intergovernmental agreements requiring revi-
sions in the Agreement. As far as the U.S. Joint Committee
members know, there have been no such changes. 3 36
The third obligation of the Joint Committee is to review the
Agreement in light of actual experience after its operation for
three years. 7 The Joint Supervisory Committee members be-
lieve that the Brussels Bars are pleased with the Agreement and
its manner of implementation. 338 No formal three year review
occurred, although both sides have indicated a desire to sched-
ule a meeting in the future. ABA representatives indicate that
they have no reason to believe that the Brussels Bars are dis-
pleased with the Agreement. 339
The fourth obligation of the Joint Committee is to be avail-
able for consultations in connection with any disciplinary mat-
ters. The U.S. Committee members have not been consulted in
335. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302; Nelson Mar. 18,
1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 55.
336. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supa note 96. The U.S. Committee repre-
sentatives may soon want to evaluate whether any changes are necessary in light of the
adoption of the EU Establishment Directive, supra note 19. Walter Oberreit indicated
that a B List Lawyers' Committee, of which he is one of two U.S. representatives, has
suggested to the Brussels Bars that the stationery provisions in the EU Establishment
Directive are different than and less informative than the Brussels Bars' own rules. The
B List Lawyers' Committee has suggested that Belgium may want to adopt implement-
ing legislation that requires the B List lawyers to follow the current Brussels rules con-
cerning stationery. See Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302.
337. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 3.
338. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302; Nelson Mar. 10,
1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42.
339. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96; Nelson Mar. 18, 1998 Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 42. The Agreement provides that "[t]he Committee will in
any event review this Agreement in light of actual experience after it has been in opera-
tion for three years." Agreement, supra note 3, art. 12, para. 3. According to Mr. Grif-
fin, two and a half years into the Agreement, no specific arrangements had been made
for the three-year review. Id. Mr. Oberreit had speculated that it was quite possible that
neither side would initiate the three year review. See Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone
Interview, supra note 302. Although the three year period has passed, Steve Nelson
believes such a meeting will occur in the near future. See Nelson Mar. 18, 1998 Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 55.
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connection with any disciplinary matters.3 40 Furthermore, Wal-
ter Oberreit believes that he would hear something if any disci-
plinary matters involving U.S. lawyers existed. 41
In addition to the provisions related to the Joint Commit-
tee, the Agreement requires both the ABA and the Brussels Bars
to take certain steps to further implement the Agreement. For
example, the Agreement requires the Brussels Bars to provide
any necessary derogations from their rules.342 On January 27,
1995, the French Language Order of the Brussels Bar advised
the U.S. members of the Joint Supervisory Committee that it,
and the Dutch Order, made the necessary changes to their rules
and enclosed a copy of these changes. 343 This representative fur-
ther advised that "the Bar has decided to apply the principles of
the ABA agreement to all foreign lawyers established in Brussels
in order to preserve equal treatment and to facilitate all future
registrations on the Foreign Lawyer List and the Joint List."344
The Agreement also requires the Brussels Bars to "use their
best efforts to persuade the relevant Belgian authorities to con-
form existing and future professional cards of U.S. Lawyers to
the provisions of [the] Agreement." '345 U.S. representatives do
not have information as to steps the Brussels Bars' officials took
to comply with this provision, but they are also not aware of any
340. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96; Nelson Mar. 18, 1998 Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 55.
341. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302. Mr. Oberreit
indicated that he would not' have heard about situations if the bdtonnier or stafhouder
simply called a U.S. lawyer to suggest that the U.S. lawyer had violated the Bar rules,
such as the advertising rules. This type of interaction would remain private, provided
the U.S. lawyer complied. But Mr. Oberreit is sure he would have heard about any
situation in which the Bar wanted to pursue discipline. Id.
342. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 1.
343. See Letter from Marc van der Haeger, President of the French Order of the
Brussels Bar, to Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the
Fordham International LawJournal); see also Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
344. Letter from Marc van der Haeger, President of the French Order of the Brus-
sels Bar, to Steven Nelson, Agreement Negotiator (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal); see generally Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Guide-
lines and Information Concerning the Registration of Foreign Lawyers in Belgium and
With the Brussels Bar (May 22, 1996), supra note 86.
345. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 1. As mentioned in Section II(A),
supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text, in addition to registering with the relevant
Belgian Order, U.S. lawyers practicing in Belgium also need a work permit (or "profes-
sional card") from the Belgian Government.
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complaints by U.S. lawyers in Brussels.346
In addition to imposing duties upon the Brussels Orders,
the Agreement requires the ABA to take certain steps. The re-
quired steps include urging U.S. lawyers to comply with the
terms of the Agreement. 347 After the finalization of the Agree-
ment, the ABA negotiating team advised U.S. lawyers practicing
in Brussels of that fact and urged them to register.348 As noted
earlier, the number of registered U.S. lawyers increased signifi-
cantly, although the numbers currently fall far short of the
Agreement provision that all U.S. lawyers established in Brussels
register.349
The Agreement also contains something that amounts to a
reciprocity provision. This provision, which was also the. subject
of negotiation, requires the ABA to use its best efforts to ensure
that Brussels lawyers have a reasonable and practical opportunity
to practice in the United States as either Foreign Legal Consul-
tants or full members of the state bars.35 ° The ABA efforts to
satisfy this provision are twofold. First, the ABA considers that its
promulgation and ongoing endorsement of the Model Rule for
the Licensing of Legal Consultants satisfies this provision.35
Second, the ABA asked the Brussels Bars to advise them if they
have any particular complaints or if there is any particular state
with which they are having problems, so that the ABA may nego-
tiate more directly with that state. 52 To date, the ABA has re-
ceived no complaints.35 3 Hence, although the Agreement per-
mitted it, 354 the Brussels Bars have indicated no intention to im-
346. Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42; Nelson Mar. 18,
1998 Telephone Interview, supra note 55.
347. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 2.
348. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
349. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
350. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13. See supra notes 294-97 (discussing legislative
history of this reciprocity requirement). One commentator has stated that this reci-
procity provision is "in seeming potential violation of GATS." CONE, supra note 1, at
10:29. When questioned about this, one of the ABA negotiators dismissed this point by
noting that the Agreement is not between governmental entities. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997
Interview, supra note 96.
351. Griffin Feb. 18, 1997 Interview, supra note 96.
352. Id.
353. Id.; Nelson Mar. 18, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 55.
354. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13, para. 2. This paragraph notes that the Brus-
sels Bars' ability to impose restrictions is "without prejudice to the rights and freedoms
of U.S. lawyers and their law firms then established in Brussels." This last clause pre-
sumably means that such restrictions could only be imposed prospectively on new U.S.
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pose restrictions on U.S. lawyers. 55
In discussing implementation issues, a natural question is
whether the Agreement has had any practical effect on lawyers'
lives. The anecdotal evidence suggests that, although the Agree-
ment prompted small changes, it probably has not changed U.S.
lawyers' lives significantly. Some firms undoubtedly changed
their stationery in light of the Agreement and registration on the
"B List." 56 Some firms saw changes with respect to their Belgian
partners, employees, or lawyers with whom they cooperate, some
of whom began the stage or training session. 57 Some firms
changed the manner in which they attribute any advice on Bel-
gian law. 58 Walter Oberreit speculates that those U.S. lawyers
registered on the B List may be more attentive to the Brussels
Bars' rules on advertising, especially the bans on references to
specialization or specific clients. 59 Otherwise, however, U.S.
lawyers advise that there are no notable changes in U.S. lawyers'
behavior attributable to the fact that lawyers are now subject to
the Brussels Bar's ethics rules.36 °
Although not truly an implementation issue, it is interesting
to inquire about the familiarity with this Agreement on the part
of Brussels lawyers not involved with U.S. law firms, and U.S. law-
yers outside of Brussels. The answer appears to be "not very fa-
miliar, if at all." The existence of the Agreement was not widely
lawyers coming in from those states without an FLC rule. This interpretation is con-
firmed by one of the Agreement negotiators. See Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone In-
terview, supra note 42.
355. Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 302; Nelson Mar. 10,
1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42; Nelson Mar. 18, 1997 Telephone Interview,
supra note 55. See Carol A. Needham, The Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants in the
United States, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1501 (1998) (providing detailed discussion of status
of ABA Model FLC Rule).
356. See generally ABA/Brussels file, supra note 117.
357. Id. Steve Nelson, for example, reports that as a result of the Agreement, his
firm of Dorsey & Whitney has formed partnerships and cooperations with Belgian law-
yers. See Nelson Mar. 10, 1997 Telephone Interview, supra note 42.
358. Walter Oberreit advised me that he does not know how U.S. firms are re-
sponding to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Agreement concerning citation of Belgian
lawyers as the source of Belgian law. The Agreement provides multiple methods of
attribution including a signature line and reference in the text to the Belgian lawyer
upon whom the U.S. lawyer has relied. See Oberreit Mar. 3, 1997 Telephone Interview,
supra note 302.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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reported in the United States.3 61 Indeed, as far as I know, the
entire Agreement has never before been publicly published. My
own experiences convince me that the relatively few academics
who are familiar with cross-border legal services generally were
unfamiliar with the Agreement until they learned of it at recent
AALS Conferences.36
2
The Agreement seems to be similarly unfamiliar in Brussels,
except to those directly involved in its negotiation or implemen-
tation. Joe Griffin believes that most "rank and file" Brussels law-
yers are unaware of the Agreement. According to Mr. Griffin,
the Brussels leaders who negotiated the Agreement took no ex-
traordinary steps to publicize the existence of the Agreement.
Mr. Griffin suspects that the Agreement might prove controver-
sial with many of the "rank and file" Brussels lawyers.363
In sum, there probably are many different perspectives from
which one can examine implementation issues. On the one
hand, the Agreement could be said to be remarkably successful
in the sense that both parties appear pleased with it and it has
created no significant problems. Alternatively, the Agreement
might be considered a success insofar as it provided a framework
for regulating foreign lawyers in Brussels, and insofar as that
framework is the result of significant negotiation and give and
take and thus addresses many of the parties' needs. Alterna-
tively, one probably could call the Agreement less than success-
ful if one compared the fifty percent registration rate with the
361. See Stewart, supra note 71 (discussing Agreement); See also U.S. Lawyers, supra
note 71 (reporting on Agreement).
362. The Agreement was very briefly discussed at two AALS Annual Meeting Pro-
grams. See The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the Legal Profession: A
Challenge to the Teaching of Professional Responsibility and International Business
Law, presentation at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Joint
Program of the Sections of International Law, Professional Responsibility and cospon-
sored by the Sections on Comparative Law and Graduate Programs for Foreign Lawyers
(Jan. 1997); Providing Legal Services Across Borders - Challenges for North American
Lawyers and Lessons from European Experience, presentation at the Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Joint Program of the Sections on North Ameri-
can Cooperation and Graduate Programs for Foreign Lawyers (Jan. 1996).
363. One can only speculate as to the reasons why such "rank and file" members
might object to the Agreement. Historically, however, lawyers appear to have objected
to cross-border practice both out of concerns for client protection and integrity of the
legal protection, as well as out of concerns for protecting their own market share. See
generally Chapman & Tauber, supra note 2, at 951-54 (summarizing justifications offered
against liberalization of legal profession); Transnational Law Practice, supra note 2, at
750-62.
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stated requirement that all U.S. lawyers established in Brussels
register. Moreover, for the fifty percent of U.S. lawyers not yet
registered, one does not know if this failure is due to a percep-
tion that the Agreement fails them. In short, only time will tell
which perspective prevails.
V. ANALYZING THE STRENGTHS AND VWELLKNESSES OF THE
HYBRID MODEL FOR FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER
LEGAL PRACTICE
Because the efforts at regulating cross-border legal practice
are relatively few and far between, it is useful to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of any such agreement, in an effort to
learn more about which models are or are not successful. This
Agreement's hybrid model illustrates several strengths. One of
the first strengths of this approach is the fact that the Agreement
exists. In comparison to GATS, NAFTA, the IBA, and the EU,
the Agreement is successful in that the parties were able to agree
on specific terms in a relatively short time. Whereas GATS and
NAFTA left specific agreement on provisions to a later time, the
Agreement worked out details on the scope of practice, forms of
association, and ethics and discipline issues. Moreover, even
though the EU recently adopted an Establishment Directive, this
Directive required many years to develop.364 In contrast, the
Agreement was negotiated within approximately two years of the
date the Brussels Bars first approached the ABA.
The second advantage of this hybrid model, as reflected by
the Agreement, is that it serves as a framework for a much
broader agreement. After the Brussels Bars negotiated the
Agreement, they used it as a framework for revising their B List
rules, which apply to all foreign lawyers. Thus, if one attributes
the successful and relatively quick negotiations to the fact that it
was a bilateral, rather than multilateral agreement, this frame-
work permits one to achieve a multilateral result through more
efficient bilateral negotiations.
A third advantage of this hybrid approach is that it works. A
review of the negotiation file reveals that the parties engaged in
vigorous face to face exchanges on all issues. This give and take
364. If one measured from the date of the Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, commonly known as the Treaty of Rome, then the Establishment
Directive has been almost 40 years in the making. See supra note 19.
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occurred both as to general principles, as well as to specific draft-
ing language. Consequently, by the time of the Agreement's ap-
proval, each side had fully aired its position, understood the con-
cessions given and benefits obtained, and was willing to live with
them.' Thus, to my surprise, 'issues that had been the subject of
heated debate in the negotiation stage appear to be "nonissues"
in the implementation stage. While all issues may not be com-
pletely resolved from an analytic perspective, the pragmatic and
flexible approach taken in the Agreement seems to work.
Moreover, to the extent that issues arise in the future, the
parties will address them at a time period in which they will
know even more about each other, will have built up a reservoir
of trust, and presumably will be in a better position to address
each others' concerns. In this respect, this hybrid model re-
minds me of Austria's approach to the issue of implementing the
CCBE Code of Conduct. Although the CCBE Code, by its terms,
requires the signatory parties to "implement" it into national
law, the Austrian approach was •to publish the CCBE Code next
to the Austrian regulations governing lawyers., One of the Aus-
trian representatives to the CCBE advised me that he thought
the better approach was to publicize the CCBE Code in Austria
so that lawyers became familiar with it, and worry about officially
adopting it later. 65 Walter Oberreit, for example; mentioned
that those. U.S. lawyers who had been in Brussels in the "old
days" when the Bar was hostile to U.S. lawyers felt somewhat ap-
prehensive about the Agreement because they believed that the
Brussels Bars might be tempted to abuse their discretion under
the Agreement. They have not seen, however, that the Bars take
pride in what they perceive as their progressive approach to-
wards foreign lawyers. If a track record of trust and cooperation
can be developed, these U.S. lawyers presumably will be more
understanding and trusting of the Brussels Bars if and when a
problem arises.
365. In this respect, this hybrid model reminds me of Austria's approach to the
issue of implementing the CCBE Code of Conduct. Although the CCBE Code, by its
terms, requires the signatory parties to "implement" it into national law, the Austrian
approach was to publish the CCBE Code next to the Austrian regulations governing
lawyers. One of th Austrian representatives to the CCBE advised me that he thought
the better approach was to publicize the CCBE Code in Austria so that lawyers became
familiar with it, and worry later about officially adopting it. See CCBE Code, Part II, supra
note 11, at 384-85.
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Another advantage of the hybrid model is that those who
were living the situation negotiated the provisions. Their real
world experiences made the Agreement more realistic and more
likely to be accepted. One might contrast this approach with the
approach reflected in the EU Commission's first draft of the Es-
tablishment Directive. This Draft, which rejected the approach
negotiated by the CCBE, contained several provisions with which
a majority of EU lawyers simply could not live. As a result, the
draft languished for several years before its revision and adop-
tion.
In short, the hybrid model illustrated by the Agreement ap-
pears to have many advantages and to be a model worth consid-
ering when faced with the issue of the appropriate regulation of
cross-border legal practice. This model, however, is not without
its weaknesses.
One of the weaknesses of this approach is that access to in-
formation may be limited during the negotiation period. While
the ABA/Brussels file certainly reflects many efforts on the part
of the ABA negotiators to keep the U.S. legal community in
Brussels apprised of developments, the file also reveals at least a
few attorneys who felt that decisions were being presented to
them without their input or approval. This criticism, however,
probably could be made of all the models because they all, in
one form or another, are negotiated through representatives.
Agreements negotiated under this hybrid model might also
be criticized because of the fact that they are negotiated by the
interested parties. Two diametrically opposed criticisms could
be made based on the identity of the negotiating parties. On the
one hand, one commentator suggested that in the GATS con-
text, the ABA negotiators did not represent themselves particu-
larly effectively. 66 On the other hand, one might have concerns
that the Agreement does not adequately protect clients' inter-
366. See CONE, supra note 1, at 2:3.
[T]he ABA... had functioned as both client and its own lawyer and, in its
dealings with the governmental trade negotiators, had not taken the rather
obvious step... of hiring trade lawyers on a professional basis to represent it
in the negotiations. One function of these lawyers would be to stay close to
the negotiations and to anticipate and avert surprises. Admittedly, hiring law-
yers costs money, but the handlers of ABA policy might have been thought
sympathetic to that feature of legal practice.
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ests, but protects the lawyers' interests instead. In other words,
the interested parties represented themselves too effectively,
rather than not effectively enough.3 6 7 For example, with respect
to the issue of whether U.S. lawyers would wait three years before
becoming partners with tableau lawyers, neither side seemed to
be discussing this issue from the perspective of the clients' inter-
ests, which presumably should be one of the leading justifica-
tions for regulation 6.36  A related problem is that if the negotia-
tions are handled by the parties who are directly and immedi-
ately involved, they may look at the issues from an immediate
gain perspective, rather than taking the larger and longer view.
For example, other EU countries are reportedly unhappy with
the Brussels Bars because they believe that they should not have
"agreed to disagree" on the issue of whether U.S. lawyers can
advise on EU law.369 They believe there is no room for reason-
able minds to disagree on this issue. A party to a hybrid model
Agreement might be willing to compromise in order to get an
agreement it desires, even if such compromise is inappropriate.
On the other hand, this weakness might be present with
other models as well. For example, some commentators have
suggested that the U.S. Government GATS negotiators improp-
erly "sold out" lawyers when they agreed, at the eleventh hour, to
a deal in which lawyers' interests were compromised for the sake
of agreement on something else. 7° What is worse was the sense
that lawyers were traded away for something insignificant.
Another criticism of the hybrid model is that the final prod-
uct may be limited by the number of perspectives heard in the
negotiations. If the process is relatively closed, this lack of input
may lead to weaknesses in the agreement. The "rank and file"
Belgians, for example, reportedly had little knowledge or input
into the final Agreement. While their viewpoints may have been
voiced by others, the actual voices of these lawyers might have
367. See generally Transnational Legal Practice, supra note 2, at 752.
368. The ABA representatives opposed the waiting period because it "would place
American law firms in Brussels at a competitive disadvantage with EC law firms, particu-
larly the Brussels offices of London solicitors." The Brussels representatives "replied
that the Brussels bar thinks it need the waiting periods to protect it against U.S. firms
which otherwise would attract the best talent at the Brussels bar .. " See Memorandum
from Sydney Cone, Attendee at August 8-9, 1993 Meeting, to ABA Negotiators (Aug. 23,
1993) (summarizing meeting).
369. See supra note 191.
370. See Dillon, Unfair Trade?, supra note 30.
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brought something new to the negotiations. Similarly, some
U.S. lawyers criticized the negotiations because they did not in-
clude the Belgian jurists, who would be affected by the Agree-
ment. While the ABA negotiators had reasonable explanations
about why the negotiations did not include the jurists, those indi-
viduals might have contributed a perspective, and a worthwhile
change in the Agreement. At a minimum, these jurists might
have had less of a tendency to feel disenfranchised if the negotia-
tions had included them.
Once again, however, one must query how much better the
other models are on this point. Even in government to govern-
ment negotiations, the number of voices heard and considered
may be in direct proportion to the efforts of the negotiators. For
example, although the U.S. Trade Representative certainly solic-
ited lawyer input on GATS, I have seen at least one letter asking
ABA representatives to comment on a draft position within one
week's time. Certainly the number of perspectives one can ob-
tain during that time period is limited. Moreover, I suspect that
if you ask the "rank and file" U.S. lawyer about GATS, and
whether their input was solicited, most do not even know that
GATS exists. Moreover, the agendas of the negotiators in a gov-
ernment to government model may not be the interests of the
client or another otherwise acceptable agenda. One can imag-
ine a goal of either "getting a deal, any deal" or "getting a deal
on widgets, which are viewed as more important than lawyers or
clients."
Another criticism of the Agreement's hybrid model might
be the imprecision of the terms. When one looks at the Agree-
ment, one certainly notes places where there is no Agreement or
the Agreement is imprecise. Because this is a bilateral agree-
ment, it is possible that the parties may be willing to tolerate
more ambiguity than they would with a multilateral agreement.
On the other hand, to the extent that ambiguity is a function of
compromise, it is possible that ambiguity is more likely to arise
in a multilateral agreement than in a bilateral agreement. For
example, the EU Establishment Directive permits a visiting law-
yer to appear in court in cooperation with a lawyer from the
Host State. The European Court of Justice ultimately declared
Germany and France's implementation of this provision uncon-
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stitutional. 37 1 The Agreement has a similar "cooperation" provi-
sion. This language, however, went through many drafts and re-
finements. To date, there have been no problems with the im-
plementation of this provision. Thus, it may be, that the greater
dialogue possible with a bilateral agreement will result in fewer
ambiguities than one otherwise would have.
On a related point, it may be that the hybrid model, such as
that reflected by the Agreement, is in effect simply an illusory
agreement. The ABA in fact gave very little, if anything, in re-
turn for the changes made by the Brussels Bars. Additionally, the
ABA's promise in the Agreement that "all" U.S. lawyers estab-
lished in Brussels register turned out to be an empty promise
because only fifty percent of U.S. lawyers registered.
On the one hand, although the hybrid model may be an
illusory contract, that does not make it worthless. The Brussels
Bars reportedly are content with the improvement in registra-
tion. Moreover, the Agreement serves as a framework for fur-
ther changes and additional registrations of other lawyers. Thus,
it may be that an "illusory" approach, which eases into things,
has distinct advantages. In some situations, however, this illusory
approach may not be desirable to all parties.
A final weakness of the hybrid approach may be that it is
more likely to yield piecemeal results, rather than an agreement
negotiated on a government to government basis as part of an
overall package. U.S. lawyers in Japan, for example, remain dis-
satisfied with the progress made in their negotiations with the
Japanese Bar. They undoubtedly welcome the leverage available
through government to government negotiations. In such a situ-
ation, the hybrid model would offer distinct weaknesses.
CONCLUSION
In sum, it appears that there certainly are situations in
which the hybrid model will be a desirable model to use to deter-
mine the appropriate provisions facilitating and governing cross-
border legal practice. While a significant body of literature
probably exists on negotiation theory which might support these
points, my own observations suggest that this hybrid model
would work well when several conditions are present:
371. See supra note 179.
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You can identify two sides, both of whom believe they
have something to gain from the negotiations;
There is fairly centralized power in the Host State so that
regulations can be adopted without much bureaucratic has-
sle;
The parties have, or are able through negotiations to, de-
velop a sense of trust between the parties. This trust may be
based on the prior relationship, the size of the group negoti-
ating and ability to get to know each other, and the parties'
interdependency, among other factors;
The private sector representatives take their obligations
to look out for the interests of clients seriously, and seem less
concerned about protecting lawyers' own interests;
The lawyers providing cross-border legal services are will-
ing to tolerate a certain amount of uncertainty and risk with
respect to ethics and disciplinary issues;
The parties are familiar with, or educable about, each
other's legal culture and expectations so that it is possible to
negotiate; and
The negotiators, particularly the private representatives,
consult their constituencies often enough so that the group
understands both sides, trusts the negotiators, and a certain
number are willing to comply with any resulting agreement.
In short, from my perspective, the Agreement is an example of
the advice Professor Richard Abel suggested. The last of his rec-
ommendations was that powerful jurisdictions with major com-
mercial or regulatory centers should use their leverage to negoti-
ate the lowering of foreign barriers while avoiding a "beggar
your neighbor" trade war.3 7 2 The Agreement may be a model
other jurisdictions want to consider, particularly because it may
lead to maintaining their "major role." Thus, Sydney Cone may
be correct when he observes that although the global approach
represented by a model Foreign Legal Consultant rule can set a
general tone to advancing the foreign legal consultant, cross-
border legal practice ultimately is regulated in discrete jurisdic-
tional pieces. "[T]here are no shortcuts to this process. The
necessary domestic and bilateral negotiations are often tedious
and rarely glamorous."3 73 The Agreement represents the culmi-
372. Transnational Legal Practice, supra note 2, at 763.
373. Sydney M. Cone, III, FLC's Face Licensing Hurdles in Host Countries, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 7, 1996, at C2.
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nation of such efforts and demonstrates the value of the hybrid
approach and the tedious and unglamorous negotiations re-
quired to reach such an agreement.
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APPENDIX A
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60611
Represented by: President
Hereinafter called: the "ABA"
AND THE FRENCH LAN- THE DUTCH LAN-
GUAGE GUAGE
ORDER OF THE BRUS- ORDER OF THE BRUS-
SELS BAR SELS BAR
With statutory seat at With statutory seat at
the the
Palais de Justice Gerechtsgebouw
Place Poelaert Poelaertplein
1000 BRUXELLES 1000 BRUSSEL
Represented by: Represented by:
Bftonnier Stafhouder
Hereinafter called the "Orders"
WHEREAS each Order regulates aspects of the professional
practice of its members who are full members (admitted to the
"tableau" - hereinafter "Tableau Lawyers") or are trainees (regis-
tered on the list of "stagiair[e] s" - hereinafter "Stagiairl[e]s");
WHEREAS the Orders have rules (hereinafter "Foreign Lawyer
List Rules") concerning the terms and conditions on which Tab-
leau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s may form Cooperations and Part-
nerships (as hereinafter defined) with other lawyers who are
members of foreign bars or of equivalent foreign professional
bodies of lawyers;
WHEREAS the Foreign Lawyer List Rules provide that foreign
lawyers who form certain cooperative arrangements with Tab-
leau Lawyers or Stagiair[e]s must register on one of the lists of
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foreign lawyers maintained by the Orders (hereinafter "Foreign
Lawyer Lists");
WHEREAS certain members of bars of the United States who are
not Tableau Lawyers or Stagiair[e]s (hereinafter "U.S. Lawyers")
are resident or regularly present in Brussels and maintain re-
spective establishments in Brussels from which they provide legal
services (hereinafter "Established U.S. Lawyers");
WHEREAS many U.S. Lawyers are partners in or otherwise asso-
ciated with law firms the majority of the partners in which are
U.S. Lawyers and which have establishments in Brussels from
which they provide legal services (hereinafter "Established U.S.
Law Firms");
WHEREAS some Established U.S. Lawyers are registered on the
Foreign Lawyer Lists but others are not, and the Orders wish to
encourage Established U.S. Lawyers not listed on a Foreign Law-
yer List to register on a second list that they intend to create and
maintain jointly for that purpose (hereinafter the 'Joint List");
WHEREAS Established U.S. Lawyers hold professional cards is-
sued by the Belgian Ministry of the Middle Classes or work per-
mits issued by the regional Ministries of Employment and Labor
unless exempted by applicable law;
WHEREAS members of the Orders and the ABA, as a practical
matter, enjoy generally comparable opportunities to provide
legal services in, respectively, the United States and Belgium, in
that the professional rules applicable in most major U.S. eco-
nomic centers of interest to tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s af-
ford Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s substantial opportunities
to provide legal services in those centers, and in that Belgian law
and the rules of the Orders afford U.S. Lawyers substantial op-
portunities to provide legal services in Brussels;
WHEREAS the Orders and the ABA wish to recognize this gen-
eral comparability of practical opportunities;
WHEREAS the Orders wish to improve the practice opportuni-
ties for Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s and to expand oppor-
tunities for U.S. Lawyers to register with the Orders;
WHEREAS the ABA wishes to maximize the opportunities for
U.S. Lawyers to practice law within their fields of competence in
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Brussels; to form cooperations, including but not limited to ar-
rangements involving association, cost-sharing, and mutual rec-
ommendation, but not including partnerships (hereinafter col-
lectively "Cooperations"), with Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair [e] s;
and to form partnerships with Tableau Lawyers (hereinafter
"Partnerships");
WHEREAS while the ABA does not have the authority to pre-
scribe the conduct of U.S. Lawyers, it can make recommenda-
tions to U.S. Lawyers, and many U.S. Lawyers are members of
the ABA and abide by the rules and recommendations of the
ABA;
WHEREAS it is in the best interests of U.S. Lawyers, Tableau
Lawyers, Stagiair[e]s' and their clients that the rules applicable
to U.S. Lawyers, to Cooperations between U.S. Lawyers and Tab-
leau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s, to Partnerships between U.S. Law-
yers and Tableau Lawyers, and to relationships between U.S.
Lawyers and Belgian citizens who are resident in Brussels and
hold Belgian law degrees but are not Tableau Lawyers or
Stagiair[e]s (hereinafter "Belgian Jurists") be clarified in accord-
ance with the principles recognized immediately above;
WHEREAS the ABA and the Orders have agreed to the arrange-
ments hereinafter set forth, to be brought into force as of Octo-
ber 1, 1994 (hereinafter the "Effective Date");
NOW THEREFORE THE ORDERS AND THE ABA AGREE AS
FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1 REGISTRATION
1. A U.S. Lawyer who becomes an Established U.S. Lawyer shall,
within six months thereafter, register with one of the Orders in'
accordance with this Article.
2. An Established U.S. Lawyer who has a Belgian law degree and
all other qualifications requisite for registration on the list of
Stagiair[e]s or the Tableau shall register as such with one of the
Orders and, upon such registration, shall not be deemed a U.S.
Lawyer within the meaning and for the purposes of this Agree-
ment.
3. Except as provided in paragraph 5 of Article 2 and in para-
graph 4 of Article 3, any U.S. lawyer who intends to form or par-
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ticipate in a Cooperation with one or more Tableau Lawyers or
Stagiair [e] s, or a Partnership with one or more Tableau Lawyers,
shall before doing so register on the Foreign Lawyer List of one
of the Orders. Any other U.S. Lawyer may also register on the
Foreign Lawyer List of one of the Orders.
4. All Established U.S. Lawyers who are not registered on the
Foreign Lawyers List of one of the Orders shall register on the
Joint List. Any U.S. Lawyer registered initially on the Joint List
who thereafter registers on a Foreign Lawyers List will be dere-
gistered from the Joint List.
ARTICLE 2 COOPERATIONS
1. U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists may form
Cooperations with Stagiair[e]s and/or Tableau Lawyers at any
time. Established U.S. Lawyer(s) participating in or associated
with any such Cooperation may share office premises with the
participating Tableau Lawyer(s) and/or Stagiair[e] (s) or, in the
case of a Cooperation that is limited to mutual recommenda-
tion, may maintain separate premises.
2. Where a U.S. Lawyer on a Foreign Lawyer List forms a Coop-
eration with a Stagiair[e], any Tableau Lawyer having the requi-
site seniority (currently five years on the tableau) may be the
patron of the Stagiair[e] whether or not the U.S. Lawyer has
formed a Partnership or Cooperation with the Tableau Lawyer.
3. Except as provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, U.S. Law-
yers not registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists shall not form
Cooperations with Stagiair[e]s or Tableau Lawyers. Subject to
the transitional provisions of Article 12, U.S. Lawyers shall not
form or maintain Cooperations with Belgian Jurists.
4. U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists or the
Joint List may form Cooperations with, or include in Coopera-
tions formed in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article,
members of the bars or equivalent professional bodies of third
countries, whether or not established in Brussels, subject to any
legal restrictions or conditions affecting the rights of such third-
country lawyers to establish themselves in Brussels indepen-
dently. The U.S. Lawyers participating in such Cooperations
shall encourage the participating third-county lawyers estab-
lished in Brussels to comply with the provisions of this Agree-
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ment in the same manner as if they were Established U.S. Law-
yers and, subject to their doing so, they shall be entitled to the
benefits of this Agreement to the same extent as U.S. Lawyers.
5. U.S. Lawyers who are not themselves Established U.S. Lawyers
but who belong to an Established U.S. Law Firm may participate
in any Cooperation formed in accordance with paragraph 1 of
this Article without being registered on a Foreign Lawyer List or
the Joint List, provided that (a) at least one U.S. Lawyer who is a
partner in that Established U.S. Law Firm is registered on a For-
eign Lawyer List and (b) any and all Established U.S. Lawyers
who belong to that Established U.S. Law Firm are registered on a
Foreign Lawyer List.
ARTICLE 3 PARTNERSHIPS
1. U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists may form
Partnerships with Tableau Lawyers at any time, provided that all
Established U.S. Lawyers who are partners in any such Partnership
are registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists and that either (a)
one of the U.S. Lawyers participating in such Partnership has
been so registered for at least one year or (b) all of the U.S.
Lawyers participating in such Partnership are members of an Es-
tablished U.S. Law Firm that has maintained an establishment in
Brussels for at least one year as of the Effective Date. Any Estab-
lished U.S. Lawyer(s) participating in or associated with any such
Partnership shall share office premises with the participating
Tableau Lawyer(s) and/or Stagiair[e] (s).
2. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Article, U.S. Law-
yers not registered on a foreign Lawyer List shall not form Part-
nerships with Stagiair[e]s or Tableau Lawyers. Subject to the
transitional provisions of Article 12, U.S. Lawyers shall not form
or maintain Partnerships with Stagiair[e]s or Belgian Jurists.
3. U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists or the
Joint List may form Partnerships with, or include in Partnerships
formed in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, members
of the bars or equivalent professional bodies of third countries,
whether or not resident or established in Brussels, subject to any
legal restrictions or conditions affecting the rights of such third-
country lawyers to establish themselves in Brussels indepen-
dently. The U.S. Lawyers participating in any such Partnership
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shall encourage the participating third-country lawyers estab-
lished in Brussels to comply with the provisions of this Agree-
ment in the same manner as if they were Established U.S. Law-
yers and, subject to their doing so, they shall be entitled to the
benefits of this Agreement to the same extent as U.S. Lawyers.
4. U.S. Lawyers who are not Established U.S. Lawyers but who
belong to an Established U.S. Law Firm may participate in any
Partnership formed in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle without being registered on a Foreign Lawyer List or the
Joint List, provided that (a) at least one U.S. Lawyers who is a
partner in that Established U.S. Law Firm is registered on a For-
eign Lawyer List and (b) any and all Established U.S. Lawyers
who belong to that Established U.S. Law Firm are registered on a
Foreign Lawyer List.
ARTICLE 4 PRACTICE
1. U.S. Lawyers registered on either of the Foreign Lawyers Lists
or the Joint List shall be free to render legal services in Brussels
and to provide advice and representation regarding all matters
as to which they are consulted, provided that they shall be pro-
hibited from rendering advice and representation as to matters
governed predominantly by the national laws of Belgium except
as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. A U.S. Lawyer registered on a Foreign Lawyer List may pro-
vide advice and representation concerning matters governed in
whole or in material part by Belgian law on the conditions that
(a) the U.S. Lawyer's advice as to any question of Belgian law is
based on the advice of and rendered in consultation with either
a Tableau Lawyer, a Stagiair[e] who has completed at least one
year of stage and has obtained the CAPA/BUBA of the appropri-
ate Order, or a similarly-qualified lawyer who is a member of an-
other bar in Belgium, and (b) such Tableau Lawyer, Stagiair[e]
or other lawyer is identified as the source of such advice,
whether by inclusion of his or her name on the stationery of the
U.S. Lawyer where permissible, through signature or co-signa-
ture of the relevant opinions, or otherwise.
3. A U.S. Lawyer registered on either a Foreign Lawyer List or
the Joint List may provide advice and representation concerning
matters involving ancillary issues of Belgian law, on the condi-
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tion that the U.S. Lawyer's advice as to any question of Belgian
law is based onthe advice of and rendered in consultation with
either a Tableau Lawyer, a Stagiair[e] who has completed at
least one year of stage and has obtained the CAPA/BUBA of.the
appropriate Order, or a similarly-qualified lawyer who is a mem-
ber of another bar in Belgium.
4. A U.S. Lawyer shall not have the right to appear as a lawyer
before any Belgian judicial or administrative tribunal except if
and to the extent permitted by the rules of such tribunal and
then only in a manner consistent with the limitations and condi-
tions applicable to such U.S. Lawyer in relation to advice on mat-
ters of Belgian law.
5. Without prejudice to the provisions of any eventual agree-
ments between the ABA and the Council of the Bars and Law
Societies of the European Community (CCBE), or between the
United States and the European Union, concerning the practice
of U.S. Lawyers within the European Union as a whole thing,
nothing in this Agreement shall be read as affecting in any way
the practice of European Union law as such by U.S. Lawyers in
Belgium. It is, however, understood that the registration of U.S.
Lawyers on either the Foreign Lawyer Lists or the Joint List shall
not be construed as conferring upon such U.S. Lawyers any right
to practice before Institutions of the European Union that they
would not enjoy in the absence of such registration.
ARTICLE 5 STATIONERY AND FIRM NAME
1. If one or more U.S. Lawyers form a Partnership with one or
more Tableau Lawyers, the stationery used by the Partnership
shall state the firm name of the Partnership, the identify of each
resident partner in the Brussels office of the Partnership and the
bar of which each such resident partner is a member. The sta-
tionery used by the Partnership may also state the identity of
other resident lawyers practicing in the Brussels office of the
Partnership who are not partners, including their bars and pro-
fessional titles of origin.
2. If one or more U.S. Lawyers form a Cooperation with one or
more Tableau Lawyers and/or Stagiair[e]s, the stationery used
by the U.S. Lawyer(s) shall state the law firm name if any, under
which the U.S. Lawyer(s) practice(s), the identity of each Estab-
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lished U.S. Lawyer who is a partner in that law firm and the bar
of which each such Established U.S. Lawyer is a member, to-
gether with the names of the Tableau Lawyers and/or
Stagiair[e] participating in the Cooperation, the bar of which
each of them is a member and an indication of the nature of the
Cooperation in a form consistent with the nomenclature and
presentation ordinarily approved by the Orders for use by Tab-
leau Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s in respect of similar Cooperations
among themselves. The stationery used by the U.S. Lawyers may
also state the identity of other resident lawyers in their Brussels
office, including their bars and professional titles of origin.
3. An Established U.S. Law Firm that has at least one partner,
whether or not a U.S. Lawyer, in its Brussels office may carry on
its practice in Brussels under the name that it uses in the United
States even if one or more of its partners, including some or all
of the partners in its Brussels office, are Tableau Lawyers.
ARTICLE 6 CONDUCT AND PRIVILEGES
1. A U.S. Lawyer registered on a Foreign Lawyer List shall con-
duct his or her practice within and relating to Belgium in ac-
cordance with the rules of ethics and practice of the Order with
which he or she is registered, provided that such rules shall be
applied in accordance with the principles set forth in the CCBE
Common Code of Conduct, mutatis mutandis and with the proce-
dures set forth in Article 7 for the resolution of conflicts with the
rules of any United States bar of which the U.S. Lawyer is a mem-
ber.
2. A U.S. Lawyer registered on the Joint List shall conduct his or
her practice within (both geographic and subject matter) or re-
lating primarily to Belgium in accordance with the rules of con-
duct and practice set forth or referred to in the CCBE Common
Code of Conduct except that, where such rules impose upon the
U.S. Lawyer any obligation which conflicts with any obligation
imposed upon him or her under the rules of any United States
bar of which he or she is a member, the U.S. Lawyer may comply
with the latter rules.
3. The Orders will protect and defend the professional privi-
leges, including both attorney-client privileges and attorney-at-
torney privileges, of U.S. Lawyers registered on their respective
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Foreign Lawyer Lists and, insofar as shall be permitted under
Applicable law, of U.S. Lawyers registered on the Joint List, in
the same manner as they defend the professional privileges of
their members.
4. To the extent permitted by Belgian law, and except as other-
wise expressly provided in this Agreement, U.S. Lawyers regis-
tered on the Foreign Lawyer List of either of the Orders shall
have the rights and privileges, and be subject to the obligations,
of Tableau Lawyers who are members of that Order.
5. As the independence of U.S. Lawyers is guaranteed by the
rules of professional conduct applicable to them as members of
bars of the United States, they shall not be precluded, by reason
of registration on a Foreign Lawyer List or otherwise, from hav-
ing the status of employee in a law firm or partnership.
ARTICLE 7 DISCIPLINE
1. U.S. Lawyers registered on the Foreign Lawyer List of each
Order shall be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Baton-
nier/Stafhouder and Council of the Order in the same manner
and to the same extent as members of the Order, subject to the
provisions of this Agreement. Whenever it is determined that a
U.S. Lawyer is in breach of any obligation imposed upon him or
her under the rules referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6 which
may be in irreconcilable conflict with an obligation imposed
upon him or her under the rules of any United States bar of
which he or she is a member, the Stafhouder/Batonnier or the
Council of the Order shall invite and consider the views of the
ABA or the relevant State Bar Association before imposing sanc-
tions for such breach.
2. If seized of a complaint in respect of the conduct of a U.S.
Lawyer registered on the Joint List, the Batonnier/Stafhouder or
Council of either Order may request the United States bar of which
the U.S. Lawyer is a member to take appropriate disciplinary action, and
the ABA shall, at the request of the Order concerned, render all
assistance which it is reasonably capable of providing in facilitat-
ing such a request and the response thereto. However, if the
Council of the Order concerned shall consider that the U.S.
Lawyer has engaged in conduct constituting a violation of the
rules applicable to him or her under paragraph 2 of Article 6,
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the Order concerned may suspend or deregister the U.S. Lawyer
from the Joint List provided that, where the United States bar to
which such a request has been addressed commences discipli-
nary proceedings against the U.S. Lawyer, the United States bar
concerned may request the Order concerned to suspend its con-
sideration of the matter until those proceedings have been com-
pleted.
3. Any problems arising in connection with disciplinary matters
relating to the conduct of lawyers registered in accordance with,
or participating in relationships referred to in, this Agreement
shall, upon the request of the ABA or either of the Orders, be
submitted to and, if possible, resolved by the Joint Supervisory
Committee established in accordance with paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 11. The role of the Joint Supervisory Committee shall be
strictly consultative, and it shall not be seized of or have deci-
sional responsibility in individual cases.
ARTICLE 8 ADMINISTRATION
1. Where one or more U.S. Lawyers form a Partnership with one
or more Tableau Lawyers, the Tableau Lawyer(s) shall submit to
his, her or their Order(s) for approval the agreement between
the U.S. Lawyer(s) and the Tableau Lawyer(s) concerning the
formation of such Partnership, and the U.S. Lawyers participat-
ing in the Partnership, if there are more than one, shall submit
to such Order(s) for information the partnership agreement
among themselves or, if no written agreement exists, a written
confirmation that such partnership agreement does not conflict
with any provisions of their agreement with the Tableau Law-
yer(s).
2. The requirements of the Orders concerning the accounts in
which clients' funds are kept (CARPA) shall apply only to U.S.
Lawyers on Foreign Lawyer Lists having Partnerships or Cooper-
ations with Tableau Lawyers or Stagiair[e]s and with respect to
transactions, disputes or other matters having a primary nexus
with Belgium.
3. A U.S. Lawyers registered on a Foreign Lawyer List shall com-
ply with the requirements established by the Orders and applica-
ble to all members of their respective Orders in respect of pro-
fessional liability insurance but may satisfy those requirements by
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providing appropriate written assurances that the U.S. Lawyer
has at least the level of coverage called for by such requirements.
ARTICLE 9 REGISTRATION FEES
1. The Orders may charge U.S. Lawyers registered on their For-
eign Lawyer Lists fees that are reasonable and comparable to
those charged by the Orders to Tableau Lawyers and Stagiair[e] s
of equivalent seniority.
2. The Orders may charge reasonably reduced fees to U.S. Law-
yers on the Joint List.
ARTICLE 10 NON-DISCRIMINATION
1. The rights of a U.S. Lawyer under this Agreement shall not be
abridged by reason of nationality, membership in a bar or legal
profession of any third country, or association with members of a
bar or legal profession of any third country.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall operate to limit the rights
and privileges to which a U.S. Lawyer may be entitled by reason
of nationality, professional qualification, or membership in a bar
or legal profession of any third country.
ARTICLE 11 IMPLEMENTATION
1. The Orders shall implement this Agreement by providing for
appropriate derogations from any of their respective rules and
requirements that would otherwise be applicable and shall use
their best efforts to persuade the relevant Belgian authorities to
conform existing and future professional cards of U.S. Lawyers
to the provisions of this Agreement.
2. While it is understood that the ABA has no authority to im-
pose the requirements of this agreement on U.S. lawyers, the
ABA undertakes strongly to urge U.S. Lawyers to comply with
the terms hereof.
3. There shall be a Joint Supervisory Committee, consisting of
representatives of the Orders and of the ABA, which shall moni-
tor the implementation and observance of this Agreement and
shall attempt to resolve any problems or issues arising in connec-
tion with its implementation. The Committee shall, in addition,
consider any adaptations or revisions of this Agreement that may
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be required by reason of any changes in applicable law or regula-
tions, intergovernmental agreements or other circumstances be-
yond the control of the Orders or the ABA. The Committee will
in any event review this Agreement in light of actual experience
after it has been in operation for three years.
ARTICLE 12 TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. The transitional provisions contained in this Article shall pre-
vail over any other provision of this Agreement with which they
are in conflict.
2. A U.S. Lawyer who maintained a Cooperation with a Belgian
Jurist on June 1, 1994, and who is registered on a Foreign Lawyer
list on the Effective Date or applies for such registration within
three months thereafter may (a) continue such Cooperation,
provided that such Belgian Jurist applies for registration on the
list of Stagiair[e]s or the Tableau of one of the Orders within
three months after the 'Effective Date and is eligible for such re-
gistration under the standards ordinarily applied by the Orders
and (b) form a Partnership with such (former) Belgian Jurist at
any time after that Cooperation shall have continued for at least
three years, including any part of such period that shall predate
the Effective Date, even if the (former) Belgian Jurist is still a
Stagiair[e] at the time the Partnership is formed.
3. A U.S. Lawyer who maintained a Partnership with a Belgian
Jurist onJune 1, 1994, and who is registered on a Foreign Lawyer
List on the Effective Date or applies for such registration within
three months thereafter may continue such Partnership, pro-
vided that such Belgian Jurist applies for registration on the list
of Stagiair[e] s or the Tableau of one of the Orders within three
months after the Effective Date and is eligible for such registra-
tion 'under the standards ordinarily applied by the Orders.
4. A Belgian Jurist who is also a member of a bar in the United
States, who has been resident outside Belgium at all time since
the Effective Date and who, within three months after resuming
residence in Belgium, applies for registration on the list of
Stagiair[e]s or the Tableau of one of the Orders and is eligible
for such registration under the standards ordinarily applied by
the Orders, shall be permitted to continue any Cooperation or
Partnership in which he or she has been engaged with U.S. Law-
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yers while resident outside Belgium and, provided that any such
Cooperation shall have continued for at least three years in the
case of a Stagiair[e], to enter into Partnership with such U.S.
Lawyers.
5. U.S. Lawyers who are not Established U.S. Lawyers but who
belong to an Established U.S. Law Firm may participate in any
Cooperation or Partnership formed' or maintained in accord-
ance with any of paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Article without
being registered on a Foreign Lawyer List or the joint List, pro-
vided that (a) at least one U.S. Lawyer who is a partner in that
Established U.S. Law Firm is registered on a Foreign Lawyer List
on the Effective Date or applies for such registration within
three months thereafter and (b) any and all Established U.S.
Lawyers who belong to that U.S. Law Firm are registered on a
Foreign Lawyer List on the Effective Date or apply within three
months thereafter for registration on a Foreign Lawyer List.
6. A Belgian Jurist who maintains a Cooperation or Partnership
with one or more U.S. Lawyers under the conditions set forth in
any of paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Article and who applies for
registration on the list of Stagiair[e]s or the Tableau within
three months after the Effective Date and is eligible for such re-
gistration under the standards ordinarily applied by the Orders
shall not be prohibited, prevented or dissuaded by the Orders
from continuing such Partnership or Cooperation except on
grounds, apart from the prospective status of the Belgian Jurist
as a newly-registered Stagiair(e), that would justify a prohibition
of such Partnership or Cooperation under the rules of ethics
and practice of the Order with which he or she is registered,
applied in a manner consistent with the provisions, purposes
and intents of this Agreement.
7. All provisions of this Agreement relating to Partnerships be-
tween U.S. Lawyers and Tableau Lawyers shall apply with equal
force to Partnerships between U.S. Lawyers and Stagiair[e]s that
are permitted under the provisions of this Article. A U.S. Lawyer
who participates in a Cooperation or Partnership with a
Stagiair[e] pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be enti-
fled to rely upon the advice of such Stagiair[e] for purposes of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 without regard to the require-
ment set forth in each of those paragraphs that such Stagiair[e]
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have completed at least one year of stage and obtained the
CAPA/BUBA of the appropriate Order, provided that such
Stagiair[e] shall have participated in such Cooperation or Part-
nership, or Cooperation followed by Partnership, for at least one
year at the time such advice is given.
8. The Orders shall be free to make such changes to the Foreign
Lawyer List Rules as may appear appropriate from time to time,
provided that no such change shall apply to U.S. Lawyers regis-
tered on the Foreign Lawyer Lists, regardless of when they shall
have registered, if the consequence of such change would be to
restrict or limit the rights and privileges of U.S. Lawyers either
under this Agreement or under the Foreign Lawyer List Rules in
effect on June 1, 1994.
ARTICLE 13 RECIPROCITY
1. It is a premise of this Agreement that members of the Orders
will continue to have a reasonable and practical opportunity,
either as legal consultants or as full members of the State bars in
the United States, to carry on the practice of law in those States
which currently permit such practice and that existing rules per-
mitting such practice will not be made more restrictive. The
ABA undertakes to use its best efforts to the end that this prem-
ise will remain valid and to encourage the adoption of rules con-
forming to the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Con-
sultants by States not presently having such rules.
2. At the time of the three-year review provided for in Article 11,
the Orders, after consultation with the Joint Review Committee
established under that Article, shall be free to consider the im-
position of reasonable and proportional restrictions on the prac-
tice in Brussels of U.S. Lawyers who are not members of the bars
of States which have adopted rules conforming substantially to
the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants,
without prejudice to the rights and freedoms of U.S. Lawyers
and their law firms then established in Brussels.
ARTICLE 14 FINAL PROVISIONS
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the Effective Date
and thereafter shall continue in force indefinitely unless and un-
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til terminated by the Orders of the ABA upon one (1) year's
written notice.
2. As a transitional matter, the provisions of this Agreement re-
lating to the Joint List shall be inoperative until the regulations
and procedures for the Joint List shall have been adopted by the
Orders, and any and all obligations of U.S. Lawyers relating to
registration on the Joint List shall be suspended until that time.
3. This Agreement has been concluded in English, French and
Dutch language versions. Each version is equally authentic.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF each party has caused this Agreement
to be signed on its behalf by its duly authorized signatory this 6th
day of August, 1994 at New Orleans, Louisiana. in the United
States of America.
For the American Bar Association
For the French Language For the Dutch Language
Order of the Brussels Bar Order of the Brussels Bar
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APPENDIX B
STANDARD APPLICATION FORM FOR REGISTRATION ON
THE LIST OF MEMBERS OF FOREIGN BARS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BRUSSELS BAR
To: Monsieur le B~tonnier de L'Ordre Francais des Avocats
du Barreau de Bruxelles
Palais de Justice
1000 Bruxelles
Monsieur le Batonnier,
I have the honour to herby submit to the Order an application
for registration on the List of Members of Foreign Bars estab-
lished in Brussels.
I enclose the following documents:
1. the original certificate delivered by my Home Bar/Law Soci-
ety certifying: (i) that I am duly registered with such Bar/Law
Society, (ii) the date of my first registration, (iii) that I have
not incurred any disciplinary sanction, and (iv) that I have
complied with probationary training period imposed by my
Home Bar/Law Society;
2. a photocopy of my identity card or of an extract of my pass-
port issued in my home country;
3. a photocopy of my professional card or of my work permit;
4. a photocopy of my registration with the Belgian municipality
where I reside or, alternatively, the indication of the measures
taken to ensure an effective running of my Brussels office;
5. a draft specimen of the stationery that I intend to use in
Belgium, mentioning the address of my future office in Brus-
sels and my professional title and my Bar/Law Society;
6. a draft specimen of the stationery that I intend to use outside
Belgium;
7. a certificate of good standing issued by the competent author-
ity of my home country;
Furthermore, I undertake:
1. to submit my professional activity in Belgium to the discipli-
nary jurisdiction and to the regulations and decisions of the
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Brussels Bar, without prejudice to any derogatory proceed-
ings and rules which would be provided by an agreement be-
tween the Brussels Bar and my Home Bar;
2. not to practice Belgian law, except under the following condi-
tions, without prejudice to the more detailed provisions of an
agreement with my Home Bar:
a) except for matters involving ancillary issues of Belgian
law, I will base advice as to any question of Belgian law on
the advice of and render such advice in consultation with
a member of the Bar or a stagiaire who has completed at
least one year of stage and has passed the professional ex-
ams of the Bar, or a similarly qualified lawyer who is a
member of another bar in Belgium;
b) I will in all cases identify the source of such advice,
whether by inclusion of such lawyer's name on the station-
ary used by me, or through signature or co-signature of
the relevant opinions;
1. to conform to all provisions of any agreement concluded with
my Home Bar;
2. to pay the registration fees fixed in accordance with Art. 443,
para. 1 of the Belgian Judicial Code or by Art. 10 of the new
Brussels Bar regulations;
3. to abide by the various provisions of the new Brussels Bar reg-
ulations relating to the handling of clients; funds, without
prejudice to the provisions of any agreement concluded with
my Home Bar.
I furthermore confirm, upon verification with my insurance
company, that the activities carried out from my Brussels office
shall be adequately covered by a profession liability insurance
(minimum 15,000,000 BEF per occurrence).
I remain fully at your disposal for any further information you
might require.
Yours respectfully,
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